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Standard Provisions 
The following Standard Provisions are part of Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Form GMMS 1012). 
PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT 
The purpose of this Agreement is to promote a 
relationship between Division and its Dealers which 
encourages and facilitates cooperation and mutual effort 
to satisfy customers, and permits Division and its dealers 
to fully realize their opportunities for business success 
Division has established a network of authorized dealers 
operating at approved locations to effectively sell ind 
service its Products and to build and maintain consumer 
confidence and satisfaction in Dealer and Division Con-
sequently, Division relies upon each Dealer to provide 
appropriate skill, capital, equipment, staff and facilities 
to properly sell, service, protect the reputation, and sat-
isfy the customers of Division's Products in a manner that 
demonstrates a caring attitude toward those customers 
At the same time, Dealer relies upon Division to provide 
sales and service support and to continually strive to 
enhance the quality and competitiveness of its Products 
This mutual dependence requires a spirit of coopera-
tion, trust and confidence betweea Division and its 
dealers To facilitate attainment of cooperation, trust and 
confidence, and to provide Division with the benefit of 
dealer advice regarding many decisions which affect 
dealer business operations, Division has established 
mechanisms to obtain dealer input in the decision-
naking process These mechanisms are descnbed in 
Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. 
This Agreement (1) authorizes Dealer to sell and 
service Division's Products and represent itself as a 
Division Dealer; (n) states the terms under which Dealer 
and Division agree to do business together, (lii) states the 
responsibilities of Dealer and Division to each other and 
to customers, and (IV) reflects the mutual dependence of 
the parties in achieving their business objectives " 
ARTICLE 1. APPOINTMENT \ s \L THORIZED DEALER 
Division appoints Dealer as a non-exclusive dealer of 
Division Products Dealer has the right to buy Products 
and the obligation to market and service those Products in 
accordance with this Agreement and related documents 
ARTICLE J. hi VI I K OPERATOR 
This is a Personal Services Agreement, entered into in 
reliance on the qualifications of Dealer Operator identi-
fied in Paragraph Third, and on Dealer's assurance that 
Dealer Operator will provide personal services by 
exercising full managerial authority over Dealership 
Operations Dealer Operator will have an unencumbered 
ownershigjnterest in Dealer of at least 15 percent atall 
times A Dealer Operator must be a competent business 
Article! Dealer Operator 
01S 
pi fly 
pefSori,' an effective manager, must have demonstrated a 
paring attitude toward customersL and should have a 
Successful „ record ^as a merchandiser of automotive 
nctond services or otherwise have demonstrated 
the ability to manage a dealership. The experience 
necessary may vary with the potential represented by 
each dealer location. 
ARTICLE 3. DEALER OWNER 
Division enters into this Agreement in reliance on the 
qualifications of dealer owner(s) identified in the Dealer 
Statement of Ownership. Division and Dealer agree each 
dealer owner will continue to own, both of record 
and beneficially, the percentage stated in the Dealer 
Statement of Ownership, unless a change is made in 
accordance with Article 12. 
ARTICLE 4. AUTHORIZED LOCATIONS 
4 J Dealer Network Planning 
Because Division distributes its Products through a 
^ A o f authorized dealers operating from approved 
tocationsf those dealers must be appropriate in number, 
located properly, and have proper facilities to represent 
and service Division's Products competitively and to 
^permit each dealer the opportunity to achieve a reason-
able return on investment if it fulfills its obligations 
fiiffif fo Deafer Agreement, Through such a dealer 
network, the Division can maximize the convenience of 
Customers in purchasing Products and having them 
Serviced. As a result, customers, dealers, and the 
^Division all benefit. 
To*maximize the effectiveness of its dealer network, 
Division agrees to monitor marketing conditions and 
Strive, to the extent practicable, to have dealers appropri-
ate in number, size and location to achieve the objectives 
itated above. Such marketing conditions include Divi-
sion's sales and registration performance, present and 
future demographic and economic considerations, com-
petitive dealer networks, the ability of Division's exist-
ing dealers to achieve the objectives stated above, the 
opportunities available to existing dealers, and other 
appropriate circumstances. 
4.2 Area of Primary Responsibility 
Dealer is responsible for effectively selling, servicing 
and otherwise representing Division's Products in the 
Area designated in a Notice of Area of Primary 
Responsibility. Division retains the right to revise 
Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility at Division's 
sole discretion consistent with dealer network planning 
objectives. If Division determines that marketing condi-
tions warrant a change in Dealer's Area of Primary 
Responsibility, it will advise Dealer in writing of the 
proposed change, the reasons for it, and will consider any 
information the Dealer submits. Dealer must submit such 
information in wnting within 30 days of receipt of notice 
of the proposed change If Division thereafter decides 
the change is warranted, it will issue a revised Notice of 
Area of Primary Responsibility. 
(/4.3 ] Establishment of Additional Dealers 
division reserves the right to appoint additional 
dealers but Division will not exercise this right without 
first analyzing dealer network planning considerations 
Prior to establishing an additional dealer within 
Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility, Division will 
advise D in writing and gi dealer thirty days to 
present relevant information before Division makes a 
final decision. Division will advise Dealer of the final 
decision, which will be made solely by Division pursuant^ 
to its business judgment^othing in this Agreement is 
intended to require Dealer's consent to the establishment 
of an additional dealer. 
^ Neither the appointment of a dealer at or within three 
miles of a former dealership location as a replacement for 
the former dealer nor the relocation of an existing dealer 
will be considered the establishment of an additional 
Dealer for purposes of this Article 4.3. Such events are 
within the sole discretion of Division, pursuant to its 
business judgment. 
4 4 Facilities 
4 4 1 I ocation 
Dealer agrees to conduct Dealership Operations only 
from the approved location(s) within its Area of Primary 
Responsibility. The Location and Premises Addendum 
identifies Dealer's approved location(s) and facilities 
("Premises"). If more than one location is approved, 
Dealer agrees to conduct from each location only those 
Dealership Operations authonzed in the Addendum for 
such location 
4 4 2 Change in I turn 
Premises 
If Dealer wants to make any change in location(s) or 
Premises, or in the uses previously approved for those 
Premises, Dealer will give Division written notice of the 
proposed rhinge together with the reasons for the 
proposal, for Division's evaluation and final decision in 
light of dealer network planning considerations. No 
change m location or in the use of Premises, including 
addition of an\ other vehicle lines, will be made without 
Division^ prior written authorization. 
Before Division requires any changes in Premises, it 
will consult with Dealer, indicate the rationale for the 
change, and solid' tier's views on th^" Ap§slL If^ 
after such review with Dealer, Division Uwwermines a 
change in Premises or location is appropriate, the Dealer 
will be allowed a reasonable time to implement the 
change. Any such changes will be reflected in a new. 
Location and Premises Addendum or other-Written^ 
agreement executed by Dealer and Division. ' %* 
KJL. Nothing herein is intended to require the consent or 
approval of any dealer to a proposed relocation of any * 
other dealer. 
4.4.3 Size 
Dealer agrees to provide Premises at its approved 
location(s) that will promote the effective performance 
and conduct of Dealership Operations/and thexDivk; 
sion's image and goodwill. Consistent with Division's 
dealer network planning objectives and Division's inter-
est m maintaining the stability and viability of its 
dealers, Dealer agrees that its facilities will be sized in 
accordance with Division's requirements for "that* 
location. 
Division agrees to establish and maintain a^  clearly 
stated policy for determining reasonable dealer facility 
space requirements and to periodically re-evaluate those -
requirements to ensure that they continue- to be 
reasonable 
4.4.4 Dealership Image and Design 
The appearance of Dealer's Premises is important to 
the image of Dealer and Division, and can affect the way 
customers perceive Division's Products and its dealers 
generally. Dealer therefore agrees that its Premises will 
be properly equipped and maintained/ and that the 
interior and exterior retail environment and signs will 
compl> with any reasonable requirements Division may 
establish to promote and preserve the image of Division 
and its dealers. 
Division will monitor developments in automotive and; 
3 Article 4. Authorized Locations 
mi 
other retailing to ensure that Division's image and 
facility requirements are responsive to changes in the 
marketing environment. 
Division will take into account existing economic and 
marketing conditions, and consult with dealers as 
descnbed in Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agree -
ment, in establishing such requirements 
44.5 Dealership Equipment 
Effective performance of Dealer's responsibilities 
under this Agreement requires that the dealership be 
reasonably equipped to communicate with customers 
and the Division and to properly diagnose and service 
Products. Accordingly, Dealer agrees to provide for use 
in the Dealership Operations any equipment reasonably 
designated by Division as necessary to Dealer's effective 
performance under this Agreement Division will make 
such designations only after having consulted with 
dealers as described in Division's Dealer Sales and 
Service Agreement 
ARTICLE 5. DEALER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROMOTE, SELL, 
AND SERVICE PRODUCTS 
5.1 Responsibility to Promote and Sell 
5.1.1 Dealer agrees to effectively, ethicall/ 
and lawfully sell and promote the purchase, lease and use 
of Products by consumers located in its Area of Primary 
Responsibility. To achieve this objective, Dealer agrees 
to: 
(a) maintain an adequate torce of trained sales 
personnel; 
(b)
 t explain to Product purchasers the items 
which make up the purchase price and provide 
purchasers with itemized invoices; 
(c) not charge customers for services for which 
Dealer is reimbursed by General Motors; 
(d) include in customer orders only equipment 
or accessories requested by customer or required by 
law; and 
(e) ensure that the customer's purchase and 
delivery experience are satisfactory. 
aler modifies or sells a modified new Motor 
Vehicle, or installs any equipment, accessory or part not 
supplied by General Motors, or sells any non-General 
Motors service contract for a Motor Vehicle, Dealer will 
disclose this fact on the purchase order and bill of sale, 
indicating that the modification, equipment, accessory 
or part is not warranted by General Motors or, in the case 
-^of a service contract, the coverage is not provided by 
/ General Motors or an affiliate. 
© Dealer is authorized to sell new Motor 
Vehicles only to customers located in the United States 
Dealer agrees that it will not sell new Motor Vehncles for 
resale"or|principal use outside the United States Dealer 
also agrees not to sell any new Motor Vehicles which 
were not originally manufactured for sale and distnbu-
tion in the United States 
5.1.3 Division will conduct general adver-
tising programs to promote the sale ot Products for the 
mutual benefit of Division and Dealers Division will 
make available to Dealer advertising and sales promotion 
materials from time to time and advise Dealer of any 
applicable charges 
/fs.2j Responsibility to Service 
5.2.1 Dealer agrees to maximize customer 
satisfaction byjiroviding courteous, convenient, prompt 
efficient and quality service to owners of Motor Vehi-
cles, regardless of from whom the vehicles were 
purchased. service will bt rformed and ad-
ministered in a professional manner and in accordance 
with all applicable laws and regulations, and this 
Agreement, including the Service Policies and Pro-
cedures Manual, as amended from time to time. 
5.2.2 Dealer agrees to maintain an adequate 
service and parts organization as recommended by 
Division, including a competent, trained service and 
parts manager(s), trained service and parts personnel 
and, where service volume or other conditions make it 
advisable, a consumer relations manager. 
5.2.3 Dealer and Division will each provide 
the other with such information and assistance as may 
reasonably be requested by the other to facilitate compli-
ance with applicable laws, regulations, investigations 
and orders relating to Products. 
5.2.4 To build and maintain consumer confi-
dence in, and satisfaction with, Dealer and Division, 
Dealer will comply with Divisional procedures for the in-
vestigation and resolution of Product-related complaints. 
5,2.5 Di >n will make availal Dealer 
current service and parts manuals, bulletins, and techni-
cal data publications relating to Motor Vehicles. 
5.3 Customer Satisfaction 
Dealer and Division recognize that appropriate care. 
for the customer will promote customer satisfaction with 
Division's Products and its dealers, which is critically 
important to our current and future business success. 
Dealer therefore agrees to conduct its operations in^a 
manner which will promote customer satisfaction with 
the purchase and ownership experience. Division agrees 
to provide Dealer with reasonable support to assist 
Dealer's attainment of customer satisfaction. At its 
discretion, Division will monitor the satisfaction of-
Dealer's customers, and report the results to Dealer Any 
written response from Dealer concerning a customer 
satisfaction report issued to Dealer will become a part of 
the report. 
5.4 Business Planning 
To enable Dealer to most effectively meet its obliga-
tions under this Agreement, and to enable Division to 
effectively support Dealer's efforts, Dealer agrees to 
develop and implement a Business Plan if such is 
required by Division. 
ARTICLE 6. SALE OF PRODUCTS TO DEALERS 
( ^ J / Sale of Motor Vehicles to Dealer 
Division will periodically furnish Dealer one or more 
Motor Vehicle Addenda specifying the current model 
types or series of new Motor Vehicles which Dealer may 
order under this Agreement. Division may change a 
Motor Vehicle Addendum by furnishing a superseding 
one, or may cancel an Addendum at any time. 
Division will endeavor to distribute new Motor 
Vehicles among its dealers in a fair and equitable 
ponent availability and production capacity, sales 
potential in Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility, 
varying consumer demand, weather and transportation 
conditions, governmental regulations, and other condi- JJ 
tions beyond the control of General Motors. Division ~ 
reserves to itself discretion in accepting orders and 
distributing Motor Vehicles, and its judgments and 
decisions are final. Upon written request, Division will 
advise Dealer of the total number of new Motor Vehicles, \ 
manner. Many factors affect the availability and dis- by series, sold to Dealers in Dealer's Zone of Branchy 
tribution of Motor Vehicles to dealers, including com- during the preceding month. 
Article 6. Sale of Products to Dealers 
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6.2 Sale of Parts and Accessories to Dealer 
New, reconditioned or remanufactured automotive 
parts and accessories marketed by General Motors and 
listed, in current Dealer Parts and Accessories Price 
Schedules or supplements furnished to Dealer are called 
Parts and Accessories. 
Orders for Parts and Accessories will be submitted 
and processed according to written procedures estab-
lished by General Motors or other designated suppliers. 
6.3 Prices and Other Terms of Sale 
6.3.1 Motor Vehicles 
Prices, destination charges, and other terms of sale 
applicable to purchases of new Motor Vehicles will be 
those established according to Vehicle Terms of Sale 
Bulletins furnished periodically to Dealer. 
Prices, destination charges, and other terms of sale 
applicable to any Motor Vehicle may be changed at any 
time. Except as otherwise provided in writing, changes 
apply to Motor Vehicles not shipped to Dealer at the time 
the changes are made effective. 
/'T'Dealer will receive written notice of any price increase 
before any Motor Vehicle to which such increase applies 
is shipped, except for initial prices for a new model year 
\ or for any new model or body type. Dealer has the right to 
' cancel or modify the affected orders by delivering 
* written notice to Division within 10 days after its receipt 
\^of the price increase notice. 
6.3.2 Parts and Accessories 
Prices and other terms of sale applicable to Parts and 
Accessories are established by General Motors accord-
ing to the Parts and Accessories Terms of Sale Bulletin 
furnished to Dealer. 
Prices and other terms of sale applicable to Parts and 
Accessories may be changed by General Motors at any 
time. Such changes apply to Parts and Accessories not 
shipped to Dealer at the time changes become effective 
6.4 Inventory 
6.4.1 Motor Vehicle Inventory 
Dealer recognizes that customers expect Dealer 
to have a reasonable quantity and variety of current 
model Motor Vehicles in inventory^Tlccordingly, Dealer 
agrees to order and stock and Division agrees to mnkft 
available, subject to Article 6 1, a mix of models and 
series of Motor Vehicles identified in the Motor Vehicle 
Addendum in quantities adequate to enable Dealer 
to fulfill its obligations in its Area of Primary 
Responsibility, 
6.4.2 Parts and Accessories 
Dealer agrees to stock sufficient Parts and Accessories 
made available by General Motors to perform warranty 
repairs and policy adjustments and meet customer 
demand. 
6.5 Warranties on Products 
General Motors warrants new Motor Vehicles and 
Parts and Accessories (Products) as explained in docu-
ments provided with the Products or in the Service 
Policies and Procedures Manual 
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, 
THE WRITTEN GENERAL MOTORS WARRAN-
TIES ARE THE ONLY WARRANTIES APPLICA-
BLE TO PRODUCTS. WITH RESPECT TO DEALr 
ERS, SUCH WARRANTIES ARE IN LIEU OF ALL 
OTHER WARRANTIES OR LIABILITIES, EX-
PRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FIT-' 
NESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR ANY 
LIABILITY FOR COMMERCIAL LOSSES BASED 
UPON NEGLIGENCE OR MANUFACTURER'S 
STRICT LIABILITY EXCEPT AS MAY BE PRO^ 
VIDED UNDER AN ESTABLISHED GENERAL 
MOTORS PROGRAM OR PROCEDURE. GENERAL 
MOTORS NEITHER ASSUMES NOR AUTHORIZES 
ANYONE TO ASSUME FOR IT ANY OTHER 
OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY IN CONNECTION 
WITH PRODUCTS, AND GENERAL MOTORS 
MAXIMUM LIABILITY IS TO REPAIR OR RE-
PLACE THE PRODUCT 
ART LE 7. SERVICE OF PRODT ~TS 
7.1 Service for Which Division Pays 
7.1.1 New Motor Vehicle Pre-Delivery 
Inspections and Adjustments 
Because new vehicle delivery condition is critical to 
customer satisfaction, Dealer agrees to perform speci-
fied pre-delivery inspections and adjustments on each 
new Motor Vehicle and verify completion according to 
procedures identified in the Service Policies and Pro-
cedures Manual. 
7.L2 Warranty and Special 
Policy Repairs 
Dealer agrees to perform (i) required warranty repairs 
on each qualified Motor Vehicle at the time of pre-
delivery service and when requested by owner, and (ii) 
special policy repairs approved by Division. When the 
vehicle is returned to the owner, Dealer will provide 
owner a copy and explanation of the repair document 
reflecting all services performed. 
<f7l3) 7.1.  J Campaign Inspections 
and Corrections 
Division will notify Dealer of suspected unsatisfac-
tory conditions on Products and issue campaign instruc-
tions. Dealer agrees to inspect and correct suspected 
unsatisfactory conditions on Products in accordance with 
the instruction^Dealer will also determine that cam-
paign inspections and corrections have been made on 
new and used Motor Vehicles in its inventory prior to 
sale, and follow up on Products on which campaigns are 
outstanding. 
Division may ship, and Dealer agrees to accept, 
unordered parts and materials required for campaigns 
Upon campaign completion, Dealer will receive credit 
for excess parts and materials so shipped if they 
are returned or disposed of according to Division's 
instructions. 
7.1 A Payment for Pre-Delivery 
Adjustments, Warranty^ 
Campaign and Transportation 
Damage Work 
For Dealer's performance of services, pre-delivery 
inspections and adjustments, warranty repairs, special 
policy repairs, campaign inspections and corrections, 
and transportation damage repairs, Division will pro-
vide or pay Dealer for the Parts and other materials 
required and will pay Dealer a reasonable amount for 
labor. Payment will be made according to policies in the 
Service Policies and Procedures Manual. Dealer will not 
impose any charge for such service on owners or usgrs 
except where a deductible or pro-rata charge applies. 
w j ) Parts, Accessories, and Body Repairs^ 
721 Warranty and Policy Repairs 
Dealer agrees to use only genuine GM or General 
Motors approved Parts and Accessories in performing 
warranty repairs, special policy repairs, and any other 
repairs paid for by Division, in accordance with the 
applicable provisions of the Service Policies and fro-* 
cedures Manual. 
\7.2.2) Representations and Disclosures 
as to Parts and Accessories 
In servicing vehicles marketed by General Motors, 
Dealer agrees to disclose the use of non-General Motors 
parts and accessories as set forth in Article 5.1.1.' 
(Y2 3y Body Repairs 
Dealer agrees to provide quality body repair service 
for Motor Vehicles. Dealer can provide this service 
through its own body shop, or by arrangement with an 
alternate repair establishment. 
Article 7. Service of Products 
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72A „ Tools and Equipment 
Dealer agrees to provide essential service tools as 
required by Division and other tools and equipment as 
necessary to fulfill its responsibilities to properly 
diagnose and service Products. 
ARTICLE 8. TRAINING 
Properly trained personnel are essential to the success 
of Dealer and Division, and to providing customers with 
a satisfactory sales and service experience. Division 
agrees to make available or recommend to Dealer 
product, sales, service and parts, accounting and busi-
ness management training courses for Dealer personnel. 
Division will make such training available as conve-
niently in time and location as practical circumstances 
permit. Division will assist Dealer in determining 
training requirements and periodically will require that 
Dealer have personnel attend specific courses. Dealer 
agrees to comply witji any such reasonable training 
requirements and pay any specified training charges. 
Division will consult with dealers as descnbed in 
Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement prior to 
determining the training courses or programs from 
which an individual Dealer's requirements under this 
Article may be established. Specific minimum service 
training requirements will be descnbed in Division's 
Service Policies and Procedures Manual. 
Division will make available personnel to advise and 
counsel Dealer personnel on sales, service, parts and 
accessories, and related subjects. 
ARTICLE 9.)REVIEW OF DEALER'S SALES AND 
SERVICE PERFORMANCE 
5 p Dealer's performance of its obligations is essential 
to the effective representation of Division's Products, 
and to the reputation and goodwill of Dealer, Division, 
and other Division dealers. Periodically, Division 
will review various aspects of Dealer's sales and service 
performance. Division and Dealer will use the review 
process to identify areas in which improvements or 
changes are necessary so that Dealer can take prompt 
action to achieve acceptable performance. 
ARTICLE 10. CAPITALIZATION 
The Capital Standard Addendum reflects the mini-
mum net working capital necessary for Dealer to conduct 
Dealership Operations. Dealer agrees to maintain at 
least this level of net working capital. Division will issue 
a new Addendum if changes in operating conditions or 
Divisional guidelines indicate capital needs have 
changed materially. 
To avoid damage to goodwill which could result if 
Dealer is financially unable to fulfill its commitments^ 
Dealer agrees to have and maintain a separate line of 
7*1 
credit from a financial institution available to finance its 
purchase of new vehicles. The amount of the line of 
. m 
credit will be sufficient for Dealer to meet its obligation^ 
under Article 6.4. 
ARTI .E 11. ACCOUNTS AND RI ORDS 
HI Uniform Accounting System 
A uniform accounting system facilitates an evaluation 
of Dealer business management practices and the impact 
of Division's policies and practices. Division therefore 
agrees to maintain, and Dealer agrees to use and 
maintain records in accordance with, a uniform account-
ing system set forth in an accounting manual furnished to 
Dealer. 
Dealer also agrees to timely submit true and accurate 
applications or claims for payments, discounts or 
allowances; true and correct orders for Products and 
reports of sale and delivery; and any other reports or 
* • • -
statements required by Division, in the manner specified 
by Division, and to retain such records for at least two 
years. 
The parties recognize that customers and authorized 
dealers, as well as shareholders and employes of General 
Motors, have a vital interest in the continued success and 
efficient operation of Division's dealer network. Accor-
dingly, Division has the responsibility of continuing to 
administer the network to ensure that dealers are owned 
and operated b\ qualified persons able to meet the 
requirements of this Agreement. 
12.1 Succession Rights Upon Death 
or Incapacity 
12.1.1 Successor Addendum 
r Dealer can apply for a Successor Addendum designat-
ing a proposed dealer operator and/or owners of a 
112 Examination of Accounts 
and Records 
Dealer agrees to permit any designated representative 
of Division to examine, audit, and take copies of any of 
the accounts and records Dealer is to maintain under the 
accounting manual and this Agreement. Dealer agrees to 
make such accounts and records readily available at its 
facilities during regular business hours. Division agrees 
to furnish Dealer with a list of any reproduced records* 
113 Confidentiality of Dealer Data 
Division agrees not to furnish any personal or finan-
cial data submitted to it by Dealer to any non-affiliated 
entity unless authorized by Dealer, required by law, or 
pertinent to judicial or administrative proceedings, or to 
proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Process. 
successor dealer to be established if this Agreement 
expires or is terminated because of death or incapacity. 
Division will execute the Addendum provided Dealer is 
meeting itsobligations under tHIs Agreement and under 
any Dealer Agreement which Dealer may have with 
other Divisions of General Motors for the conduct of 
Dealership Operations at the approved location; and the 
proposed dealer operator is, and will continue to be, 
employed full-time by Dealer or a comparable automo-
tive dealership, and is already qualified or is being 
trained to qualify as a dealer operator; and provided all 
other proposed owners are acceptable. 
Division may refuse to enter into a Successor Adden-
dum with Dealer if Division has previously notified 
ARTICLE 12. CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP 
9 Article 12. Changes in Management and Ownership 
Dealer it does not plan to continue Dealership Operations 
at the approved location, except for renewal of an 
existing Successor Addendum where the same proposed 
^dealer operator continues to be qualified. 
^ Upon expiration of this Agreement, Division will, 
upon Dealer's request, execute a new successor adden-
dum provided a new and superseding dealer agreement 
is executed with Dealer, and Dealer, the proposed dealer 
operator and dealer owners are then qualified as de-
scribed above. 
12.1.2 Absence of Successor Addendum 
If this Agreement expires or is terminated because of 
death or incapacity and Dealer and Division have not 
executed a Successor Addendum, the Dealer Operatoi 
or, if there is not a remaining Dealer Operator, the 
remaining dealer owners may propose a successor dealer 
tp continue the operations identified in this Agreement 
The proposal must be made to Division in writing at least 
30 days prior to the expiration or termination of this 
Agreement, including any deferrals. 
12.1.3 Successor Dealer Requirements 
Division will accept a proposal to establish a successor 
dealer submitted by a proposed dealer operator under 
this Article 12.1 provided: 
(a) the proposed successor dealer and the 
.proposed dealer operator are ready, willing and 
>able to meet the requirements of a new dealer 
agreement at the approved location(s); 
(b) Division approves the proposed dealer 
operator and all proposed owners not previously 
approved for the existing Dealership Operations; 
(c) all outstanding monetary obligations of 
Dealer to General Motors have been satisfied; and 
(d) Dealer has not been previously notified 
that Division may discontinue Dealership Opera-
tions at that location. 
12.1.4 Term of New Dealer Agreement 
The dealer agreement offered a successor dealer will 
be for a three-year term Division will notify the 
successor dealer in writing at least 90 days prior to the 
expiration date whether the successor dealer has per-
formed satisfactonly and, if so, that Division will offer a 
new dealer agreement. 
12.1.5 Limitation on Offers 
Dealer will be notified in wnting of the decision on a 
proposal to establish a successor dealer submitted under 
Article 12 1 within 60 days after Division has received 
from Dealer all applications and information reasonably 
requested by Division Division may condition its offer 
of a dealer agreement on the relocation of dealership 
operations to an approved location by successor dealer 
within a reasonable time Division's offer of a new 
dealer agreement under this Article 12 1 will automat-
ically expire if not accepted in wnting by the proposed 
successor dealer within 60 days after it receives the offer. 
12.1.6 Cancellation of Addendum 
Dealer may cancel an executed Successor Addendum 
at any time pnor to the death of a Dealer Operator or 
Dealer Owner, or the incapacity of Dealer Operator. 
Division may cancel an executed Successor Addendum^ 
only if the proposed dealer operator is no longer 
qualified under Article 12.1 1. 
122 ler Changes in nership or 
Management 
If Dealer proposes a change in Dealer Operator, a 
change in ownership, or a transfer of the dealership 
business or its principal assets to any person conditioned 
upon Division's entering into a dealer agreement with 
that person, Division will consider Dealer's proposal and 
not arbitrarily refuse to approve it, subject to the 
following: 
12 2 J Dealer agrees to give Division prior 
written notice of any proposed change or transfer 
described above. Dealer understands that if any such 
change is made prior to Division's approval of the 
proposal, termination of this Agreement will be war-
ranted and Division will have no further obligation to 
consider Dealer's proposal. 
1222 Division agrees to consider Dealer's 
proposal, taking into account factors such as (a) the 
personal, business, and financial qualifications of the 
proposed dealer operator and owners, and (b) whether 
the proposed change is likely to result in a successful 
dealership operation with acceptable management, cap-
italization, and ownership which will provide satisfac-
tory sales, service, and facilities at an approved location, 
while promoting and preserving competition and cus-
tomer satisfaction. 
122.3 Division will notify Dealer in writing 
of Division's decision on Dealer's proposal within 60 
days after Division has received from Dealer all applica-
tions and information reasonably requested by Division. 
If Division disagrees with the proposal, it will specify its 
reasons. 
12 2 A Any material change in Dealer's pro-
posal, including change in price, facilities, capitaliza-
tion, proposed owners, or dealer operator, will be 
considered a r proposal, and the t"' " period for 
Division to respond shall recommence. 
122*5 Division's prior written approval is not 
required where the transfer of equity ownereKip or 
beneficial interest to an individual is (a) less than ten 
percent in a calendar year; and (b) between existing 
dealer owners previously approved by Division where 
there is no change in majority ownership or^oting 
control. Dealer agrees to notify Division within 30 days 
of the date of the change and to execute a new Dealer 
Statement of Ownership. 
122.6 Division is not obligated to approve 
any proposed changes in management or ownership 
under this Article unless Dealer makes arrangements 
acceptable to Division to satisfy any indebtedness of 
Dealer to General Motors. 
M2.3 j Right of First Refusal to Purchase 
12.3 J Creation and Coverage 
If Dealer submits a proposal for a change of ownership 
unTtef^Si^ g> right of first 
refu^aLia-puftrfia&e the diiAldisl'iip as&e$s regardless of 
whether the proposed buyer is qualified to be a dealer. If 
Divkieircho^sesToexercise this right, it will do so in its 
written respnnt.fr to'Dealers proposal. Division will 
have a reasonable ppp™+y«"»y *<* i ^ p ^ the assets, 
including real estate, before making its decision. 
1232 Purchase Price and Other Terms 
ofSale 
(a) Bona Fide Agreement 
If Dealer has entered into a bona fide written buy/sel 
agreement, the purchase price andjather terms of sal< 
will be those *»•* forth In sugh agr^m^nf and any relate* 
documents, unless Dealer, and Division agreeto othe 
terms. 
11 Article 12. Changes in Management and Ownersh 
Upon Division's request, Dealer agrees to provide all 
documents relating to the proposed transfer If Dealer 
refuses to provide such documentation or state in writing 
that such documents do not exist, it will be presumed that 
the agreement is not bona fide. 
(b) Absence of Bona Fide 
Agreement 
In the absence of a bona fide written buy/sell 
agreement, the purchase price of the dealership assets 
will be determined by good faith negotiations by Dealer 
and Division. If agreement cannot be reached within a 
reasonable time, the price and other terms of sale will be 
established by arbitration according to the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. 
12.3 J Consummation 
Dealer agrees to transfer the property by Warranty 
Deed, where possible, conveying marketable title free 
and clear of liens and encumbrances. The Warranty 
Deed will be in proper form for recording and Dealer wil I 
deliver complete possession of the property when the 
Deed is delivered Dealer will also furnish copies ot any 
easements, licenses or other documents affecting the 
property and assign any permits or licenses necessary for 
the conduct of Dealership Operations 
13.1 Certain Acts or Events 
The following acts or events, which are within the 
control of Dealer or originate from action taken b> 
Dealer or its management or owners, are material 
breaches of this Agreement If Division learns that an\ o\ 
the acts or events has occurred, it may notify the Dealei 
in writing. If notified, Dealer will be given the oppor-
tunity to respond in writing within 30 days of receipt of 
123A Assignment 
Division's rights under this section may be assigned to 
any third party ("Assignee") If there is an assignment, 
Division will guarantee full payment of the purchase 
pnee by the Assignee. Division shall have the oppor-
tunity to discuss the terms of the buy/sell agreement with 
a potential Assignee 
Division's rights under this Article are binding on and 
enforceable against any Assignee or successor in interest 
of Dealer or purchaser of Dealer's assets 
12,3,5 Transfer Involving 
Family Members and 
Dealer Management 
When the proposed change of ownershipjnyolves a 
transfer by a dealer owner solely to a member or 
members of his or her immediate family, or to a 
qualifying member of Dealer's Management, the Divi-
sion's right of first refusal will not apply An "immediate 
family member" shall be the spouse, child, grandchild, 
spouse of a child or grandchild, brother, sister or parent 
of the dealer owner A "qualifying member of Dealer's 
Management" shall be an individual who has been 
employed by Dealer for at least two years and otherwise 
qualifies as a dealer operator 
the notice, explaining or correcting the situation to 
Division's satisfaction 
13.1.1 The removal, resignation, with-
drawal, or elimination from Dealer for any reason of any 
Dealer Operator or dealer owner without Division's prior 
wntten approval () 3 Q 
13.1.2 Any attempted or actual sale, transfer, 
ARTICLE 13. BREACHES AND OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY 
or assign Dy Dealer of this cement or any of the 
rights granted Dealer hereunder, or any attempted or 
actual transfer, assignment or delegation by Dealer of 
any of the responsibilities assumed by it under this 
Agreement contrary to the terms of this Agreement. 
13J.3 Any change, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, in the record or beneficial ownership of 
Dealer as set forth in the Dealer Statement of Ownership 
furnished by Dealer, unless permitted by Article 12.2.5 
or pursuant to Division's written approval. 
13.1.4 Any undertaking by Dealer or any of 
its owners to conduct, either directly or indirectly, any of 
the Dealership Operations at any unapproved location. 
13.1.5 Any sale, transfer, relinquishment, or 
discontinuance of use by Dealer of any of the Dealership 
Premises or other principal assets required in the conduct 
of the Dealership Operations, without Division's prior 
written approval. 
13.1.6 Any dispute among the owners or 
management personnel of Dealer which, in Division's 
opinion, may adversely affect the Dealership Operations 
or the interests of Dealer or Division. 
13.1.7 Refusal by Dealer to timely furnish 
sales, service or financial information and related 
supporting data, or to permit Division's examination or 
audit of Dealer's accounts and records. 
13.1.8 A finding by a government agency or 
court of original jurisdiction or a settlement arising from 
charges that Dealer, or a predecessor of Dealer owned or 
controlled by the same person, had committed a misde-
meanor or unfair or deceptive business practice which, in 
Division's opinion, may adversely affect the reputation 
or interests of Dealer or Division. 
13.1.9 lful failure of Deal i comply 
with the provisions of any laws or regulation^ i elating to 
the sale or service of Products. 
13 J JO Submission by Dealer ofjalse a p -
plications or reports, including false orders for PrSduct^ 
or reports of delivery or transfer of Products.' 
13.LU Failure of Dealer to maintain the 
line of credit required by ArticleTlO. 
13 J .12 Failufe of Dealer to timely pay its 
obligations to General Motors. 
13.1.13 Mj^jbthei^matert^b^ail l? of^  
Dealer's obligations under this ^ greemem;tl6tl0ther-
wise identified in this Article 13 or in Article 14.' 
If Dealer's response demonstrates that the breach has 
been corrected, or otherwise explains the circumstances 
to Division's satisfaction, then Division shall confirm 
this fact in writing to Dealer 
If, however, Dealer's response does not demonstrate 
that the breach has been corrected, or explain the 
circumstances to Division's .satisfaction, termination is 
warranted and Division may terminate this Agreement 
upon written notice to Dealer. Termination will be 
effective 60 days following Dealer's receipt of the notice. 
13.2j Failure of Performance by Dealer 
If Division determines that Dealer's Premises are not 
acceptable, or that Dealer has failed to adequately 
perform its sales or service responsibilities, including 
those responsibilities relating to customer satisfaction 
and training, Division will review such failure with 
Dealer. 
As soon as practicable thereafter, Division will notify 
Dealer in writing of the nature of Dealer's failure and of 
the period of time (which shall not be less than six 
months) during which Dealer will have the opportunity 
to correct the failure. 
Article 13. Breaches and Opportunity to Remedy 
W-f 
If Dealer does correct the failure by the expiration of 
the period, Division will so advise the Dealer in writing. 
If, however, Dealer does not correct the failure by the 
14.1 By Dealer 
Dealer has the right to terminate this Agreement 
without cause .at any time upon written notice to 
Division. Termination will be effective 30 days after 
Division's receipt of the notice, unless otherwise mutu-
ally agreed in writing. 
14.2 By Agreement 
This Agreement may be terminated at any time by 
written agreement between Division and Dealer. 
Termination assistance will apply only as specified in 
the written termination agreement. 
14.3 Failure to be Licensed 
If Division or Dealer fails to secure or maintain any 
license required for the performance of obligations under 
this Agreement or such license is suspended or revoked, 
either party may immediately terminate this Agreement 
by giving the other party written notice. 
14.4 Incapacity of Dealer Operator 
Because this is a Personal Services Agreement, 
Division may terminate this Agreement by written 
notice to Dealer if Dealer Operator is so physically or 
mentally incapacitated that the Dealer Operator is unable 
to actively exercise full managerial authority. The 
effective date of termination will be stated in such 
written notice and will be not less than three months after 
receipt of such notice. 
14.5 Acts or Events 
If Division learns that any of the following has 
occurred, it may terminate this Agreement by giving 
expiration of the period, Division may terminate this 
Agreement by giving Dealer 90 days advance written 
notice. 
Dealer written notice of termination. Termination will be 
effective on the date specified in the notice. 
14.5.1 Conviction in a court of original juris-
diction of Dealer, or a predecessor of Dealer owned or 
controlled by the same person, or any Dealer Operator or 
dealer owner of any felony. 
14.5.2 Insolvency of Dealer, or filing by or 
against Dealer of a petition in bankruptcy; or filing of a 
proceeding for the appointment of a receiver or trustee 
for Dealer, provided such filing or appointment is not 
dismissed or vacated within thirty days; or execution by 
Dealer of an assignment for the benefit of creditors or any 
foreclosure or other due process of law whereby a third 
party acquires rights to the operation, ownership or 
assets of Dealer. 
14.53 Failure of Dealer to conduct custom-
ary sales and service operations during customary 
business hours for seven consecutive business days. 
14.5.4 Any misrepresentation to General 
Motors by Dealer or b> any Dealer Operator or owner in 
applying for this Agreement, or in identifying the Dealer 
Operator, or record or beneficial ownership of Dealer. 
14.5.5 Submission by Dealer of false applica-
tions or claims for any payment, credit, discount, or 
allowance, including false applications in connection 
with incentive activities, where the false information was 
submitted to generate a payment to Dealer for a claim 
ARTICLE 14. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
which wou. . ot otherwise have lified for payment. 
Termination for failure to correct other breaches will 
be according to the procedures outlined in Article 13. 
14.6 Reliance on Any Applicable 
Termination Provision 
The terminating party may select the provision under 
which it elects to terminate without reference in its notice 
to any other provision that may also be applicable. The 
terminating party subsequently also may assert other 
grounds for termination. 
14.7 Transactions After Termination 
14.7.1 Effect on Orders 
If Dealer and Division do not enter into a new Dealer 
Agreement when this Agreement expires or is termi-
nated, all of Dealer's outstanding orders for Products 
will be automatically cancelled except as provided in this 
Article 14.7. 
Termination of this Agreement will not release Dealer 
or Division from the obligation to pay any amounts 
15.1 Deferral of Effective Date 
If this Agreement is scheduled to expire or terminate 
because of the death or incapacity of a Dealer Operator or 
the death of a Dealer Owner and Dealer requests an 
extension of the effective date of expiration or termina-
tion thirty days prior to such date, Division will defer the 
elective date for up to a total of eighteen months after 
such death or incapacity occurs to assist Dealer in 
winding up its Dealership Operations. 
15.2 Purchase of Personal Property 
15.2.1 Division's Obligations 
If this Agreement expires or is terminated and 
owing the other, noi .ase Dealer from the dtion to 
pay for Special Vehicles if Division has begun process-
ing such orders prior to the effective date of termination. 
14.72 Termination Deliveries 
If this Agreement is voluntarily terminated by Dealer 
or expires or is terminated because of the death or 
incapacity of a Dealer Operator or death of a Dealer 
Owner, without a termination or expiration deferral, 
Division will use its best efforts consistent with its 
distribution procedures to furnish Dealer with Motor 
Vehicles to fill Dealer's bona fide retail orders on hand 
on the effective date of termination or expiration, not to 
exceed, however, the total number of Motor Vehicles 
invoiced to Dealer for retail sale during the three months 
immediately preceding the effective date of termination. 
14.7.3 Effect of Transactions After 
Termination 
Neither the sale of Products to Dealer nor any other act 
by Division or Dealer after termination of this Agree-
ment will be construed as a waiver of the termination. 
Division does not offer Dealer or a replacement dealer 
that has substantially the same ownership (more than 50 
percent including total family ownership) a new Dealer 
Agreement, Division will offer to purchase the following 
items of personal property (herein called Eligible Items) 
trom Dealer at the prices indicated: 
(a) New and unused Motor Vehicles of the 
current model year purchased by Dealer from 
Division at a price equal to the net prices and 
charges that were paid to General Motors; 
(b) Any signs owned by Dealer of a type 
recommended in writing by Division and bearing 
any Marks at a price agreed upon by Division'and 
(133 
15 Article 15. Termination Assistance 
ARTICLE 15. TERMINATION ASSISTANCE 
Dealer. If Division and Dealer cannot agree on a 
price, they will select a third party who will set the 
price; 
(c) Any essential tools recommended by Divi-
sion and designed specifically for service of Motor 
Vehicles that Division offered for sale during the 
three years preceding termination at prices estab-
lished in accordance with the applicable pricing 
formula in the Service Policies and Procedures 
Manual; and 
' (d) Unused and undamaged Parts and Accesso-
ries that (i) are still-in the original, resalable 
merchandising packages and in unbroken lots (in 
the case of sheet metal, a comparable substitute for 
the original package may be used); (ii) are listed for 
sale in the then current Dealer Parts and Accesso-
ries Price Schedules (except ''discontinued" or 
"replaced" Parts and Accessories); and (iii) were 
purchased by Dealer either directly from General 
Motors or from an outgoing dealer as a part of 
Dealer's initial Parts and Accessories inventory. 
Prices will be those dealer prices in effect at the 
time General Motors receives the Parts and Acces-
sories, less any applicable allowances whether or 
not any such allowances were made to Dealer when 
Dealer purchased the Parts and Accessories. In 
addition, an allowance of five percent of dealer 
price for packing costs and reimbursement for 
transportation charges to the destination specified 
by General Motors will be credited to Dealer's 
account. 
152.2 Dealer's Responsibilities 
Division's obligation to purchase Eligible Items is 
bject to Dealer fulfilling its responsibility under this 
bsection. 
Within fifteen days following the effective date of 
mination or expiration of this Agreement, Dealer will 
rnish Division with a list of vehicle identification 
mbers and such other information as Division may 
request pertaining to eligible Motor Vehicles. Dealer will 
deliver the eligible Motor Vehicles to a destination 
determined by Division that will be in a reasonable 
proximity to Dealer's Premises. 
Within two months following the effective date of 
termination or expiration of this Agreement, Dealer will 
mail or deliver to General Motors a complete and 
separate list of each of the Eligible Items other than 
Motor Vehicles. Dealer will retain the Eligible Items 
until receipt of written shipping instructions from 
General Motors. Within thirty days after receipt of 
instructions, Dealer will ship the Eligible Items, trans-
portation charges prepaid, to the destinations specified 
in the instructions. 
Dealer will take action and execute and deliver such 
instruments as necessary to (a) convey to Division and 
General Motors good and marketable title to all Eligible 
Items to be purchased, (b) comply with the requirements 
of any applicable state law relating to bulk sales or 
transfer, and (c) satisfy and discharge any liens or 
encumbrances on Eligible Items prior to their delivery to 
Division and General Motors. 
15.2.3 Payment 
Subject to Article 17.10, Division will pay for the 
Eligible Items as soon as practicable following their 
delivery to the specified destinations. Pa\ment may be 
made directly to anyone having a secuntv or ownership 
interest in the Eligible Items. 
If Division has not paid Dealer for the Eligible Trerp^  
within two months after delivery, and if Dealer has 
fulfilled its termination obligations under this Agree-
ment, Division will, at Dealer's wntten request, estimate 
the purchase price of the unpaid Eligible Items and all 
other amounts owed Dealer by General Motors. After 
deducting the amounts estimated to be owing General 
Motors and its subsidiaries by Dealer, Division will 
advance Dealer 75 percent of the net amount owed 
Dealer and will pay the balance, if any, as soon as 
practicable thereafter. /,
 0 fi 
< assignment of. its 
j ^ B j ^ f s i o n has decided to appoint a replacement dealer 
B p & l e r ' s location, Dealer may sell its Eligible Items 
Bl&fapproved in writing by Division, assign its rights 
B ^ p k k Article 15.2 to a designated replacement 
RpSefprovided the replacement dealer assumes Dealer's 
Obligations under this Article. 
W>31? Assistance on Premises 
WmW IS3.1 Division's Obligation 
KSubject to Article 17.10, Division agrees to give 
pealer assistance in disposing of the Premises if (i) this 
^Agreement expires for any reason or is terminated by 
rDivision under Articles 13.2 or 14.4 and (ii) Dealer is not 
goffered a new Dealer Agreement. Such assistance shall 
be given only on Premises that are described in the 
Location and Premises Addendum and only if: 
(a) they are used solely for Dealership Opera-
tions (or similar dealership operations under agree-
ments with other Divisions of General Motors 
which will be terminated simultaneously with this 
Agreement); and 
(b) they are not substantially in excess of space 
requirements at the time of termination or, if they 
are substantially in excess, they became excessive 
because of a reduction in the requirements applica-
ble to Dealer's facilities. 
Any Dealer request for such assistance must be in 
writing and received by Division within thirty days of the 
expiration or termination of this Agreement. 
Premises that consist of more than one parcel of 
property or more than one building, each of which is 
separately usable, distinct and apart from the whole or 
any other part with appropriate ingress or egress, shall be 
considered separately under this Article 15.3. 
153.2 Owned Premises 
Division will provide assistance on owned Premises 
by either (a) locating a purchaser who will offer to 
purchase the Premises at a reasonable price, or (b) 
locating a lessee who offer to lease the Pr' es. If 
Division does not locate a purchaser or lessee within a 
reasonable time, Division will itself either purchase or, at 
its option, lease the Premises for a reasonable term at a 
reasonable rent If the cause of termination or expiration; 
is a death or the incapacity of the Dealer Operator, 
Division may instead pay Dealer a sum equal to a 
reasonable rent for a period of twelve months imme-
diately following the effective date of termination or 
expiration of this Agreement. 
75 J J Leased Premises 
Division will provide assistance on leased Premises by 
either: 
(a) locating a tenant(s), satisfactory to lessor, 
who will sublet for the balance of the lease or 
assume it; or 
(b) arranging with the lessor for the cancella-
tion of the lease without penalty to Dealer, or. 
(e) reimbursing Dealer for the lesser of the 
rent specified in the lease or settlement agreement 
or a reasonable rent for a period equal to the lesser 
of twelve months from the effective date or 
termination or expiration of the balance of the lease 
term. 
Upon request, Dealer will use its best efforts to effect a 
settlement of the lease with the lessor subject to 
Division's prior approval of the terms. Division is not 
obligated to reimburse Dealer for rent for any month 
during which the Premises are occupied by Dealer or 
anyone else after the first month following the effective 
date, of termination or expiration. 
153.4 Rent and Price 
Division and Dealer will fix the amount of a reason-
able rent and a reasonable price for the Premises by 
agreement at the time Dealer requests assistance. The 
factors to be considered in fixing those amounts are: 
(a) the adequacy and desirability of the Prem-
ises for a dealership operation; and 
Article 15. Termination A^Hstince 
(b) the fair market value of the Premises. If 
Division and Dealer cannot agree, the fair market 
value will be determined by the median appraisal 
of three qualified real estate appraisers, of whom 
Dealer and Division will each select one and the 
two selected will select the third. The cost of 
appraisals will be shared equally by Dealer and 
Division. 
153.5 Limitations on Obligation to 
Provide Assistance 
Division will not be obligated to provide assistance on 
Premises if Dealer 
(a) fails to accept a bona fide offer from a 
prospective purchaser, sublessee or assignee; 
(b) refuses to execute a settlement agreement 
with the lessor if the agreement would be 
Division and Dealer agree that mutual respect, trust 
and confidence are vital to the relationship between 
Division and Dealer. So that such respect, trust and 
confidence can be maintained, and differences that may 
17 J No Agent or Legal Representative 
Status 
This Agreement does not make either party the agent 
or legal representative of the other tor any purpose, nor 
does it grant either party authority to assume or create 
any obligation on behalf of or in the name of the others 
No fiduciary obligations are created by this Agreement 
17.2 Responsibility for Operations 
Except as provided in this Agreement, Dealer is solely 
without cost to Dealer; 
(c) refuses to use its best efforts to effect a 
settlement when requested by Division, or 
(d) refuses to pe rmi t Div is ion to 
examine Dealer's books and records if necessary to 
venfy claims of Dealer under this Article 
Any amount payable by Division as rental reimburse-
ment or reasonable rent shall be proportionately reduced 
if the Premises are leased or sold to another party dunng 
the period for which such amount is payable Payment of 
rental reimbursement or reasonable rent is waived by 
Dealer if it does not file its claim therefor withm two 
months after the expiration of the period covered by the 
payment Upon request, Dealer will support its claim 
with satisfactory evidence of its accuracy and 
reasonableness. 
develop between Dealer and Division may be resolved 
amicably, Division and Dealer agree to resolve disputes 
in accordance with the Dispute Resolution Process, a 
copy of which has been provided to Dealer 
responsible for all expenditures liabilities and obliga-
tions incurred or assumed b> Dealer tor the establish-
ment and conduct ot its operations 
173 Taxes 
Dealer is responsible for all local, state, federal, or 
other applicable taxes and tax returns related to its 
dealership business and will hold General Motors 
harmless from any related claims or demands made by 
any taxing authority 
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17.4) Indemnification by 6 jral Motors 
General Motors will assume the defense of Dealer and 
indemnify Dealer against any judgment for monetary 
damages or rescission of contract, less any offset 
recovered by Dealer, in any lawsuit naming Dealer as a 
defendant relating to any Product that has not been 
altered when the lawsuit concerns: 
\lfA.ly Breach of the General Motors warran-
ty related to the Product, bodily injury or property 
damage claimed to have been caused solely by a defect in 
the design, manufacture, or assembly of a Product by 
General Motors (other than a defect which should have 
been detected by Dealer in a reasonable inspection of the 
Product); 
/f 17.4.2 ) Failure of the Product to conform to 
the description set forth in advertisements or product 
brochures distributed by General Motors because of 
changes in standard equipment or material component 
parts unless Dealer received notice of the changes prior 
to retail delivery of the affected Product by Dealer; or 
(f 17.4.3 J Any substantial damage to a Product 
purchased by Dealer from General Motors which has 
been repaired by General Motors unless Dealer has been 
notified of the repair prior to retail delivery of the 
affected Product. 
If General Motors reasonably concludes that allega-
tions other than those set forth in 17.4 J , 17.4.2, or 17.4.3 
above are being pursued in the lawsuit, General Motors 
shall have the right to decline to accept the defense or 
indemnify dealer or, after accepting the defense, to 
transfer the defense back to Dealer and withdraw its 
agreement to indemnify Dealer. 
Procedures for requesting indemnification, ad-
ministrative details, and limitations are contained in the 
Service Policies and Procedures Manual under "Indem-
nification.' ' The ob.
 w .dons assumed by Ge Motors 
are limited b those specifically described in this Article 
and in the Service Policies and Procedures Manual and 
are conditioned upon compliance by Dealer witluthe, 
procedures described in the Manual. This Article shall 
not affect any right either party may have to seek 
indemnification or contribution under any other contract 
or by law and such rights are hereby expressly preserved, 
17.5 Trademarks and Service Marks 
General Motors or affiliated companies are the 
exclusive owners or licensees of the various trademarks, 
service marks, names and designs (Marks) used in 
connection with Products and services. 
Dealer is granted the non-exclusive right to display 
Marks in the form and manner approved by Division in 
the conduct of its dealership business. Dealer agrees to 
permit any designated representative of Division upon 
the Premises during regular business hours to inspect 
Products or services in connection with Marks. 
Dealer will not apply to register any Marks either 
alone or as part of another mark, and will not take any 
action which may adversely affect the validity of the 
Marks or the goodwill associated with them. 
Dealer agrees to purchase and sell goods bearing 
Marks only from parties authorized or licensed by 
Division or General Motors. 
Marks may be used as part of the Dealer's name with 
Division's written approval. 
Dealer agrees to change or discontinue the use of any 
Marks upon Division's request. 
Dealer agrees that no company owned by or affiliated 
with Dealer or any of its owners may use any Mark 
to identify a business without Division's written 
permission. 
Upon termination of this Agreement, Dealer agrees to 
immediately discontinue, at its expense, all use of 
Marks. Thereafter, Dealer will not use, either directly or 
indirectly, any Marks or any other confusingly similar 
Article 17. General Provisions 
- marks in a manner that Division determines is likely to 
cause confusion or mistake or deceive the public. 
- Dealer will reimburse Division for all legal fees and 
other expenses incurred in connection with action to 
require Dealer to comply with this Article 17.5. 
17.6 Notices 
Any notice required to be given by either party to the 
other in connection with this Agreement will be in 
writing and delivered personally or by first class or 
express mail or by facsimile. Notices to Dealer will be 
directed to Dealer or its representatives at Dealer's 
principal place of business and, except for indemnifica-
tion requests made pursuant to Article 17.4, notices by 
Dealer will be directed to the appropriate Zone or Branch 
Manager of the Division(s) of General Motors. 
17.7 No Implied Waivers 
The delay or failure of either party to require 
performance by the other party or the waiver by either 
party of a breach of any provision of this Agreement will 
not affect the right to subsequently require such 
performance. 
17.8 Assignment of Rights or Delegation 
of Duties 
-Dealer has not paid any fee for this Agreement. 
Neither this Agreement nor any right granted by this 
Agreement is a property right. 
Except as provided in Article 12, neither this Agree-
ment nor the rights or obligations of Dealer may be sold, 
assigned, delegated or otherwise transferred. 
Division may assign this Agreement and any rights, or 
delegate any obligations, under this Agreement to any 
affiliated or successor company, and will provide Dealer 
written notice of such assignment or delegation. Such 
assignment or delegation shall not relieve Division of 
liability for the performance of its obligations under this 
Agreement. 
17.9 No Third Party Benefit Intended 
This Agreement is not enforceable by any third parties 
and is not intended to convey any rights or benefits to 
anyone who is not a party to this Agreement. 
17.10 Accounts Payable 
All monies or accounts due Dealer are net of Dealer's 
indebtedness to Division, General Motors and its subsid-
iaries. In addition, Division may deduct any amounts 
due or to become due from Dealer to Division or General 
Motors, or any amounts held by Division, from any sums 
or accounts due or to become due from Division, General 
Motors or its subsidiaries. 
17.11 Sole Agreement of Parties 
Except as provided in this Agreement, Division has 
made no promises to Dealer, Dealer Operator, or dealer 
owner and there are no other agreements or understand-
ings, either oral or written, between the parties affecting 
this Agreement or relating to any of the subject matters 
covered by this Agreement. 
Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement 
cancels and supersedes all previous agreements between 
the parties that relate to any matters covered herein, 
except as to any monies which may be owing between 
the parties. 
No agreement between Division and Dealer which 
relates to matters covered herein, and no change in, 
addition to ("except the filling in of blank lines) or erasure 
of any printed portion of this Agreement, will be binding 
unless permitted under the terms of this Agreement or 
related documents, or approved in a written agreement 
executed as set forth in Division's Dealer Sales and 
Service Agreement. 
17.12 Applicable Law 
This agreement is governed by the laws of the State of 
Michigan. However, if performance under this Agree-
mtnt is ille iaer a valid law of jurisdiction where 
tsiich performance is to take place, performance will be 
% 
'rnodified to the minimum extent necessary to comply 
fewith such law if it was effective as of the effective date of 
'this Agreement. 
1713 Superseding Dealer Agreements 
If Division offers a superseding form of dealer 
agreement to Division's dealers generally at any time 
prior to expiration of this Agreement, Division may 
terminate this Agreement by prior written notice to 
Dealer, provided Division offers Dealer a dealer agree-
ment in the superse form for a term of i **?$ than 
the unexpired term of this Agreement. 
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the rights and 
obligations of Dealer that may otherwise become appli-
cable upon termination or expiration of the term of this 
Agreement shall not be applicable if Division and Dealer 
execute a superseding dealer agreement, and the ma-
tured rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall 
continue under the new agreement. 
Dealer's performance under any prior agreement may 
be considered in an evaluation of Dealer's performance 
under this or any succeeding agreement. 
Article 17 General Provisions 
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GLOSSARY 
1. Area of Primary Responsibility-The geographic area designated by Division from time to time in a 
Notice of Area of Primary Responsibility. 
2. Dealer - The corporation, partnership or proprietorship that signs the Dealer Agreement with 
Division. 
3. Dealer Agreement - The Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, including the Agreement proper that 
is executed, the Standard Provisions, all of the related Addenda, the Accounting and Service Policies 
and Procedures Manuals, and the Terms of Sale Bulletins. 
4. Dealership Operations - All operations contemplated by the Dealer Agreement. These operations 
include the sale and service of Products and any other activities undertaken by Dealer related to 
Products, including rental and leasing operations, used vehicle sales and body shop operations and 
finance and insurance operations whether conducted directly or indirectly by Dealer. 
5. Division - The unit of General Motors Corporation that has entered into a Dealer Agreement with 
Dealer authorizing it to market and service Division's Motor Vehicles. 
6. General Motors - General Motors Corporation. 
7. Motor Vehicles - All current model types or series of new motor vehicles specified in any Motor 
Vehicle Addendum and all past General Motors motor vehicles marketed through Motor Vehicle 
Dealers. 
8. Products - Motor Vehicles, Parts and Accessories. 
9. Service Policies and Procedures Manual - The Manual issued periodically which details certain 
administrative and performance requirements for Dealer service under the Dealer Agreement. 
10. Special Vehicles - Motor Vehicles that have limited marketability because they differ from standard 
specifications or incorporate special equipment. 
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Tab 2 
1 Q ACCORDING TO YOUR COMPLAINT, I THINK YOU 
2 INDICATE THAT IN APPROXIMATELY MAY OF 1992 SIERRA BUICK 
3 FAILED TO OPEN ITS DOORS FOR BUSINESS AND UNDER THE TERMS 
4 OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE DEALER SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENT 
5 BUICK ADVISED HELSCO BY LETTER THAT THE SALES AND SERVICE 
6 AGREEMENT COULD BE TERMINATED. DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR 
7 RECOLLECTION? 
8 A YES, 1992. 
9 Q HAD YOU HAD ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH ANYONE ABOUT 
10 THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION PRIOR TO THAT TIME OF APPLYING 
11 — NOT ACQUIRING BUT APPLYING FOR THE BUICK POINT IF IT 
12 BECAME AVAILABLE? 
13 A SOMETIME IN 1992 I HAD CONVERSATIONS. 
14 Q WHO WITH? 
15 A I CALLED THE BUICK ZONE OFFICE AND ASKED THEM 
16 IF THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF PURCHASING THAT POINT. 
17 Q APPLYING FOR THAT POINT? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q WHEN YOU SAY PURCHASE, YOU DON'T PURCHASE 
20 SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENTS, YOU APPLY FOR THEM AND THEY 
21 ARE EITHER ACCEPTED OR DECLINED, ISN'T THAT CORRECT? 
22 A WELL, THERE IS TWO PARTS TO THAT. YOU APPLY 
23 FOR THEM BUT YOU DO HAVE TO STRIKE SOME PURCHASE 
24 AGREEMENT. 
25 Q WITH THE OLD OWNER? 
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1 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
2 Q BUT YOU DON'T PAY ANYTHING TO GENERAL MOTORS 
3 CORPORATION FOR THE DEALER SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENTS 
4 PER SE? 
5 A NO, SIR. 
6 Q WHO DID YOU TALK WITH AT THE ZONE OFFICE ABOUT 
7 THAT? 
8 A I BELIEVE IT WAS THE ZONE MANAGER, TOM GAROVE. 
9 Q THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN BEFORE THE MAY 1992 TIME 
10 PERIOD WHEN SIERRA BUICK FAILED TO OPEN ITS DOORS FOR 
11 BUSINESS? 
12 A COULD HAVE BEEN, YES. 
13 Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT WILL BE MARKED AS 
14 DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NUMBER 3 AND ASK IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY 
15 IT FOR ME, PLEASE. 
16 (DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 3 WAS MARKED 
17 FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
18 A I DO RECOGNIZE THIS. 
19 Q DO YOU RECALL SPEAKING TO MR. GAROVE BEFORE 
20 YOU WROTE THIS LETTER ABOUT THE BUICK POINT IN OGDEN, 
21 UTAH — 
22 A YES, SIR. 
23 Q — CURRENTLY HELD BY SIERRA BUICK AT THIS 
24 TIME? 
25 A YES. 
32 
1 Q HOW MANY CONVERSATIONS DID YOU HAVE WITH MR. 
2 GAROVE PRIOR TO THIS LETTER BEING SENT? 
3 A I BELIEVE JUST ONE. 
4 Q CAN YOU RECALL WHAT WAS SAID AND BY WHOM 
5 DURING THAT — I GUESS IT WAS A TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION. 
6 A YES. HE WAS VERY POLITE TO ME, LET ME KNOW 
7 THAT PRESENTLY THEY HAD A SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENT 
8 WITH A DEALER IN OGDEN, UTAH AND INVITED ME TO UPDATE HIS 
9 FILE OR SEND SOMETHING TO HIM AND THAT WAS THE PURPOSE 
10 FOR THIS LETTER. 
11 Q HE ALSO PROBABLY TOLD YOU, DIDN'T HE, THAT HE 
12 COULDN'T REALLY TALK TOO MUCH ABOUT THAT DEALERSHIP OR 
13 ITS FUTURE BECAUSE THEY HAD A CURRENT DEALER? DIDN'T HE 
14 ADVISE YOU OF THAT AS WELL? 
15 A YES, HE DID. 
16 Q IN FACT, IT'S THE POLICY OF GENERAL MOTORS 
17 CORPORATION, WHEN THEY HAVE AN EXISTING DEALER, NOT TO 
18 TALK ABOUT THAT EXISTING DEALER WITH OTHER DEALERS, ISN'T 
19 THAT CORRECT? 
20 A THAT IS THE POLICY. 
21 Q THAT'S USUALLY FOLLOWED, AT LEAST BASED ON 
22 YOUR EXPERIENCE? 
23 A YES, I DO THINK SO. 
24 Q THIS LETTER, EXHIBIT 3, WAS PRECIPITATED BY 
25 YOUR TELEPHONE CALL WITH MR. GAROVE, IS THAT CORRECT? 
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1 A YES. 
2 Q IN FACT, THAT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 
3 APPARENTLY OCCURRED THE WEEK BEFORE MARCH 30 OF 1992, 
4 ACCORDING TO EXHIBIT 3, IS THAT CORRECT? 
5 A YES. 
6 Q HAD YOU TALKED WITH ANYONE ELSE ABOUT APPLYING 
7 FOR THAT BUICK POINT, IF IT BECAME AVAILABLE, WITH ANYONE 
8 ELSE AT BUICK BESIDES MR. GAROVE PRIOR TO MARCH 30 OF 
9 1992? 
10 A NO, SIR. 
11 Q HAD YOU TALKED WITH ANYBODY ABOUT ACQUIRING 
12 THAT BUICK POINT PRIOR TO MARCH 30 OF 1992? 
13 A I THINK I TALKED TO MY PARTNER, MERRILL BEAN, 
14 OF OUR — OF THE POTENTIAL INTEREST IN HAVING ANOTHER 
15 FRANCHISE IN THIS BUILDING. 
16 Q THE REASON FOR THAT WAS YOU HAD THE SPACE? 
17 A YES. 
18 Q BECAUSE YOU HAD ALREADY SOLD THE OTHER THREE 
19 LINES THAT WE TALKED ABOUT PREVIOUSLY. 
20 A YES, SIR. 
21 Q YOU THOUGHT BUICK WOULD COMPLEMENT THE 
22 CHEVROLET LINE THAT YOU KEPT? 
23 A YES. 
24 Q ANY OTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH ANYBODY ELSE 
25 BESIDES YOUR BUSINESS PARTNER, MR. GAROVE, ABOUT THE 
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2 about whether or not they could make application for this 
3 franchise, to your recollection? 
4 A Prior to this proposal? 
5 Q Either prior to that proposal or concurrent 
6 with that proposal, in that same time period. 
7 MR. STEPHENS: Prior to Exhibit 2 or 
8 concurrent with Exhibit 2. 
9 A You know, it's hard to recall conversations, 
10 but I would guess that somewhere in the course of 
11 considering this proposal there were other inquiries, 
12 yes. 
13 Q And what did you do with those other 
14 inquiries? 
15 A Well, if they were verbal, I simply advised 
16 the inquirer that we currently had a dealer in place and 
17 in business in Ogden, Utah and that I was not at liberty 
18 to discuss any opportunities with them. 
19 Q Is that the general policy of General Motors 
20 where you have an application that's been made? 
21 A Yes, sir. 
22 Q At what point do you feel that you are then 
23 free to accept other applications from other parties? 
24 MR. STEPHENS: If the application originally 
25 is rejected or accepted? I don't understand your 
ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK (212) 732-6190 
1 Garove 18 
2 question. 
3 MR. BEAN: Whichever way they go. 
4 Q If the application is accepted, then I 
5 assume no other applicants are considered; is that a fair 
6 statement? 
7 A Certainly. 
8 Q And if the application is rejected, then you 
9 are then in a position to accept other applications; is 
10 that correct? 
11 A Certainly, yes. 
12 Q At what point in that rejection process do 
13 you feel that you are free to accept other applications? 
14 A Well, that would be after our existing 
15 dealer is formally notified in writing that he is -- his 
16 proposal has been rejected. 
17 Q So, you would not make contact then or allow 
18 some other dealer to make contact with you about whether 
19 or not a franchise was available until you formally 
20 notified the applicant that his application had been 
21 rejected; is that correct? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q Are there written guidelines that are used 
24 by zone managers to determine the qualifications of an 
25 applicant for a Buick franchise? 
ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK (212) 732-6190 
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Q. And it did not come out of the zone office 
where you're — where you go to work? 
MR. STEPHENS: Objection; calls for speculation. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
MR. BEAN: Q. Mr. Woodley, is there a policy or 
practice within Buick Division of General Motors 
Corporation that when a dealer has submitted an 
application for a sales and service agreement, General 
Motors will not entertain applications from anyone 
else until that application has been disposed of, 
either by granting the sales and service agreement or 
by rejecting the application? 
MR. STEPHENS: Objection; the question is 
compound in using the term "policy or practice." 
Would you break it down, please. 
MR. BEAN: Q. Any type of common 
understanding — 
MR. STEPHENS: Objection; vague as to "common 
understanding. " 
MR. BEAN: Q. Do you understand the nature of my 
question? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you know or have you discussed with 
anyone, any employee of Buick Motor Division, a 
practice or an understanding within the industry that 
when a dealer application is pending, you don't 
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discuss or entertain that application or any other 
application for that dealership until the application 
pending has been disposed of? 
MR. STEPHENS: Object; the question is compound. 
MR. BEAN: Q. Do you understand my question? 
A. I don't understand the "industry" part of 
it, I don't understand it. 
MR. STEPHENS: He's asking for discussions about 
that . 
MR. BEAN: Q. I'm saying, are you privy to any 
discussions or understanding among the employees of 
Buick Motor Division that when an application for a 
sales and service agreement is pending, has been 
received, that Buick Motor Division will not discuss 
that application, nor will they receive applications 
from any other parties until the pending application 
is d isposed of? 
MR. STEPHENS: Object to the question as 
definitely compound. 
THE WITNESS: It's my understanding that we woul 
not consider two applications at the same time. 
MR. BEAN: Q. And where somebody wants to make 
application while another application is pending, how 
is that handled? 
A. Normally it would not be — we would not be 
handling two applications at the same time. 
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Q. What do you say to the other party wanting 
to make application? 
A. Normally that conversation would happen with 
the selling party. 
Q. Between you and the selling party? 
A. Yes, between — 
Q. And what do you mean by that? Would you 
tell a selling party that you can't look at anyone 
else until the application that's there and the 
buy-and-sell agreement that's in your possession has 
been handled one way or another? 
A. Normally we would inform the seller that the 
practice would be not to evaluate two applications at 
o n e t i m e . 
Q. Do any of the reports of CSI or retail sales 
and registration summaries come through you; that is, 
do you review those reports or read them with respect 
to Buick dealers in the San Francisco zone? 
A. Yes, I do read those reports. 
Q. Are you familiar with the reports of CSI and 
retail sales and registration summary for Petersen 
Motors with regard to Buick — 
A. No, I'm not. 
Q. -- sales? Who would have those reports now? 
A. Any reports now would be at the zone office, 
which would be in Denver. 
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Tab 3 
1 Garove 34 
2 Q I'm talking about the agreement for sale of 
3 assets that was made between John Watson Chevrolet and 
4 Helsco, Inc. d/b/a Sierra Buick. 
5 A Yes, I'm aware of it, the agreement you are 
6 referring to. 
7 Q And were you aware? 
8 A But I'm not -- the date is unclear to me. I 
9 believe it was sometime in late August, September. 
10 MR. STEPHENS: The buy-sell agreement? 
11 THE WITNESS: The buy-sell agreement. 
12 Q Prior to that buy-sell agreement, did your 
13 investigation show whether or not Sierra Buick was still 
14 doing business, and if not, what did you do about that? 
15 That's what I'm trying to ascertain. 
16 A All our investigations showed that they were 
17 doing business. 
18 Q Was a letter of termination ever sent to 
19 Sierra Buick indicating that their franchise was going to 
20 be terminated? 
21 A No. 
22 Q You are not aware of it? 
23 A Not as a result of those investigations. 
24 MR. STEPHENS: You used the term 
25 "franchise," David, and I'm not going to object to 
ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK (212) 732-6190 
1 Garove 3 
2 many reasons in the normal course of business after they 
3 have been submitted to us for consideration. 
4 Q I guess that's my question. That goes to 
5 the heart of my question. In those kinds of situations 
6 you've just described, normally you have a dealer in 
7 place that's continuing to function; is that correct? 
8 A Correct. 
9 Q And in this case, is it possible that Sierra 
10 Buick was not continuing to function, that they were not 
11 selling new cars? 
12 MR. STEPHENS: Objection. His testimony was 
13 that it was his belief they were continuing to do 
14 business and selling cars. 
15 MR. BEAN: Yes, I'm just reconfirming that 
16 and saying is it possible that you are mistaken 
17 that they were not selling cars at this time. 
18 MR. STEPHENS: Do you have any knowledge 
19 that they were not doing business? 
2 0 THE WITNESS: I don't have any knowledge of 
21 that, no. 
22 Q Do you, as the zone manager, get reports of 
23 the number of cars, new automobiles, registered in a 
24 particular area from a particular point in the state in 
25 which that point exists? Do you follow my question? 
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elsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle 
520 Wall Avenue 
gden, Utah 84403 
TTENTION: Mr. David Koch, VP/General Manager 
entlemen: 
fcfective November 1, 1990, Buick Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, and 
elsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle entered into a General Motors Corporation 
ealer Sales and Service Agreement (Dealers Agreement) which authorized you to 
onduct dealership operations at premises located at 3520 Wall Avenue, Ogden, Utah. 
ur observation and investigation indicates that you have failed to maintain 
tjstoxnary sales and service operations for at least seven (7) consecutive business 
ays. This constitutes grounds for immediate termination pursuant to the Dealer 
greement and is grounds for termination pursuant to state lav. 
Article 14.5.3 of your Dealer Agreement provides in pertinent part: 
If Division learns that any of the following has occurred, it may 
terminate this Agreement by giving Dealer written notice of 
termination. Termination will be effective on the date specified 
in the notice. 
Failure of Dealer to conduct customary sales and service operations 
during customary business hours for seven consecutive business days. 
or the reasons stated herein, Buick is hereby terminating the Dealer Agreement 
etveen it and Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle. This termination is in 
ffectlve sixty (60) days following your receipt of this letter and your status 
s an authorized Buick dealer will cease at that time. 
incerely. 
WICK MOTOR DIVISION 
General Motors Corporation 
7
**rf y. 
'• £. Garove 
assistant Zone Manager 
"EG/db 
?ct Henry Mixon 
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE AND PURCHASE OF ASSETS 
S7— 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into t h i s ^ day of 
SfopK/s-rr. 1992 by and between HELSCO, INC, , an Alabama 
corporation, dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle Hereinafter referred 
"Seller11) and John Watson Chevrolet/G^Watson), a Delaware 
corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Purchaser"). 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Seller is engaged in business as a Buick automobile dealer 
pursuant to a General Motors Sales and Service Agreement-Buick 
Division and as a Jeep/Eagle dealer pursuant to a Sales and Service 
Agreement with Chrysler Corporation, The said business (located in 
Ogden, Utah) may at times hereinafter be referred to as the 
"Dealership". The aforementioned sales and service agreement may 
at times hereinafter be referred to as the "Franchise Agreements"; 
and 
WHEREAS, Seller is desirous of selling certain specified assets used 
in the Dealership business and Purchaser is desirous of purchasing 
certain specified assets used in the operation of the Dealership 
related to Buick, pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth 
herein; and 
WHEREAS, the Seller has represented and does hereby represent 
that this "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Assets" is entered into 
pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors of HELSCO, Inc. and 
approved by unanimous consent of the shareholders of the 
corporation, a copy of said resolution and consent to be provided to 
Purchaser prior to the Closing Date of the transaction; and 
WHEREAS, the parties, by this Agreement set forth the purchase 
price, terms, and conditions upon which the parties desire to proceed; 
and 
ly^ 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the purchase price hereinafter 
set forth and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt 
and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is mutually 
agreed by and between the Seller and Purchaser as follows: 
1. ASSETS PURCHASED AND PURCHASE PRICE. The Seller agrees to 
sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase the following assets ( the 
"purchased assets") at the price as established in this paragraph: 
a. Parts Inventory. Ail Buick factory parts listed in the Buick 
Factory Price Catalog as being current parts on or about the date of 
closing shall be purchased by Purchaser. A physical inventory will 
be conducted three days prior to the date of closing under this 
agreement by representatives of both Buyer and Seller and mutually 
agreed to by both Buyer and Seller. Purchaser agrees to purchase 
said inventory at current factory catalog prices , to the extent the 
parts and accessories are current items in the Buick catalog. It is 
specifically agreed that items in parts inventory which are partial 
cases, etc. which are not returnable to the factory will be purchased 
at mutually-agreed prices, so long as the items are in usable 
condition. The purchase price of all inventory items not returnable 
to Buick shall be negotiated by and between the parties. If the 
parties are unable to reach agreement regarding the value of non-
current parts, then an appraiser mutually agreeable to the parties 
shall be selected to establish the value. The cost of such an appraisal 
shall be shared equally by the parties. The purchase price of the 
parts inventory shall be adjusted to the date of closing. An exhibit 
to this agreement shall be prepared prior to closing which identifies 
the parts and accessories to be purchased and the respective 
purchase price individually and in the aggregate. 
b. Fixed assets and personal property. The Seller will create 
an inventory of fixed assets and personal property of the Dealership, 
if any, remaining subsequent to the auction conducted by Zion's Bank 
and will provide same to Purchaser. Purchaser agrees to purchase 
Buick special tools at Seller's cost and to purchase Buick advertising 
materials/showroom display materials at Sellers cost as shown on 
Exhibit A to this agreement to be prepared and agreed to prior to 
closing, to the extent the advertising materials and displays are 
current and usable for 1993 models, Buick special tools and their 
related storage containers will be purchased at Seller's cost only to 
the extent they are no more than three years old and to the extent 
they are usable, full sets. Usable full sets of special tools that are 
more than three years old will be purchased by Buyer at mutually-
agreed amounts, provided that if amounts cannot be mutually agreed 
upon, the purchase price will be determined by independent 
appraisal. Cost of such appraisal to be shared equally by Purchaser 
and Seller. Other fixed assets and personal property shall be 
purchased at mutually-agreed upon amounts. A listing of assets to 
be purchased and amounts to be paid therefor shall be prepared by 
the Seller and signed by Purchaser and Seller prior to closing. If 
Purchaser and Seller cannot agree on a price, an appraiser mutually 
acceptable to the parties shall be selected to establish the value, and 
the cost of the appraisal shall be shared equally by the parties. The 
purchase price of property which is subject to a security interest of 
Zion's Bank or GMAC will be paid to respective lender as provided 
herein. 
The sum of the items above shall be defined as the "purchase price". 
2. PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price, as set forth 
above, shall be paid in immediately available funds by Purchaser to 
Seller on the closing date. Said payment will be made to the Escrow 
Agent hereinafter designated and disbursed by the Escrow Agent to 
secured/priority creditors of Seller , including the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission, as directed by Seller. 
3. CLOSING DATE. The closing date will occur within three business 
days of receipt by Purchaser of a General. Motors Sales and Service 
Agreement-Buick Division, Provided, however, If closing does not 
occur before October 31, 1992, the parties shall be relieved from 
performing the terms and conditions of this Agreement and further 
relieved from any claims arising hereunder. Provided, however, that 
such closing date may be extended by written mutual agreement of 
the parties to this Agreement, 
4. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS OF SELLER. Seller hereby 
represents and warrants as follows: 
a. Title, Seller will transfer to Purchaser good and marketable 
title to ail of the assets purchased hereunder, free and clear of all 
liens and encumbrances. 
b. Bulk Sales. Seller shall cooperate in all respects in fulfilling 
and complying with the terms of the Utah Bulk Sales Law. 
c. Authorization. Seller is a corporation duly organized, validly 
existing and in good standing under the laws of the state of Alabama 
and has all necessary corporate power and authority to consummate 
the transactions contemplated herein. This agreement has been duly 
authorized and executed pursuant to all necessary corporate action 
and constitutes a valid obligation of the Seller. The Seller will cause 
to be executed the appropriate corporate resolution and shareholder 
consent to allow closing of the transaction. 
d. Transfer of the franchise agreement. Following the execution of 
this agreement and upon payment of the agreed upon sums into 
escrow, Seller will use its best efforts to assist purchaser in obtaining 
the consent and approval of Buick Motor Division necessary to allow 
the granting of the General Motors Sales and Service Agreement-
Buick Division to Purchaser. 
e. Compliance with law. To the best knowledge of Seller, the 
operations of Seller have not violated any federal, state, or local laws, 
regulations or orders to the extent that any such violation would 
materially and adversely affect Seller or Seller's ability to perform 
its obligations set forth in this agreement. 
f. Litigation. 
(1) Seller has not received notice and has no knowledge of any claim 
or demand, either pending or threatened, asserted against, affecting 
or involving Seller or its business, assets, properties, rights or 
operations which would materially affect the ability of Seller to carry 
out the transactions contemplated by this agreement, except for 
pending litigation between Seller and James Whetton , et, al„ which 
litigation will be settled and dismissed, by offset of claims and 
mutual releases of all parties, within two business days of the 
execution of this Agreement. 
(2) There is to the best knowledge of Seller's executive officers no 
litigation, action, proceeding or investigation pending or threatened 
( or any basis therefor known to such persons) before any court, 
administrative agency or other governmental body or arbitrator by, 
against, affecting or involving Seller or any of its business, assets, 
properties, rights or operations or which would materially affect the 
abilities of Seller to carry out the transactions contemplated by this 
agreement. 
g. Brokers or Finder's Fees. Seller has not incurred nor will it 
incur any liability for broker's fees or finders fees. Purchaser 
acknowledges it has not incurred any broker's or finder's fees in 
connection with this transaction. 
5. Transfer of assets. All of the purchased assets shall be 
transferred to Purchaser by Seller on the closing date by appropriate 
legal documents.. 
6. Warranties and representations of Purchaser, 
a. Authorization. Purchaser is a corporation duly 
organized , validly existing and in good standing under the laws of 
the state of Delaware and has all necessary corporate power and 
authority to consummate the transactions contemplated herein. This 
agreement has been duly authorized by all necessary corporate 
action, has been executed, and constitutes a valid obligation of 
Purchaser. Documentation of such corporate authorization will be 
provided at closing. 
b. Franchise application. Purchaser warrants that 
Purchaser is an experienced automobile dealer and is aware of the 
requirements which must be met in order to obtain the 
Buick franchise. Purchaser agrees to promptly perform all acts 
necessary to obtain prompt approval of such applications. It is 
acknowledged that time is of the essence in the performance of the 
terms and conditions of this agreement. John Watson, as a 
stockholder of Purchaser, warrants and guarantees that he 
personally and the Purchaser will perform all acts necessary to fulfill 
this agreement and to effect the transfers of assets contemplated by 
this agreement. By execution of this agreement, John Watson 
acknowledges receipt of good and valuable consideration for the 
guarantee set forth in this paragraph and, hence, his execution of this 
agreement. This personal guarantee includes payment of the 
$120,000 referred to herein but is limited to said sum in dollar 
amount. 
c. Ownership. Purchaser is a corporation owned by John 
Watson, Beanstalk Limited Partnership, and J. Merrill Bean. There 
are no ownership interests (partnership, joint venture, or otherwise) 
by any other individuals, corporations, or partnerships with respect 
to John Watson Chevrolet or with respect to any entity which will 
operate the Buick dealership or its successor companies, if any, 
Purchaser represents that James J. Whetton, individually or through 
a corporation or partnership, does not have an ownership interest in 
Beanstalk Limited Partnership. As of the date of this Agreement, it is 
not contemplated there will be any change of ownership in John 
Watson Chevrolet Geo, or its subsidiaries or affiliated companies 
which are in the business of selling or leasing automobiles and 
trucks. 
7. Access to records and properties, From and after the 
execution hereof until the closing date, Seller agrees to permit 
purchaser to make investigation of seller's business records relevant 
to this transaction. Seller shall give to Purchaser access to relevant 
records at reasonable hours and shall furnish such documents as are 
requested and are relevant to this transaction. All such information 
revealed to Purchaser shall be held by it, its agents and employees, 
as confidential. 
8. Conditions to closing. 
a. Accuracy of representations and warranties. All of the 
representations and warranties made by Seller and Purchaser in this 
Agreement shall be correct and complete in all material respects at 
and as of the closing date, except to the extent such representations 
and warranties may have been affected by changes specifically 
permitted by this Agreement. 
b. No action or proceeding. No claim, action, suit, 
investigation or other proceeding shall be pending or threatened 
before any court or governmental body which presents a substantial 
risk of the restraint or prohibition of the transaction contemplated 
by this Agreement. It is agreed by the parties hereto that, 
simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement, the litigation 
between the Seller and James Whetton, et. al., will be settled and 
dismissed, as described herein. 
c. Purchaser shall submit all required Buick Motor 
Division documents to be appointed the Buick Dealer in Ogden, Utah, 
d. Compliance with terms. On the closing date, all of the 
terms, conditions and covenants of this Agreement to be complied 
with, performed or observed by Purchaser and Seller at or before the 
closing date shall have been complied with, performed or observed, 
in all material respects. 
e. Approval of documentation. The form and substance 
of all certificates, instruments, opinions and other documents 
delivered under this Agreement shall be satisfactory to the attorneys 
for the Purchaser and the Seller. 
f. Time being of the essence, Purchaser shall receive at 
least verbal approval as a Buick dealer in Ogden, Utah and verbal 
approval of this Agreement within twenty-one (21) days of the date 
of execution of this Agreement, In the event such approval is not 
received within that period, Seller, solely within its discretion, may 
at any time exercise its right to terminate this Agreement upon 
forty-eight (48) hours prior written notice. If Seller terminates this 
Agreement as provided in this subparagraph 8 (f), the escrowed 
funds and the interest, if any, earned thereon while in the account, 
will be returned to Purchaser. 
9. Termination. 
a. Anything, in this Agreement to the contrary 
notwithstanding, this Agreement may be terminated and abandoned 
at any time prior to closing; 
(1) by mutual written consent of all parties hereto; 
(2) notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, if 
the closing has not occurred by October 31, 1992, and if prior to that 
date neither Seller or Purchaser have terminated the Agreement, 
then this Agreement shall automatically terminate unless extended 
in writing signed by all parties hereto. 
10. Notices. All notices and other documents to be given by 
any party or parties to this agreement to any other party or parties 
hereto shall be in writing, and shall be given in person or by 
depositing in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
To Seller; To Purchaser: 
Mr. Noel Hyde, Esq, Mr. John L, Watson JJTU 
Nielsen & Senior John Watson Chevrolet/ ^ e 
Eagle Gate Tower 3535 Wall Avenue / 
Salt Lake City, UT Ogden, UT 84401 
or to such other address as such party may provide by notice given 
in the manner herein prescribed. Any such notice shall be deemed 
effective upon such personal delivery or upon the third day 
following its deposit in the mail as specified above. 
11. General provisions. The following additional general 
provisions shall apply to this agreement: 
a. This agreement has been executed in and shall be 
governed by the laws of the state of Utah. 
b. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding 
between the parties hereto and may not be altered, amended or 
revoked except by the written agreement of all of the parties or as 
provided for herein. 
c. This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be 
binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, and personal 
representatives. 
i i 
d. This agreement may not be assigned without written 
consent of Seller. 
I 
e. The parties agree that, should a dispute arise in the 
consummation of the transaction contemplated herein, said dispute 
will be resolved by submission of the matter for arbitration. Said 
arbitration will be by an individual or organization which has 
professional certification by a national organization as an arbitrator. 
The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding on ail parties. 
f. The paragraph headings used herein are for 
convenience only and shall not be deemed to modify or construe the 
provisions of this agreement. , 
g. Each of the parties shall pay ail of their own costs and 
expenses (including attorney's fees and accountant fees) incurred or 
to be incurred by it or them in negotiating and preparing this 
agreement and in closing and carrying out the transactions 
contemplated by this agreement. This provision shall be in effect 
whether or not the contemplated closing shall occur, 
h. All representations, warranties, convenants and 
agreements of the parties contained in this agreement or in any 
exhibit, instrument, certificate, opinion or other writing provided for 
in it, shall survive the closing date. 
12. Escrow payment, Contemporaneously with the execution 
of this agreement, Purchaser will deliver to Nielsen & Senior, as 
escrow agent, (Escrow Agent), the sum of $120,000. Funds 
representing the purchase price as defined herein will also be 
deposited with the escrow agent at closing. The total of the funds 
deposited and interest earned thereon (the Escrowed Funds) will be 
held by the Escrow Agent until closing. Escrow Agent agrees to hold 
the Escrowed Funds in an interest-bearing account. At the closing 
date, the Escrowed Funds will be disbursed by the Escrow Agent 
upon written approval of Purchaser and Seller to the Internal 
Revenue Service and the State of Utah Tax Commission in full 
settlement of amounts owed. The remainder of the Escrowed Funds, 
if any, will be disbursed to James & CoM Certified Public Accountants, 
who will then disburse such funds to the secured and preference 
creditors, and to unsecured creditors, to the extent of remaining 
funds after payment of secured and preference creditors. Lien 
releases will be obtained by Seller's agent concurrent with payments 
to the Internal Revenue Service, the State of Utah Tax Commission, 
and secured and preference creditors, 
a. If Purchaser fails to close after appointment as a Buick 
dealer in Ogden, Utah, the Escrowed Funds will be paid to Seller as 
liquidated damages. 
b. It is acknowledged that, from the Escrowed Funds 
representing the purchase price, $81,531.78 will be paid at closing to 
the Internal Revenue Service and that (approximately $38,000-exact 
amount to be inserted] will be paid at closing to the Utah State Tax 
Commission, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this agreement has been executed as of the 
day and year first above written. 
SELLER: 
HELSCQjnc, 
David KochX 
Its President 
ESCROW AGENT: 
Nielsen & Senior 
BUYER: 
& 
^r*/*~ 
John Watson Chevrolet, Gco-
Its Present 
tfimfart. 
John Watson, Guarantor 
with-respect to the items in 
paragraph 6 above 
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AND 
CONSULTING AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, is made effective as of this ?/ day of August, 
1992 by and between John Watson Chevrolet -Gee, Inc., a Utah ^ 6 * 
corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Purchaser" and David Koch 
(hereinafter referred to as "Koch"). 
WHEREAS, Koch is the owner of approximately 15% of the 
issued and outstanding stock of HELSCO, Inc. , an Alabama 
corporation dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle which operates a Buick and 
Jeep/Eagle automobile and truck dealership located in Ogden, Utah; 
and 
WHEREAS, Purchaser has agreed to purchase certain specified 
assets from HELSCO in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
that certain "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Assets", dated the 
*T/ "*clay of August, 1992 (the Purchase Agreement); and 
WHEREAS, Purchaser desires to obtain a Covenant Not to 
Compete and Consulting Agreement from Koch, and whereas Koch is 
willing to execute such a Covenant Not to Compete and Consulting 
Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth herein; and 
WHEREAS, Koch has agreed with Purchaser to assist the 
Purchaser in its marketing efforts and business pursuits in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements contained herein and other good and valuable 
consideration and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties 
covenant and agree as follows: 
1. TERM. The term of this agreement shall be three years 
effective on the date first written and continuing thereafter for three 
consecutive years; 
2. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT. It is acknowledged by the parties 
that Koch has been substantially involved in the operation of the 
automobile dealership described in this agreement as a stockholder, 
an officer, director, and as general manager of the dealership during 
the period HELSCO has operated the automobile dealership described 
in this agreement for a substantial period of time, Koch has 
developed not only expertise in the operation of the business, but 
also expertise in marketing strategies which have lead to a 
substantial customer base in the dealership's relevant market area. 
Koch has knowledge of the books and records of the dealership 
together with the knowledge of the knowledge of the propensities of 
the franchisors to establish or relocate the dealership within Davis, 
Weber, or Box Elder counties. Koch agrees that he will not , for a 
period of three years from the effective date of this agreement, 
directly or indirectly as a sole proprietorship, as an equity member 
of a partnership, as an officer of a joint venture, association or 
corporation, or as a stockholder owning more than ten percent of the 
outstanding stock of a corporation in competition with Purchaser 
compete with Purchaser as a Buick new car or truck dealer in Davis, 
Weber, or Box Elder counties, State of Utah, 
In the event the length of time, type of activity, geographic 
area, or other restrictions set forth in this paragraph are deemed 
unreasonable in any court proceeding, the parties agree that the 
court may reduce such restrictions in such a manner as it deems 
reasonable to protect the substantial investment Purchaser has made 
in the dealership. 
3. CONSULTING SERVICES. Purchaser hereby engages Koch to 
consult with Purchaser on an as-needed basis and upon reasonable 
notice with respect to the operation of the Buick dealership located in 
Ogden, Utah. Koch agrees to furnish such consulting services as and 
when call upon by the Purchaser and at such times as Koch is 
available. Koch agrees to use his best efforts to promote the 
continuation and growth and profitability of the Buick dealership, 
4. COMPENSATION. Purchaser agrees to pay Koch the sum of 
$50,000 in consideration for the covenants set forth in this 
agreement. This amount is included in the $120,000 paid into 
escrow by Purchaser under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. 
Payment shall be made in full on the closing date of the "Purchase 
Agreement" referred to herein. Ail compensation paid to Koch under 
this Agreement will be invested in HELSCO, to pay obligations of 
HELSCO to the Internal Revenue Service for the trust portion of 
payroll taxes withheld and to the Utah State Tax Commission for 
sales taxes collected. 
5. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS. Koch shall be deemed 
an independent contractor in fulfilling the terms of this agreement, 
and Purchaser shall not be responsible for tax withholding. 
6. REMEDIES. 
a. In addition to other rights of the parties as provided 
by law, Purchaser shall be entitled to enforce this agreement by 
injunction or restraining order, in addition to any other damages 
which may be proven, including actual attorney's fees, costs and 
expert witness fees which may be required to enforce the 
agreement. 
b. In the event of breach or default in the performance 
of this noncompetition and consulting agreement by either party, the 
parties agree to enter into binding arbitration , using an individual or 
organization which has professional certification as an arbitrator, 
7. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matters 
contained herein and supersedes any prior agreements. No 
supplement, modification, or amendment to this agreement shall be 
deemed, or shall constitute a v/aiver of any other provision, whether 
or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver. 
No such amendment, modification, or waiver shall be binding unless 
. executed in writing by the parties, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this 
agreement the date and year first above written. 
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AND 
CONSULTING AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, is made effective as of this ZTS day of Augu 
1992 by and between John Watson Chevrolet Ge©> Inc., a Utah 
corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Purchaser" and Henry P. 
Mixon (hereinafter referred to as "Mixon"). 
WHEREAS, Mixon is the owner of approximately 85% of the 
issued and outstanding stock of HELSCO, Inc. , an Alabama 
corporation dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle which operates a Buick and 
Jeep/Eagle automobile and truck dealership located in Ogden, Utah; 
and 
WHEREAS, Purchaser has agreed to' purchase certain specified 
assets from HELSCO in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
that certain "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Assets", dated the 
gsr^** ^  dav of August, 1992 (the Purchase Agreement); and 
WHEREAS, Purchaser desires to obtain a Covenant Not to 
Compete and Consulting Agreement from Mixon, and whereas Mixon 
is willing to execute such a Covenant Not to Compete and Consulting 
Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth herein; and 
WHEREAS, Mixon has agreed with Purchaser to assist the 
Purchaser in its marketing efforts and business pursuits in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements contained herein and other good and valuable 
consideration and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties 
covenant and agree as follows: 
1. TERM. The term of this agreement shall be two years 
effective on the date first written and continuing thereafter for two 
consecutive years; 
2. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT. It is acknowledged by the parties 
that Mixon has been involved as a stockholder in HELSCO, Inc, 
during the period HELSCO has operated the automobile dealership 
described in this agreement for a substantial period of time. As a 
stockholder and investor, Mixon has developed not only expertise in 
the automobile business, but also expertise in marketing strategies, 
valuable relationships with Buick Motor Division and its 
representatives, and other relationships acknowledged by the parties 
hereto to be valuable to the ongoing success of the Buick franchise. 
Further, Mixon has numerous important business contacts in the 
state of Utah who represent potential buyers of products and 
services of the successor dealership. Mixon agrees that he will not , 
for a period of three years from the effective date of this agreement, 
directly or indirectly as a sole proprietorship, as an equity member 
of a partnership, as an officer of a joint venture, association or 
corporation, or as a stockholder owning more than ten percent of the 
outstanding stock of a corporation in competition with Purchaser 
compete with Purchaser as a Buick new car or truck dealer in Davis, 
Weber, or Box Elder counties, State of Utah. 
In the event the length of time, type of activity, geographic 
area, or other restrictions set forth in this paragraph are deemed 
unreasonable in any court proceeding, the parties agree that the 
court may reduce such restrictions in such a manner as it deems 
reasonable to protect the substantial investment Purchaser has made 
in the dealership. 
3, CONSULTING SERVICES. Purchaser hereby engages Mixon to 
consult with Purchaser on an as-needed basis and upon reasonable 
notice with respect to the operation of the Buick dealership located in 
Ogden, Utah. Consulting services under this agreement will be 
related to knowledge acquired as a stockholder of HELSCO during the 
period HELSCO operated the dealership. It is understood by the 
parties that Mixon has other business and professional relationships 
which may restrict the services he can provide. Accordingly, it is 
acknowledged by the parties that Mixon will not be required to 
perform any consulting services which are inconsistent with those 
business and professional relationships. Mixon represents, however, 
that he has no business relationships which are in the automobile 
industry which would prevent his performance under this 
agreement. Mixon agrees to furnish such consulting services as and 
when call upon by the Purchaser and at such times as Mixon is 
available. Mixon agrees to use his best efforts to promote the 
continuation and growth and profitability of the Buick dealership. 
4. COMPENSATION. Purchaser agrees to pay Mixon the sum of 
$70,000 in consideration for the covenants set forth in this 
agreement This amount is included in the $120,000 paid into 
escrow by Purchaser under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, 
Payment shall be made in full on the closing date of the "Purchase 
Agreement" referred to herein. This consideration has been 
negotiated by the parties based upon the understanding and 
assumption that there shall remain no obligations owing to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for payroll tax trust funds or to the 
Utah State Tax Commission ( Tax Commission) for sales taxes, after 
application of the proceeds of sale under the Agreement for Sale and 
Purchase of Assets and after application of money to which 
Purchaser is entitled to offset or withhold from David Koch , The 
value of such consulting and non-compete arrangements shall be 
lower if such obligations do exist. If, therefore, there remain any IRS 
or Tax Commission obligations, the consideration to Mixon shall be 
reduced by the amount of the remaining IRS and Tax Commission 
obligations. Mixon shall have no direct or indirect interest in those 
moneys, and Purchaser shall pay such amounts directly to the IRS 
and to the Tax Commission 
5. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS. Mixon shall be deemed 
an independent contractor in fulfilling the terms of this agreement, 
and Purchaser shall not be responsible for tax withholding. 
6. REMEDIES. 
a. In addition to other rights of the parties as provided 
by law, Purchaser shall be entitled to enforce this agreement by 
injunction or restraining order, in addition to any other damages 
which may be proven, including actual attorney's fees, costs and 
expert witness fees which may be required to enforce the 
agreement, 
b. In the event of breach or default in the performance 
of this noncompetition and consulting agreement by either party, the 
parties agree to enter into binding arbitration , using an individual or 
organization which has professional certification as an arbitrator. 
7. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matter 
contained herein and supersedes any prior agreements. No 
supplement, modification, or amendment to this agreement shall be 
deemed, or shall constitute a waiver of any other provision, whether 
or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver. 
No such amendment, modification, or waiver shall be binding unless 
executed in writing by the parties. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this 
agreement the date and year first above written. 
John Watson C h e v r o l e ^ - ^ ^ f ^ S ^ / ^ Henry P. Mixon 
t 
Its President 
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1 MR. STEPHENS: Objection, assumes facts, 
2 vague. 
3 THE WITNESS: Well, in the negotiations on 
4 this, we were assured that John Watson could get James 
5 Whetton to lift the restraining order. 
6 Q. (BY MR. BEAN) Okay. Is that how you 
7 expected that to be done, is through John Watson? 
8 A. Exactly. 
9 Q. And was that an understanding that was 
10 expressed at the time that you negotiated this Exhibit 
11 4 contract? 
12 A. That's as it was expressed to me, yes. 
13 Q. At the time that that occurred, did you have 
14 any conversations with anybody representing Buick 
15 Motor Division that that was how that restraining 
16 order was going to get handled? 
17 A. One telephone conversation. 
18 Q. Do you recall who that was with? 
19 A. I cannot recall. It was either Chris Wolf or 
20 his successor. I can't recall his name right off the 
21 top of my head. 
22 Q. If I gave you a name, would you recognize it? 
23 A. I'm sure I would. 
24 I Q. Mr. Garove, Tom Garove? 
25 | A. That's him, yeah. 
19 
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1 Q. When you say you had one conversation, do you 
2 recall about when that occurred? 
3 A. I can't give you a date on that right off the 
4 top of my head, no. 
5 Q. Would it have been after the execution of 
6 this agreement or before, if you can recall? 
7 MR. STEPHENS: Again, Exhibit 4? 
8 Q. (BY MR. BEAN) Exhibit 4. 
9 A. My guess would be before, and without 
10 actually having my diaries or anything to 
11 double-check, I would just have to -- I'm almost 
12 certain it was before, but I'm not positive. 
13 Q. Do you recall what was said in that 
14 conversation or -- I don't mean the exact words, but 
15 the nature, the substance of the conversation, what 
16 was being discussed? 
17 A. Only that there was some concern by Buick 
18 Motor Division that James Whetton was employed by the 
19 purchasing -- the company we were planning to let 
2 0 purchase the franchise and the concern was that James 
21 Whetton would somehow be involved in the new 
22 franchise. Without recalling exact verbiage or any of 
23 that, there was strong opposition to that. 
24 Q. To your knowledge, was that concern ever 
25 realized? That is, to your knowledge, was Mr. Whetton 
20 
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1 WHETTON BECAUSE NO ONE ELSE WAS ABLE TO DO THAT. 
2 Q THAT'S CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE, 
3 EXHIBIT 9, IS IT NOT? 
4 A IT IS NOT — IT'S IDENTIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT 
5 OF SALE BUT POTENTIALLY MAYBE NOT INTERPRETED IN THE 
6 AGREEMENT OF SALE AS I JUST STATED. 
7 Q IN FACT, LOOKING AT PAGE 5, PARAGRAPH F(l) ON 
8 EXHIBIT 9, IT REFERS TO A "PENDING LITIGATION BETWEEN 
9 SELLER AND JAMES WHETTON, ET AL., WHICH LITIGATION WILL 
10 BE SETTLED AND DISMISSED BY OFFSET OF CLAIMS AND MUTUAL 
11 RELEASES OF ALL PARTIES WITHIN TWO BUSINESS DAYS OF THE 
12 EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT." 
13 A YES, SIR, AND THAT WAS INTENDED THAT JOHN 
14 WATSON WOULD BE THE ONE TO SETTLE THAT CLAIM OR GET MR. 
15 WHETTON TO RELEASE THE RESTRAINING ORDER OR PETITION THE 
16 COURT TO RELEASE THE RESTRAINING ORDER. 
17 Q DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST HAD YOU HAD ANY 
18 DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. WHETTON OR AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO 
19 AUGUST 31 OF 1992 WITH MR. WHETTON ABOUT SETTLING HIS 
20 CLAIMS AGAINST HELSCO, DBA SIERRA BUICK? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q HOW MANY SUCH CONVERSATIONS DID YOU HAVE? 
23 A I COULDN'T TELL YOU THE NUMBER OF 
24 CONVERSATIONS, BUT I HAD GONE TO MR. WHETTON AND PLEADED 
25 WITH HIM THAT IF IN FACT I BECAME THE BUICK DEALER IN 
54 
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1 A I don't recall what caused it to be lifted 
2 specifically. I didn't lift it. Are you sayii 
3 did we get a bond posted or as a result of not 
4 posting the bond was it lifted? 
5 QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN: 
6 Q Yes. 
7 A My recollection was it was not lifted at the 
8 time of this, and my recollection is that the 
9 judge did not require the posting of the bond, 
10 as is normally required by law. 
11 Q I show you Exhibit 8, and ask you to read 
12 through that exhibit. 
13 A Okay. 
14 Q Was a pretrial conference referred to in that 
15 document actually held, to your knowledge? 
16 MR. STEPHENS: Objection, no 
17 foundation. 
18 A I don't know if this particular one was held or 
19 not. 
20 QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN: 
21 Q Do you recall attending a pretrial conference 
22 in connection with the lifting of the 
23 II restraining order? 
24 || A There were so many meetings and discussions. I 
25 || don't -- I mean, this one appears to have been 
Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services 
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Utah? 
Did I communicate that to Buick? 
Yes . 
I can't remember a particular conversation, but 
I do recall that was my belief at the time, and 
based upon that belief, it might have been 
communicated, but I can't say, yes, I told them 
that. 
Is there some reason why you did not tell them 
that there was an agreement between Helsco and 
John Watson Chevrolet, that John Watson 
Chevrolet would get the Whetton restraining 
order lifted as part of the Buy and Sell 
Agreement between Helsco and John Watson 
Chevrolet? 
MR. STEPHENS: That's vague, 
ambiguous, objection, also misstates testimony. 
THE WITNESS: Can you read that 
back or repeat it? 
COURT REPORTER: (Reading back) 
"QUESTION: Is there some reason why you 
did not tell them that there was an agreement 
between Helsco and John Watson Chevrolet, that 
John Watson Chevrolet would get the Whetton 
restraining order lifted as part of the Buy and 
Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services 
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Sell Agreement between Helsco and John Watson 
Chevrolet?" 
A I can't recall any particular reason for my 
failure to communicate information to Buick 
Motor Division. As to whether there was an 
agreement, I don't know that I would 
characterize it as an agreement until it 
actually happened. I mean, there was a 
discussion, if this, then that. I don't rec 
that ever being reduced to an agreement. Th 
discussion was, this will happen if this 
happens, and if you make it happen, fine. I 
don't know that that's an agreement. 
QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN: 
Q Was the execution of the Buy and Sell Agreement 
between John Watson Chevrolet and Helsco 
contingent upon the dismissal of the Buy and 
Sell Agreement -- excuse me, the restraining 
order in the Whetton lawsuit? 
MR. STEPHENS: Objection, leading 
The agreement speaks for itself. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Would you 
read back the question again now that I have 
looked at the agreement? 
COURT REPORTER: (Reading back) 
Sunbelt Reporting &L Litigation Services 
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Q And you indicate that that was a verbal 
agreement. 
A Yes, that's what it says. 
Q Did you also tell Buick Motor Company at some 
time along the way, representatives of Buick 
Motor Company --
MR. STEPHENS: Division. 
QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN: 
Q -- that the restraining order could be lifted by 
John Watson and Merrill Bean if they were 
appointed the dealer operator at Ogden, Utah? 
MR. STEPHENS: Objection, leading. 
A I don't recall specifically saying it, but it 
may have happened. It may have happened. 
QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN: 
Q Did you tell anyone at Buick Motor Division that 
there was an agreement by them, that is Merrill 
Bean and John Watson and Jim Whetton, to dismiss 
the restraining order and the lawsuit, the 
lawsuit that John Whetton filed against Sierra 
Buick Jeep-Eagle --
MR. STEPHENS: Objection, leading, 
compound. 
QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN: 
Q -- if they were appointed the dealer at Ogden, 
Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services 
(713)667-0763 
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jctober 7, 1992 
f Eric E. Peterson, Director 
Dealer Network Development 
Subject: Financial Intervention 
Ogden, Utah 
Attention: Dale Brinkman, Dealer Operations Manager-
West 
The attached business case on the above subject c i t y i s being forwarded 
to for your review and as s i s tance in obtaining the necessary approval 
to f a c i l i t a t e f inanc ia l intervent ion in Ogden, Utah. 
Please c a l l Vorn Woodley or me i f you have quest ions concerning the 
attached business case . 
T. E. Garove 
Zone Manager 
Attachments 
'
>
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BUSINESS CASE ~ -
FOB 
>7T0?.^"S EYES DK-V 
Buick Franchise Purchase 
He l sco , Inc. dba S ierra Buick-Jeep Eagle 
Ogden, Utah 
ZONE; San Francisco DATE; 10 /6 /92 
PRESENT FIRM NAME; Helsco . Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle 
Ogden, Utah 
TYPE OF PROPOSAL; Financia l Intervent ion 
Purchase of our f ranch i se f o r "goodwil l" d o l l a r s t o 
f a c i l i t a t e the implementation o f the Year 2000 Plan 
in Ogden, Utah and prevent t h e Buick franchise from 
going into Bankruptcy Court. 
BACKGROUND; 
Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle became a Buick Dealer on 
December 12, 1989. Sometime a f ter becoming t h e Buick Dealer, the 
owners of He l sco , Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle found themselves in 
a l ega l d ispute with the s e l l e r , Jim Whet ton . On Apri l 2 , 1992, a f t e r 
finding i t s e l f i n a great deal of f i n a n c i a l t r o u b l e with the I n t e r n a l 
Revenue Serv i ce , the Utah State Tax Board and o t h e r c r e d i t o r s , H e l s c o , 
Inc, dba S ierra Buick Jeep-Eagle entered i n t o an "Agreement for S a l e 
and Purchase of Assets" with Rick Warner E n t e r p r i s e s , Inc. Rick Warner 
was proposed as the dealer /operator . During t h e review of the proposal 
package submitted t o Buick by Rick Warner E n t e r p r i s e s , I n c . , the Zone 
determined that Rick Warner did not have the n e c e s s a r y 15% required 
investment t o be named dealer /operator . While t h e review process was 
going on, Jim Whet ton, s e l l e r of the Buick f r a n c h i s e t o Helsco , Inc . 
f i l ed for and rece ived a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order which prevented 
Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep) Eagle from t r a n s f e r r i n g the a s s e t s 
of the Corporation t o Rick Warner Enterpr i s e s . Af ter months of l e g a l 
maneuvers and unsuccess fu l attempts by Helsco , Inc . t o have the 
restraining order l i f t e d , Helsco, Inc. and Rick Warner E n t e r p r i s e s , 
Inc. terminated t h e i r Agreement. Short ly , t h e r e a f t e r , Helsco , Inc . 
entered i n t o an "Agreement for Sale and Purchase o f Assets" with John 
Watson Chevrolet , Inc. This b u y - s e l l was f a c i l i t a t e d by the l i f t i n g of 
the temporary re s t ra in ing order which had e x i s t e d preventing such. 
The Zone has reviewed the s t i p u l a t i o n s of the "Agreement" as w e l l as 
the performance of the Dealer appl icant . The Zone has a l s o reviewed 
the Year 2000 Plan for Ogden, Utah with the o t h e r GM Div i s ions t h a t 
have representat ion in Odgen, Utah and concluded t h a t i t would be i n 
the best i n t e r e s t of General Motors that a l l e f f o r t s be made t o conform 
to the plans s e t forth. Those plans are for a Buick-Pontiac-GMC Truck 
dual, an Oldsmobile-Cadil lac dual and a Chevrolet stand alone. In an 
effort t o adhere to the Year 20(30 Dealer Network Plan for Odgen, Utah, 
the Zone i s proposing that Buick exerc i s e the Right of F i r s t Refusal by 
GG000006 
purchasing our franchise for "goodwill11 dollars as set forth in the 
"Agreement For Sale and Purchase of Assets" entered into between 
Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle and John Watson Chevrolet 
Inc. The dollar amount set forth in the Agreement is $120,000. 
RETUKN OF INVESTMENT: The Zone has discussed the option with the 
Fontiac zone management responsible for Ogden, Utah. In discussing the 
Year 2000 Plan with Kent Petersen, dealer/owner, Petersen Motor 
Company, Inc. the Pontiac/GMC Truck dealer In Ogden, Pontiacfs zone 
management was advised by Mr. Petersen that he would be very interested 
in acquiring the Buick franchise and dualling it with Pontiac and GMC 
Truck. The Zone will discuss, conditions and agreements with Mr. 
Petersen for the possibility of being awarded a Buick Motor Division -
General Motors Sales and Service Agreement. The conditions and 
Agreements will include the payment of $120,000 paid by Petersen Motor 
Companyt Inc. to Buick as repayment for the amount Buick would pay to 
purchase the Buick franchise for "goodwill" dollars from Helsco, Inc. 
dba Sierra Buick Jeep-Eagle. 
'^^}y/0 FINAL CONSIDERATION; Should Buick decide not to exercise the Right of 
i^fT First Refusal, then it is likely that Helsco, Inc. will file for 
\J^J^[^A^ bankruptcy and Buick may be forced to accept an unsatisfactory Dealer 
'Jy^t^^, as h o l d e r of the Buick franchise. Another consideration is that of 
rO^'^f1 fore8oin8 the implementation of the Year 2000 Dealer Network Plan for 
ijl^^'f Ogden, Utah by awarding John Watson Chevrolet the Buick Agreement. 
W The San Francisco Zone feels that given all of the particulars of the 
destiny of the Buick franchise in Ogden, Utah that exercising the Right 
of First Refusal and reassigning the $120,000 expense to Petersen Motor 
Company, Inc. is our best course of action and is in the best interest 
of General Motors long-term. 
Attachments are being provided to show the improving performance level r, 
of Petersen Motor Company, Inc. —» * t "T : ^ 
F0R *now**
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2 about was in a conversation between you and Mr. Woodley 
3 and Mr. Mixon; do I understand you correctly? 
4 A That's my recollection, yes. 
g Q Well, could it have been any other person 
6 with General Motors Corporation that would have been 
7 involved in that conversation? 
8 A No, we were the front line decision makers. 
9 Q So would it have been you and Mr. Woodley 
3*0 and Mr. Mixon - -
\\ A Right. 
i.2 Q --to your best recollection? 
JJ A Correct. 
14 Q Do you have any recollection, at this time, 
15 that it could have been anyone else involved in that 
16 conversation? 
17 A Would have been no reason. 
18 Q So, it wouldn't have been anyone else? 
19 A No. 
20 Q And as far as you know, there was no written 
21 authorization given by Mr. Mixon for that type of 
22 contact? 
23 A No. I may add, as I recall, the chronology 
24 of the events was upon receiving Mr. Mixon's verbal 
25 permission to contact other candidates. In this case, 
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Mr. Petersen's contact was made either by myself and/or 
Mr. Woodley, I can't recall. And that was followed up by 
further communication with Mr. Mixon, which would have --
which precipitated his understanding as documented in 
Exhibit 14. 
Q In Exhibit 14 though, he doesn't say 
anything about your contacting another dealer, does he, 
i another existing dealer? 
> MR. STEPHENS: Objection. The document 
speaks for itself. 
J A It does not state that, no. Let me read it 
J again. No, it does not state that. 
1 Q Your recommendation with regard to the 
5 options that were set forth in considering John Watson's 
6 application, it was clearly your recommendation and your 
7 representation to John Watson that there could be no 
8 dualing with Chevrolet; isn't that true? 
9 A That's correct. 
0 MR. STEPHENS: Can I talk to the witness 
1 again, please? 
2 (Whereupon, at this time, Mr. Stephens and 
3 the witness left the deposition room.) 
4 (Whereupon, at this time, the reporter 
5 marked the above-mentioned two-page document dated 
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1 A I indicated to Mr- Vansic if there was an 
2 opportunity, I would be happy to have the franchise. 
3 Either that afternoon or the next day, Mr. Tom Garove 
4 who was the San Francisco Zone Manager for Buick 
5 called me, said that he had been in touch with Jim 
6 Vansic, and that we had been highly recommended and 
7 would we be interested in taking that same agreement 
8 if they exercised their first right of refusal, would 
9 we step in and take the Buick franchise. 
10 Q When you say the same agreement, what are 
11 you referring to? 
12 A The agreement that was on the table on the 
13 buy and sale between John Watson and Sierra. 
14 Q Did Mr. Garove indicate to you whether or 
15 not at that time a decision had been made not to 
16 accept the John Watson application? 
17 A What he said was that it did not meet their 
18 criteria for Project 2000, and that inasmuch as the 
19 buy and sale was imminent, that they would like to 
20 align it so it would be properly aligned. 
21 Q Was any other reason given by Mr. Garove for 
22 the rejection of the Watson application, to your 
23 recollection? 
24 A He did not indicate anything to me. 
25 Q That was the only reason given? 
13 
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1 Q. Was he acting under your direction in any of 
2 the representations that are made in this note? 
3 A. Not under my direction, no. 
4 Q. Do you know if he was acting under direction 
5 of the board of directors generally, that is whether 
6 there had been a resolution passed or anything like 
7 that that authorized Mr. Mixon to represent the 
8 corporation in this capacity? 
9 MR. STEPHENS: Objection, vague as to what 
10 capacity. Go ahead. 
11 THE WITNESS: I can't answer that question 
12 directly. I have no general knowledge of that. You 
13 have to remember that Henry Mixon, the board of this 
14 corporation, was myself, Henry Mixon7 s wife and one of 
15 his friends. They had a quorum to hold a board 
16 meeting or whatever in my total absence. So all I can 
17 go on concerning the board meetings is what I was 
18 told. If any meetings took place directing Henry to 
19 do any of this, I had no knowledge of it. 
20 Q. (BY MR. BEAN) Let's talk about that for a 
21 minute. Were board meetings held regularly, 
22 corporation board of directors meeting held regularly 
23 by this corporation? 
24 MR. STEPHENS: Objection, lacks foundation. 
25 THE WITNESS: Again, I have no direct 
23 
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A 
Q 
assets? 
I never recall such conversations. I don't know 
that I had to authorize them. That was their 
right. It wasn't up to me to authorize it, as I 
recall. 
Now, going back to one of my previous questions, 
did you have any conversations with Peterson 
Motor or any representatives of Peterson Motor 
Company at Ogden, Utah regarding their 
appointment as the dealer operator for Buick 
Motor Division at Ogden, Utah, any conversation 
with them as to their appointment? 
As I recall, we had discussions about the 
logistical arrangements once they were appointed 
or once it had been announced that they had been 
appointed, I mean, matters like getting the 
parts and doing this and doing that. I mean, 
that was just part of the winding down. 
Did you have any discussions with Peterson, 
anyone, any representative of Peterson Motor 
Company regarding their application for a Buick 
Dealer Sales and Service Agreement? 
I don't recall any, no. 
Did you receive any kind of payment from 
Peterson Motor Company for any of the assets of 
Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services 
(713)667-0763 
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2 A Prior to October 15th or after? 
3 Q Either before or after October 15th. 
4 A After October 15th, we discussed the details 
5 of executing Mr. Mixon's demonstrator, which was part of 
6 the terms of the buy-sell agreement which --
7 Q I guess I don't understand what you mean by 
8 buy-sell agreement. 
9 A Who was going to provide him with a car and 
10 how would he take delivery, through what dealership. 
11 Q Anything else that you can recall? 
12 A None specifically at this time. 
13 Q Do you recall conversations with anyone else 
14 representing Sierra Buick that relates to the purchase --
15 to the exercise of your right of first refusal or the 
16 purchase of the assets of Helsco d/b/a Sierra Buick that 
17 you have not told us about? 
18 A Mr. Mixon was our sole contact. 
19 Q He was your sole contact? 
2 0 A Yes. Mr. Koch was per -- Mr. Mixon had been 
21 relocated out of the area and was, at some point in time, 
22 unavailable. 
23 Q Regardless of where he was. So, you don't 
24 recall having any conversations with him? 
2 5 A No, there were none^ I can assure you of 
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2 of any such contact?' 
3 MR. STEPHENS: By Pontiac. 
4 A By Pontiac, no. 
5 Q By Pontiac. 
6 A No. 
7 Q Who in your zone would have made any such 
8 contact if the contact was made? 
9 MR. STEPHENS: He's Buick, not Pontiac. 
10 MR. BEAN: Yes, I understand that. 
11 A Now, you are referring to Buick? 
12 Q Yes, who in your zone. 
13 A In the Buick zone who would have made a 
14 contact? 
15 Q Yes, in your zone for Buick, who would have 
16 made a contact with Pontiac regarding such I contact with 
17 Kent P e t e r s e n ? 
18 MR. STEPHENS: At t h i s j u n c t u r e , i t a s sumes 
19 facts. 
20 A Yes, it would have been myself or 
21 Mr. Woodley. 
22 Q If Mr. Woodley had done that, would he have 
23 discussed that with you? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Then my question is, if that kind of contact 
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j was made, would that have been contrary to the basic 
| policy of General Motors that we discussed previously, 
4 about making contacts or accepting contacts from other 
5 persons while an application is being considered? 
5 A While an application is pending and being 
7 considered? 
8 Q Yes. 
9 A No, it wouldn't, if it's with the permission 
10 of the existing dealer. 
11 Q With the permission of, for example, Helsco? 
12 A Correct. 
13 Q Do you have any knowledge that Helsco gave 
14 such permission in this case? 
-15 A Yes. 
16 Q Tell us what your information is in that 
17 regard. 
18 A Once again, I can't recall the 
19 conversations, but it would have been a discussion with 
20 Mr. Mixon and myself and Mr. Woodley. 
21 Q And that would have been something that you 
22 would have done prior to notification to John Watson that 
23 he was being restricted as an applicant for that? 
24 A That's correct. 
25 Q Do you have any knowledge, at this time, 
ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK (212) 732-6190 
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^ that such a conversation did exist between you and 
|j Mr. Woodley and Helsco or Mr. Mixon? 
j| A I believe there was one yes, 
|j Q Well, when you said you believe there was 
$ one --
7 A I would say, yes. 
% Q --do you have a recollection of that 
9 conversation? 
0 A Once again, David, we are talking a few 
tl years back. To the best of my recollection, one took 
2 place, yes. 
3 Q In the documents that have been furnished to 
% me, Mr. Garove, I see some notations of telephone calls 
5 that you had with Mr. Whetton and with other persons 
6 relative to this transaction where you felt the necessity 
7 to make a memo of the call. 
8 A Correct. 
9 Q If you had had such a conversation with 
0 Mr. Mixon, would you have made a memo of that? 
!1 MR. STEPHENS: Objection. Argumentative. 
12 A Not in this particular case, no. 
13 Q Why not? 
14 A The reason I was taking memos on my 
!5 conversations from Mr. Whetton was, my concern about 
ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK (212) 732-6190 
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2 litigation that he may bring forward whatever the outcome 
-j of all of the circumstances that were going on in Ogden, 
4 Utah. At no time did I even consider that any litigation 
5 would be brought forward based on our exercise of right 
6 of first refusal. Therefore, I did not document any of 
7 the conversations. 
8 Q But you are saying that a conversation did 
9 take place? 
10 A That's correct. 
11 Q So, you are telling us that the exception to 
12 the policy is that if the dealer, existing dealer, 
_3 permits you to do that, then you can go ahead and do 
A that, make contact with other dealers, other prospective 
5 dealers; is that correct? 
L6 A It's not an exception to a policy. It's 
.7 just a normal business courtesy thac we would discuss it 
18 with our existing dealer prior to making a contact. 
19 Q Doesn't that allow you then to make 
20 comparisons between perspective dealers if you will 
21 follow that policy? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q is that something that is acceptable as a 
24 matter to General Motors, to your knowledge, to make 
l§5 those kinds of comparisons? 
ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK (212) 732-6190 
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2 A Yes. 
3 Q So then, what you are telling me, if I 
4 understand you correctly, is you can consider the 
5 application or the possibility of the strengths and 
6 weaknesses of many different dealers for a particular 
7 franchise all at the same time if you get permission from 
8 the existing dealer to do so; is that correct? 
9 A If that's the desires. And sales and 
10 service agreements, correction on the terminology. 
11 Q When you say if it's his desire, you mean if 
12 it's the existing dealer's desire? 
13 A Correct or he grants us permission based on 
14 our request. 
15 Q That's what I'm saying. So, if you are able 
16 to make comparisons of various applicants for sales and 
17 service agreement, you ask the existing dealer if he'll 
18 grant you the right to do that and then you can make 
19 comparisons with four or five prospective --
20 A Candidates. 
21 Q candidates for that dealer sales and 
22 service agreement; is that what you are telling me? 
23 A That's correct. 
24 Q And then when you do that, when you make 
25 those comparisons, do you look at all of the factors that 
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1 Garove 90 
2 you've discussed with us previously for each of those 
3 dealers to determine which is the strongest candidates 
4 for that sales and service agreement? 
5 A Yes, all of those items we've discussed. 
6 Q So, the fact that there may be a dealer who 
7 has an application with the Buick Division of General 
8 Motors and is first to have that application pending, it 
9 doesn't necessarily mean that his application will 
10 receive consideration solely on the merits of that 
%X application, that it may be compared with other 
12 prospective dealers if you desire to do so? 
£3 MR. STEPHENS: If the dealer desires. 
14 MR. BEAN: His point was he could ask the 
15 dealer and if the dealer gave his permission, at 
16 their request, they can do that. 
17 Q Isn't that so, sir? 
18 A That's correct. 
19 Q So, if you want to do that, you can do that 
20 by simply getting the dealer's permission to do that and 
21 you never get the permission in writing. Let me rephrase 
22 that. The permission from that existing dealer does not 
23 have to be in writing, it can be verbal; is that correct? 
24 A As in this case it was, correct. 
25 Q And the permission that you are talking 
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questions about Mr. Mixon with regard to this 
exhibit. Was there any type of action or any 
direction of you as president of the corporation to 
Mr. Mixon to make contact with Mr. Whetton or his 
attorneys or to make contact with Buick Motor Division 
with respect to that lawsuit? Do you understand the 
nature of my question? 
A. No, sir, I don't. 
Q. I'm trying to understand in what capacity 
Mr. Mixon was making representations as contained in 
this note to Buick Motor Division and making 
representations to Mr. Whetton, in what capacity he 
was representing HELSCO. 
MR. STEPHENS: Objection, it lacks 
foundation. It calls for representations in the 
letter, Exhibit 8, for the note to file letter 8, 
Exhibit 8. I think it's vague. I don't understand 
the question. Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I can't answer the question 
because I don't know what capacity he was trying to 
serve when he was doing this. 
Q. (BY MR. BEAN) That's the very thing I'm 
trying to get at. Did you direct him to do this as 
president of the corporation? 
Tab 9 
1 Q. When you say you had one conversation, do you 
2 recall about when that occurred? 
3 A. I can't give you a date on that right off the 
4 top of my head, no. 
5 Q. Would it have been after the execution of 
6 this agreement or before, if you can recall? 
7 MR. STEPHENS: Again, Exhibit 4? 
8 Q. (BY MR. BEAN) Exhibit 4. 
9 A. My guess would be before, and without 
10 actually having my diaries or anything to 
11 double-check, I would just have to -- I'm almost 
12 certain it was before, but I'm not positive. 
13 Q. Do you recall what was said in that 
14 conversation or -- I don't mean the exact words, but 
15 the nature, the substance of the conversation, what 
16 was being discussed? 
17 A. Only that there was some concern by Buick 
18 Motor Division that James Whetton was employed by the 
19 purchasing -- the company we were planning to let 
2 0 purchase the franchise and the concern was that James 
21 Whetton would somehow be involved in the new 
22 franchise. Without recalling exact verbiage or any of 
23 that, there was strong opposition to that. 
24 Q. To your knowledge, was that concern ever 
2 5 realized? That is, to your knowledge, was Mr. Whetton 
] 20 
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ever employed by John Watson Chevrolet? 
A. I believe so, as a salesman, but that was way 
prior to us even discussing the matter of the 
franchise purchase. 
Q. Did you indicate to anyone representing Buick 
Motor Company that John Watson may be able to get the 
restraining order dismissed? 
A. Yes, sir, that was in that phone 
conversation. 
Q. That was in that phone conversation? 
A. Yes. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 7 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q. I show you, Mr. Koch, what's been marked 
Exhibit 7 to the deposition and ask if you have --
aside from the first page which is a fax page, if you 
have seen the other two pages of that exhibit before. 
A. I don't believe so. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 8 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q. I show you what's been marked as Exhibit 8, 
Mr. Koch. I don't represent that you have seen this 
before. I, however, would like to ask you a couple of 
21 
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dealership, did you make any comments to anyone about 
whether or not this was contrary to the provisions of 
the Project 2000 realignment? 
A Again, to be honest with you, I don't recall 
that comment. 
Q So to your recollection, you didn't have any 
conversations with Mr. Vansic, Zone Manager of 
Pontiac, or with anybody at GMC Truck as to whether or 
not you should be the one or entitled to receive the 
Buick franchise rather than Rick Warner or anyone 
else? 
A The same answer. If I did, I don't recall 
it. You talk to these people once a month, and a lot 
of things are on the record. A lot of things are 
off. But I have no recollection of specifically 
saying, "Well, I ought to be the man to have Buick." 
Q When you heard that the Rick Warner 
application had been rejected, did you make any 
attempt at that time to file an application for the 
Buick Sales and Service Agreement? 
A No. 
Q Can you tell us why you didn't do it at that 
time? 
A I had heard that John was going to receive 
it and it had between Merrill and Jim Whetton. They 
11 
1 had had the inside track to receive it. I thought it 
2 was a done deal. In factf at one time I congratulated 
3 John on his acquisition of Buick about the time that 
4 we received the Mitsubishi franchise. And I had 
5 entered into negotiation with Warner on the 
6 Mitsubishi. So I thought it had been accomplished. 
7 And so I did not try to go into competition with him 
8 over it. 
9 Q Did you ever have any conversations with 
10 either David Cook or Henry Mixon about trying to 
11 buy or enter into a buy and sell agreement with Sierra 
12 Buick/Jeep/Eagle in connection with the Buick Sales 
13 and Service Agreement? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Is it fair to state, Mr. Petersen, that at 
16 that time and prior to the time you were contacted 
17 by Mr. Vansic, that you were not actively seeking the 
18 Buick Sales and Service Agreement for the Ogden area? 
19 A Probably. 
2 0 Q After you had the conversation with the 
21 Pontiac Zone Manager, did you then have conversations 
2 2 with anybody representing the Buick Zone? 
23 A Yes. 
2 4 Q Can you tell us who you had conversations 
2 5 with? 
12 
Tab 11 
Civil Action No. 94-1453 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI; NICK 
CRIVELLI CHEVROLET, INC.; 
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI and ORLANDO 
G. CRIVELLI, t/d/b/a CRIVELLI 
ENTERPRISES, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
OPINION 
ZIEGLER, Chief Judge. 
Pending before the court is the motion of defendant, 
General Motors Corporation, for summary judgment pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Defendant has moved for summary judgment 
with regard to two claims of plaintiffs, to wit, violation of the 
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act and tortious interference with 
contracts. General Motors also has moved to dismiss the claims 
of Nicholas Crivelli, Orlando Crivelli and Crivelli Enterprises. 
This case arises out of the attempted purchase of an 
automobile dealership in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania. In early 
1991, the owner of Scheidmantel Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. decided 
to sell his business, and entered into negotiations with Floyd 
McElwain, another auto dealer. Scheidmantel's franchise 
agreement with GM contained two clauses relevant to this action. 
One mandated that any sale or transfer of the franchise must 
first have GM's approval, and the other granted GM a right of 
first refusal prior to the final transfer of the franchise. In 
October 1991, Scheidmantel and McElwain signed an asset purchase 
»i»** 
agreement which would have transferred ownership to McElwain. GM 
approved the transfer, but McElwain rescinded the agreement on 
October 28, 1991. 
On November 20, 1991, Scheidmantel signed a second 
asset purchase agreement, this time with plaintiffs. In this 
agreement, plaintiffs sought to relocate the Oldsmobile-Cadillac 
dealership from Beaver Falls to the site of Nick Crivelli 
Chevrolet, Inc., in Vanport Pennsylvania, about five miles away. 
GM did not approve the Crivelli/Scheidmantel agreement, and in 
subsequent months plaintiffs modified the agreement in order to 
gain GM's approval. In doing so, they removed the condition that 
required the move. At the same time, however, GM began separate 
negotiations with McElwain, ultimately agreeing that if GM 
exercised its right of first refusal in the Scheidmantel 
franchise contract, McElwain would assume GM's rights and replace 
plaintiffs as the buyer. The GM/McElwain contract would have 
pre-empted any final sale from Scheidmantel to plaintiffs and 
would have given McElwain the dealership at the price and terms 
of the Crivelli/Scheidmantel agreement. 
By letter dated January 31, 1992, plaintiffs notified 
GM of their modified agreement with Scheidmantel. On February 
sixth, GM exercised its right of first refusal, and scheduled a 
closing for the Scheidmantel/McElwain transfer. In March 1992, 
however, before the final transfer of the dealership to any 
party, creditors forced the Scheidmantel dealership into Chapter 
7 bankruptcy proceedings. On April 23 the United States 
2 
Bankruptcy Court held an auction to dispose of the dealership and 
awarded the dealership to McElwain, as the ^ highest bidder. 
Plaintiffs claim that the actions of General Motors 
violated the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting manufacturers from 
unreasonably withholding approval of franchise transfers among 
auto dealers. Further, plaintiffs argue that the actions also 
give rise to a tortious claim involving intentional interference 
with performance of contract by a third person. Defendant argues 
that this case is ripe for summary judgment in its favor, as 
there are no issues of material fact and that defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We disagree. 
Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with any affidavits, show that there is no issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Celotex v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 
322 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, we 
must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that 
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986). Further, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 
held that 
[a]lthough a /scintilla of evidence' supporting the non-
movant's case is not sufficient to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment, it is clear that a district court should 
not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter 
itself, but instead, should determine whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial. 
Country Floors v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford. 930 F.2d at 
3 
1062 (3d Cir. 1991), citing Anderson. 477 U.S. at 252. 
Pennsylvania Statute 
Plaintiffs contend that defendant violated § 
818.9(b)(3) of the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, which 
states that it is unlawful "for any manufacturer . . . licensed 
under this act to [unreasonably withhold consent to the sale, 
transfer or exchange of the franchise to a qualified buyer 
capable of being licensed as a new vehicle dealer in this 
Commonwealth.11 Under the act, "any person who is or may be 
injured by a violation" may bring an action for damages. 63 
P.S.A. §818.20(a). 
Defendant argues that plaintiffs lack standing under 
this act because the statute "protects [only] the existing 
dealer's ability to obtain by 'sale' the value represented by 
'the franchise.'" Defendant's brief at 25. However, in Big 
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 
1383 (3d Cir. 1992)f cert, denied. 113 S.Ct. 1262 (1993), the 
Court of Appeals interpreted the statute to greoit standing to a 
prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership. Therefore, we 
hold that plaintiffs have standing to bring suit under the 
statute. 
Defendant also argues that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether GM reasonably denied the transfer of 
the franchise to plaintiffs, and that GM is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. We disagree. 
4 
Plaintiffs first submitted the Scheidmantel/Crivelli 
transfer application to defendant's local ?zone office" on 
December 10, 1991. At that time, the application included a plan 
to relocate the franchise to the site of Crivelli's current GM 
dealership. Subsequently, plaintiffs removed the condition, and 
notified defendant of the change on January 31, 1992. During the 
interim period, General Motors initiated negotiations with 
McElwain concerning the contractual right of first refusal. On 
February 6th, defendant exercised its right of refusal and 
notified plaintiffs of its action. GM contends that this 
amounted to nothing more than an exercise of its "considered 
business judgment," in selecting franchisees for its dealerships, 
and therefore was not unreasonable. Defendant's brief at 22. 
Plaintiffs rejoin that their modified agreement with Scheidmantel 
overcame all of defendant's stated objections, and that 
defendant's denial of permission to transfer the franchise 
violated the statute. 
We have considered In Re Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 13 
F.3d 674 (3d Cir. 1993), where the Court of Appeals found that an 
issue of material fact arose in a similar situation. In that 
case, under a similarly-interpreted New Jersey statute, a 
plaintiff contended that a manufacturer had modified conditions 
for approval of transfer. The Court found that a finder of fact 
would have to determine whether the denial of approval was 
unreasonable. Applying that teaching, we find that plaintiffs 
have adduced sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of 
5 
material fact. Plaintiffs' claim will survive summary judgment. 
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship 
GM further claims that its pre-existing right of first 
refusal precludes plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference 
with the performance of a contract. In its brief, defendant 
argues that because the right of first refusal existed in 
Scheidmantel's franchise contract before plaintiffs and 
Scheidmantel began negotiations for transfer of the franchise, 
General Motors acted within its rights. Defendant's brief at 10. 
Plaintiffs argue that the ultimate determination of 
whether a tort occurred should be based on whether GM violated 
the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act. In support, plaintiffs 
again cite Bia Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, 974 F.2d 
at 1380-1382 , as well as §767 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts• According to §767(a)# the nature of the actor's conduct 
should be a part of the determination of whether the conduct was 
improper. Further, the Comment on Clause (a) states that 
evidence of whether the conduct alleged was improper can include 
H[c]onduct specifically in violation of statutory provisions." 
In Big Apple BMW, the Court of Appeals found that because the 
"factual underpinnings of [the] tort claims are intertwined11 with 
the plaintiffs7 statutory claims, a finder of fact would need to 
determine whether the actions constituted improper interference. 
Big Apple BMW. Inc.. 974 F.2d at 1382. 
In considering these factors, we hold that a fact-finder 
6 
/ must make the determination as to defendant's liability on the 
tort claim. Because a genuine issue of material fact exists for 
the statutory claim, summary judgment is inappropriate on the 
tort claim. 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs 
Finally, GM also has moved to dismiss Nicholas 
Crivelli, individually, and Nicholas and Orlando Crivelli, doing 
business as Crivelli Enterprises. Defendant argues that Crivelli 
Enterprises can claim no injury from the events that occurred in 
this case. Plaintiffs agree. Therefore, we will dismiss those 
claims. Defendant also claims that Nicholas Crivelli personally 
should be dismissed from the case. We disagree, because Crivelli 
was a party to the second Scheidmantel/Crivelli agreement, and 
therefore Nicholas Crivelli may remain as a party to the action. 
An appropriate order will follow. 
Dated: December 1995 
cc: Counsel of Record 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI; NICK 
CRIVELLI CHEVROLET, INC.; 
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI and ORLANDO 
G. CRIVELLI, t/d/b/a CRIVELLI 
ENTERPRISES, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Civil Action No. 94-1453 
ORDER 
AND NOW, this m**** day of December, 1995, after 
consideration of the motion (document no. 5) of defendant 
General Motors Corporation for summary judgment pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion be and hereby is granted 
with respect to the claims of Orlando Crivelli and Crivelli 
Enterprises and that judgment be and hereby is entered in favor 
of defendant on these claims, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion be and hereby is 
denied in all other respects. 
2^?. 
Donald E. Z\ 
Chief Judg< 
cc: Counsel of Record 
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)KE MANAGER'S COMMENTS - OGDEN. UT. 
le San Francisco Zone proposes Mr. Richard L. Warner to be 
laler/owner of this new Dealer Company with a 15% investment. The 
:>orda Family Trust, headed by Mr. Raymond J. Noorda will own 85% of 
ie new Dealer Company, which will be Rick Warner Ogden Motor Sales, 
ic. DBA Rick Warner Buick Jeep/Eagle. 
ie proposal is a result of an "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of 
ssets" between Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick Jeep-Eagle and Rick 
arner Enterprises, Inc. The Agreement was received in this office on 
pril 7, 1992. This subject point is outside the relevant market area, 
1A, (10 mile radius) of the other like GM franchises, therefore, it 
111 not be necessary to notify any dealers to satisfy the Utah State 
ranchise Law. Ogden is also an Single Dealer Area (SDA). 
iPITALIZATION: The proposed new dealership corporation will be owned 
7 Richard L. Warner, 15% and the Noorda Family Trust, 85%. The total 
roposed capital investment is $681,500. The Minimum Net Working 
apital Standard is $500,000. The Actual Working Capital Amount is 
537,500. There will be no deficiency. The proposed net value of 
ixed and other assets is $72,000. 
r. Richard L. Warner will invest $103,000 in capital stock to account 
or his minimum required investment of 15% to be named dealer. Mr. , 
arner's funds will come from his financial investment in Rick garner *""* 
nterprises and will not be encumbered.
 t —* \ """^  — \ \ v * 
NDEBTEDNESS: There is no proposed Long-Term Debt. ' v ' ^ ^-v^V'to -
r. Warner is currently dealer/owner of several other automotive-—m"~~ 
ealerships, including: Saturn of Salt Lake C^ty^^Rick"Warner 
ontiac-Mazda, Salt Lake City, Utah, Rick Warner Chrysler-Plymouth, 
alt Lake City, Rick Warner Hyundai, Ogden, Utah, Rick Warner 
incoln-Mercury, Provo, Utah, Rick Warner Suzuki, Salt Lake City and 
arner Imports, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah. 
r. Rick McDonald who is currently the general manager of Rick Warner 
itsubishi, Riverdale, Utah is proposed as Executive Manager of the new 
'ealer Company. Mr McDonald's application indicates that he has been 
n the automobile selling business since January, 1975. There is no 
inancial investment proposed for Mr. McDonald. 
ir. Raymond J. Noorda, head of the Noorda Family Trust, is 
'hairman-President, CEO of Novell, Inc. a Provo, Ut. based computer 
oftware company. Mr. Noorda indicates on his Source of Funds 
Statement the current value of Novell, Inc. common stock at 
>527,000,000. 
VERIFICATION OF FUNDS: An attached deposit slip from Mr. Richard L. 
Earner was used to verify that funds are available to him to make the 
minimum required investment of 15% in the proposed Dealer Company. 
GG00004O 
000269 
HffE MANAGER'S COMMENTS - OGDEN. UT. (COETT'D) 
JCILITIES: Buick and Jeep/Eagle will be relocated from their present 
gpation at 3520 Wall Avenue - Ogden, Utah to 770 West Riverdale Road 
llverdale, Utah. The new location will be 2 miles from the current 
^cation. As mentioned earlier, Ogden is an SDA and there are no other 
|ick dealers within a 10 mile radius. Therefore, no notification is 
jquired to any Buick dealers. 
i^ck and Jeep/Eagle will be joining Mitsubishi which is already in the 
roposed facility. However, there will be adequate space for the 
gSdition of Buick and Jeep/Eagle. 
Juick will be separated from the other product lines and will be 
distinguished through the use of elements purchased by the dealer 
|hrough the Buick Retail Environment Design Image Element catalog. 
|hose elements are: Car Talker, Buick Ceiling Ring with Dome and 
Illumination, New Vehicle Carpet Display Pad and the Buick Icon. Order 
form to be submitted after signing proposed Dealer. (Signed order form 
on file at zone office). 
the proposed Rent and Rent Equivalent is $240,000 or $444 per new unit 
sold retail. The average Rent and Rent Equivalent for the San 
Francisco Zone per new unit sold retail is $584. The current lease on 
the proposed facility expires in 1999 with a 10 year renewable option. 
*e San Francisco Zone recommends approval of this proposal. t ft \ 
r- \ \ \ >\ 
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Tab 14 
(c) Please identify all documents referring to or 
relating in any way to your response to subparts (a) and (b) 
of this Interrogatory. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Admit that the reasons for not 
appointing John Watson Chevrolet, Inc., as the authorized Buick 
dealer for the Ogden, Utah area had nothing to do with the 
performance of John Watson as an authorized Buick dealer either in 
Rocks Springs, Wyoming or Evanston, Wyoming. 
RESPONSE: Admi t. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: If your response to Request for 
Admission No. 22 above was anything other than an unqualified 
admission: 
(a) Please state all facts upon which you base your 
qualification or denial. 
(b) Please identify all persons having knowledge 
of facts supporting or otherwise relating to your response to 
subpart (a) of this Interrogatory and state the basis for such 
knowledge. 
(c) Please identify all documents referring to or 
relating in any way to your response to subparts (a) and (b) 
of this Interrogatory. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
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1 Q NOT AS OFTEN, THOUGH. 
2 A NOT AS OFTEN. I HAVE GOT THOSE IN MY RECORDS. 
3 TO JUST GIVE YOU THE NAMES OFF THE CUFF, I MAY MAKE A 
4 MISTAKE. 
5 Q WAS THAT DEALERSHIP IN EVANSTON SUCCESSFUL? 
6 A FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL. 
7 Q WHAT DO YOU MEAN, FAIRLY? 
8 A EVANSTON WAS GOING THROUGH SOME — A LITTLE 
9 DECLINE RECESSION-WISE. IT WAS PROFITABLE BUT IT WAS NOT 
10 AS PROFITABLE AS I HAD HOPED AND IT WAS AWAY FROM MY HOME 
11 HERE IN OGDEN, UTAH AND THAT WAS THE REASON THAT I SOLD 
12 IT. 
13 Q WOULD IT BE FAIR TO SAY THAT YOUR EVANSTON 
14 VENTURE WAS LESS PROFITABLE THAN PREVIOUS VENTURES THAT 
15 YOU HAD HAD? 
16 A I WOULDN'T CATEGORIZE IT THAT WAY. 
17 Q IT JUST WASN'T WHAT YOU HAD HOPED? 
18 A EXACTLY. 
19 Q HOW WERE YOUR PERFORMANCE RATINGS IN THE 
20 EVANSTON OPERATION? 
21 A IN THE SHORT TIME THAT I HAD IT, I DON'T THINK 
22 THAT WE EXCEEDED STANDARDS THAT WERE SET EVER. 
23 Q IN FACT, YOU DID NOT EXCEED; IN FACT, YOU FELL 
24 SHORT OF THE STANDARDS THAT WERE SET? 
25 A POSSIBLY. 
18 
1 Q IN FACT, FOR JUST AN EXAMPLE, I'LL SHOW YOU A 
2 DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE MARKED AS EXHIBIT 1 AND ASK IF 
3 THIS IS A TYPICAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR THAT 
4 EVANSTON OPERATION DURING THE TIME THAT YOU WERE THE 
5 DEALER OWNER-OPERATOR OF IT. 
6 (DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 1 WAS MARKED 
7 FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
8 IT INDICATES, DOES IT NOT, EXHIBIT 1, THAT 
9 YOUR PERFORMANCE BASED ON SALES IS NOT EFFECTIVE? 
10 A YES. 
11 Q WOULD THAT BE A TYPICAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
12 BY BUICK DURING THE TIME THAT YOU HELD THE DEALERSHIP 
13 FROM BUICK AS WELL AS FROM CHEVROLET AND OLDSMOBILE? 
14 A I COULDN'T ANSWER THAT. 
15 Q BUT AT LEAST AS OF THE FULL YEAR 1987 IT 
16 APPEARS OVERALL PERFORMANCE WAS' DEEMED NOT EFFECTIVE BY 
17 YOUR ZONE/BRANCH MANAGER WHO APPEARS TO BE JERRY HOLLAND. 
18 DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION? 
19 A AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, THERE'S TWO OR THREE 
20 WAYS OF MEASURING SALES EFFECTIVENESS. OUR SALES 
21 EFFECTIVENESS WAS NOT AS WE HAD HOPED. THERE WERE OTHER 
22 PARTS OF THE DEALERSHIP THAT WERE DOING REASONABLY WELL. 
23 Q LIKE BASED ON REGISTRATIONS? 
24 A AS YOU CAN SEE ON THIS. THAT MEANS THAT WE 
25 WERE PROBABLY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OTHER DEALERSHIPS IN 
19 
DNPTSR10 RETAIL SALES AND REGISTRATION SUMMARY 
LOC PT: 0006714 DIVN CODE: P GM LINE: P DIV P G 
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC. OGDEN, UT 
INDUSTRY REG IN APR -SDA 
REG TO = NAT IN APR -SDA 
ACTUAL REG IN APR -SDA 
REG VARIANCE TO NATL IN APR 
1989 
2973 
199 
228 
0 
10/05/92 16:07:' 
I 
APPT DATE 06/27/8( 
1990 
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12.C 
UNIT SALES 
SALES VARIANCE TO NATIONAL 
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DNPTSR10 RETAIL SALES AND REGISTRATION SUMMARY 
LOC PT: 0006714 DIVN CODE: G GM LINE: L DIV P G 
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC. OGDEN, UT 
INDUSTRY REG IN APR -SDA 
REG TO - NAT IN APR -SDA 
ACTUAL REG IN APR -SDA 
REG VARIANCE TO NATL IN APR 
10/05/92 16:08: 
APPT DATE 06/27/8 
1989 1990 12/199/ 
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0 0 2 
UNIT SALES 
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SALES INDEX 
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DNPTSI01 PONTIAC 
LOC POINT: 0006714 PLAN NO 0117824 
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC. 
OGDEN, UT 84405 WEBER 
06/27/80 DIVISION P G 
CSI OVERALL 
CSI INQUIRY 
DIVN CODE: P STATUS 
10/05/92 16 
ACTIVE LOAD 
07:1 
APPT DATE 
DEALERSHIP 
SURVEY 
YR STA PERIOD 
92 AUGUST 
92 JUNE 
92 MARCH 
91 DECEMBER 
91 SEPTEMBER 
91 JUNE 
91 MARCH 
90 DECEMBER 
90 SEPTEMBER 
12 MTH LAST 3 MTHS 
DLR ZONE DIVN DLR ZONE 
81 87 88 86 88 
82 86 87 84 87 
83 86 87 73 85 
81 86 87 81 86 
80 86 87 95 87 
78 86 87 86 86 
76 85 86 72 85 
77 86 86 78 85 
76 86 86 77 87 
= DEALER PARTICIPATING IN PROGRAM LESS THAN 12 MONTHS 
$ = OWNERSHIP CHANGED HANDS LAST 12 MONTHS; PREV OWNER 
§ = NO CUSTOMER RESPONSE DURING LAST 3 MONTH PERIOD 
—DEALER 
ZONE 
101/123 
98/121 
96/120 
104/126 
109/129 
117/132 
116/133 
115/132 
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RANK— 
DIVN 
2420/2789 
2355/2787 
2242/2799 
2410/2832 
2467/2840 
2590/2848 
2655/2860 
2619/2869 
2665/2867 
NON GM 
CUSTOMER 
RESPONSE 
NUM 
34 
31 
38 
41 
46 
52 
47 
58 
67 
PCT 
44% 
43% 
45% 
45% 
45% 
46%* 
41% 
40% 
38% 
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DNPTFA05 DEALER FACILITY INQUIRY - DETAIL 
LOC PT: 0006714 PLAN NO 0117824 STATUS ACTIVE LOAD 
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC. 
GMMS 1016 DATE 11/01/90 
DIVN P G 
PGUID 200 200 
DEPARTMENTS 
NEW VEHICLE DISPLAY 
USED VEHICLE DISPLAY 
PROD. SERVICE: MECH 
PROD. SERVICE: BODY 
SERVICE RECEPTION 
PARKING - CUSTOMER 
NEW VEHICLE STORAGE 
EMPL/DEMO PARK MISC 
10/05/92 16:09:52 
BMD PONT 
GENERAL OFFICE 
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0 
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STALLS 
3 
33 
9 
5 
2 
28 
50 
14 
SQ 
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—BUILDING— 
GM 
5 
12 
8 
8 
. FT 
2340 
3600 
OTHER 
10 
18 
10 
12 
1560 
4060 
LOT-
GM 
30 
40 
4 
40 
70 
35 
OTHER 
60 
47 
8 
46 
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50 
GM 
TOTAL 
35 
40 
12 
8 
12 
40 
70 
35 
2340 
3600 
TOTAL 
400 
% GM 
GUIDE 
1167 
121 
133 
160 
600 
143 
140 
250 
130 
129 
FACTS 
NONGM 
760 
COMB 
TOTA: 
10! 
8' 
3( 
IS 
3: 
8( 
22! 
8i 
390( 
766( 
PFOl FAC STUDY-SUMM PF02 NON-GM INQ 
PF05 DLR FIN SUMM PF06 FAC INQ-PREM 
PF09 BROWSE MENU PF10 INQUIRY MENU 
PF03 DIV DLR INQ 
PF07 CSI INQUIRY 
PF11 MAIN MENU 
PF04 SALES/REG SU1 
PF08 INV INQ 
ENTR NEXT LOC PT 
P/W: 
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Tab 15 
September 17, 1992 
Mr. Tom Garove . j -
Buick Motor Division 
39465 Paseo Padre Parkway 
Fremont CA 94538 -""" 
Dear Mr. Garove: 
I forwarded the documents concerning John Watson's application as 
Buick dealer in Ogden to Mr. Watson today via Mr. Merrill Bean by a 
copy of this letter. 
Your letter of September 15, 1992 transmitting said documents 
requested a copy of the Buy/Sell Agreement between HELSCO and 
John Watson. It is my understanding Dave Koch, President of HELSCO 
forwarded said document to you the day after it was executed. It is 
my understanding from John Watson today that said document has 
already been forwarded to Flint for corporate review. Accordingly, I 
did not send another copy to you. If you need an "official" 
transmittal in a certain form from an officer of the corporation, 
please contact Dave Koch. I am not an officer. 
Sincerely, 
Henry Mixon 
EXHI8IM 
K\l. For Identification 
Cc-:::::.-:j cfo I ^.Vanrfs) 
fa. 
000197 
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Mr. 
Buick 
P.O. 
Oakli 
Dear 
You ii 
Buick 
rights j 
purctu 
for Si 
1992, 
should! 
service 
day 
termini 
Mle 
action 
rights 
My ur 
Buick 1 
current 
current 
pure! 
storage 
amoudl 
fees/coj 
the abj 
(trust 
Sincei 
Henry tjkixon 
R E C E I V E D 
BUICK MOTOR DIV. 
OCT 1 3 1992 
. ~ « . ^ , A I » October 13, ^1992 
W p o d l e y SAN FRANCISCO ZONE ^ C ^ { , 
otor Division \ ^ J ~* 
\x 23500 r* i \ \ * 
CA 94623 
ten: 
tcated that, in the event John Watson is not approved as the 
ler in Ogden, Utah, Buick Motor Division will exercise its 
ider the dealer sales and service agreement to complete the 
under the same terms aft are contained in the Agreement 
and Purchase of Assets (the Agreement) dated August 31, 
lich you have been provided. Further, you indicated that 
clay in resolving the issuance of the new dealer sales and 
igreement extend beyond the e^ptiftion o f the statutory 60 
Buick Motor Division will not cause the franchise to be 
In reliance upon that representation, HELSCO will not 
Chapter 11 protection under the bankruptcy laws. Such 
fould be needed at this time only to preserve the franchise 
ultimate sale. 
landing of the terms of the Agreement is as follows. The 
and accessories will be Inventoried and purchased at 
atalog prices (or at amounts mutually agreed to, if not in a 
atalog). The special tools and their storage cases will be 
as provided in the Agreement. Fixed assets (such as parts 
ins, etc.) would be purchased at mutually agreed upon 
(not a required asset to be purchased). The consulting 
ant not to compete of $120,000 will be paid. The sum of 
amounts will be paid to the law firm of Nielsen & Senior 
count). 
000136 
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Henry T. Reath, I/ewis R ONhin. Puano. 
Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia. Pa . 
JameR W. Quinn (argued), Mindy .F Sj>ec 
tor, Weil, Gotshal & Mange?, New York 
City, for appellee cross appellant. 
Before: MANSMANN. COWEN and 
ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
OPINION OF THE COURT1 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
In these cross appeals, we are once again 
called upon to delineate that quantum of 
evidence necessary for an antitrust plain-
tiff to prove in order to withstand a motion 
for summary judgment. Here the unsuc-
cessful applicants for several BMW fran-
chises brought suit against the United 
States distributor for BMW automobiles. 
BMW of North America (BMW NA). The 
applicants (the Potamkins) assert that 
BMW NA and its dealers violated the Sher-
man Act by engaging in concerted action to 
exclude them from becoming dealers. 
BMW NA contends that it acted indepen-
dently of its dealers and tenders business 
reasons for its refusal to deal with the 
Potamkins. In response, the Potamkins 
have countered each business reason with 
circumstantial evidence of concerted action. 
Thus faced with equal and competing infer-
ences, we must apply to the standard for 
summary judgment, in which all inferences 
must be drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party, Country Floors, Inc. v. A Partner-
ship Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 
F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir.1991), the holding in 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 
465 U.S. 752, 768, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1473, 79 
L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), that in an antitrust 
action "there must be evidence that tends 
to exclude the possibility of independent 
action by the manufacturer and distribu-
tor." 
The plaintiffs are brothers Robert and 
Alan Potamkin, and their corporate enti-
ties, Big Apple BMW, Inc. and Potamkin 
BMW and VW, Inc., who, in 1985, sought 
BMW franchises in Manhattan, New York 
1. References to portions of the record filed un-
der seal have been deleted from the published 
version of this opinion. Deletions in this pub-
and Philadelphia. Pennsylvania. The Po-
tamkin family, which for our purposes in-
clude* Robert, A Inn. and their father Vic-
tor, owns approximately 45 automobile 
franchise located it) Manhattan, Philadel-
phia. Atlanta, anrl Miami. According to 
Victor. these franchises collectively 
amassed a sale*; volume of between $800 
and $900 million in 1987 alone. A657. 
The Potamkins asserted in their com-
plaint that BMW NA and certain of its 
dealer? engaged in a "group boycott to 
exclude plaintiffs and pursuant to a con-
tract, combination or conspiracy with cer-
tain BMW dealers to fix, raise, maintain 
and stabilize prices of BMW automobiles in 
the United States." Complt at !34. 
Briefly, BMW NA contends that it unilater-
ally rejected the Potamkins because their 
high volume price-discounter image is in-
compatible with the image of BMW NA 
and because the Potamkins did not meet 
other required standards. 
We conclude that, for purposes of sum-
mary judgment, the Potamkins have set 
forth sufficient evidence of concerted ac-
tion between BMW NA and its dealership 
body to exclude the Potamkins and further 
produced evidence that tends to show that 
BMW NA's alleged reasons for rejecting 
the Potamkins were pretextual. Thus, we 
will vacate the judgment with respect to 
the antitrust claims and the closely related 
pendent state law antitrust and tortious 
interference claims and remand them for 
further proceedings. These counts will 
then be joined with the Pennsylvania Board 
of Vehicles Act claim, the sole claim that 
the district court had excepted from sum-
mary judgment, for further proceedings. 
I. 
The factual underpinnings for the Potam-
kins' claims arose from three distinct, but 
allegedly related, incidents in which the 
Potamkins negotiated with BMW NA and 
BMW dealers for franchises in the Phila-
delphia and New York City metropolitan 
areas. The first incident involved Victor 
lished opinion of the court are indicated by 
three asterisks, and the length of the matter 
deleted is given in brackets. 
BIG APPLE BMW, INC. v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. 1 3 5 9 
Cite a* 974 F~2d 1358 (3rd CIr. 1992) >*»>••> 
6. Monopolies <$=»28(7.3) 
Antitrust plaintiff must be prepared to 
demonstrate causal relationship between 
alleged dealer complaints and distributor's 
action in order to show that concerted ac-
tion in violation of Sherman Act is distin-
guishable from "perfectly legitimate" inde-
pendent conduct; in that regard, proof of 
causation requires more than sequence of 
dealer complaints to distributor followed by 
distributor's conduct alleged to violate anti-
trust laws. Sherman Anti Trust Act, § 1, 
15 U.S.C A. § 1. 
7. Federal Civil P r o c e d m . ^2484 
On automobile distributor's motion for 
summary judgment on antitrust claims of 
concerted action, district court inappropri-
ately compartmentalized unsuccessful auto-
mobile franchise applicants' evidence and 
drew inferences in distributor's favor; in 
defending against summary judgment, ap-
plicants did not have to eliminate all possi-
ble independent justifications by distributor 
so that only evidence of concerted action 
would be left in the record, but rather had 
to produce evidence tending to exclude pos-
sibility of independent action. Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15 U S C A . § 1. 
8. Corporations «=»l.5(3) 
Statement of subsidiary may be attrib-
uted to its corporate parent, consistent 
with agene> theory, where parent domi-
nates actiuties of subsidiary 
9. Monopolies «=>28(7.3) 
Statement evidencing occurrence of 
concerted action is not inadmissible in anti 
trust action because it follows that aclivit) 
Sherman Anti Trust Act, § 1, 15 U S C A 
§ I-
10. Evidence <S=»253( 1) 
Proponent for admission uf statement 
as coconspirator admission must establish 
existence of conspiracy b> a fair prepunder 
ance of independent ewdence. mere assou 
aUon does not suffice, but on the other 
hand, timing urcumsUikcs , one or a aeries 
of meetings may Fed Rules L\id Rule 
SOHdH-'MrJ) 28 I ' S r A 
11. Federal Civil Procedure <£=>2484 
Unsuccessful applicants for automobile 
franchises set forth sufficient evidence of 
concerted action between distributor and 
its dealership body to exclude them, for 
purposes of determining admissibility of 
statements as coconspirators admissions 
and defeating distributor's motion for sum-
mary judgment on anti trust claims. Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1; 
Fed.RuIes Evid.RuIe 801(d)(2)(E), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
12. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>2484 
Unsuccessful applicants for automobile 
franchises produced evidence tending to 
show that distributor's alleged independent 
reasons for rejecting their applications 
were pretextual and thus defeated distribu-
tor's motion for summary judgment on an-
titrust claims; alleged reasons included al-
legations that applicants' image as high 
volume price-discounters was incompatible 
with desired product image, that appli-
cants' customer service record was inade-
quate, that one proposed location was inad-
equate for a number of reasons, that appli-
cants were uncooperative, and that one ap-
plicant objected to annual allocation of 
cars Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15 
U S C A . § 1. 
13. Federal Civil Procedure <s=2515 
Genuine issues of material fact pre-
cluded summary judgment for automobile 
distributors on unsuccessful franchise ap-
plicants' pendant state law claims for tor-
tious interference with contract, the under-
pinnings of which were intertwined with 
antitrust claims. 
14. Trade Regulation «=>871.3 
Unsuccessful applicants for automobile 
franchises had standing to allege violation 
of Penna)l\anid Board of Vehicles Act by 
automobile distributor 63 P S §§ 818.1 et 
seq , 818 9(b){3, 4) 818 20(a) 
Harold £ Kohn (argued), Robert J. l>a 
Hocca, Kohn Savett, Klein & Graf, Charles 
J Bluom, Kleinbard, Bell & Brecker, Phila-
delphia Pa , for appellants cross appellees 
Hit; AITI K BMW, INC. v. BMW OF NORTH AM* Kll 
Cite a* 974 F.2d 1358 (3rd Cir. 1992) 
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Potamkin's negotiations for a Great Neck, 
New York franchise in 1981. It admittedly 
falls outside the statute of limitations but 
is included for the purpose of demonstrat-
ing a pattern of conduct. The latter two 
incidents comprise the Potamkins' basis for 
liability. We provide only a cursory sketch 
of these incidents here because the evi-
dence will be later reviewed in detail. 
. .First, during 1981, Victor Potamkin met 
with BMW NA representatives on several 
occasions to discuss Victor's acquisition of 
a Great Neck, New York BMW franchise. 
The Potamkins allege that Victor and 
BMW NA's Eastern Regional Manager 
Terry Cronin reached an oral agreement 
for a BMW franchise; BMW NA insists 
that their discussions terminated prior to 
any agreement because Victor allegedly at-
tempted to bribe Cronin. Both parties 
agree that these discussions ended without 
a written agreement. By letter dated No-
vember 4, 1981, BMW NA conveyed to 
Victor its desire not to appoint a dealer in 
Great Neck. A1203. 
The second incident occurred in 1985. 
Gladys Caufield, owner of the Trans-Atlan-
tic BMW dealership in Manhattan, in antici-
pation of losing her lease, began to negoti-
ate with the Potamkins. A1613-14. In 
early September, they reached an oral 
agreement of sale for a price of $800,000 
plus an undetermined amount for parts. 
In the ensuing months, however, BMW NA 
informed Caufield that it would not award 
a franchise to the Potamkins, and only 
days before the expiration of her lease, 
BMW NA offered her the significantly low-
er amount of $550,000, plus a repurchase 
of parts as required by the franchise agree-
ment. A1640. She accepted this offer and 
BMW NA closed Trans-Atlantic, leaving 
only one dealer remaining in Manhattan 
A164S-49. 
The third incident occurred in Philadel-
phia, contemporaneously v>ith the second, 
when Hubert Potumkin entered into a writ-
ten agreement to purchase the assets ut 
Irvin Greens BMW dealership in October 
2. In it* a p e l l a t e bf uf* HM\S N \ h u w u i n u i u c J 
to cite to that CMJCIUC r o k J t i iaJnu^iblc bs 
the J u t l U l kOUII but hii> t a l k J t o J . a l k ' i . f . L 
of 1985. A172Q-47. This "buy-sell" agree-
ment was contingent upon Robert's acquisi-
tion of a BMW franchise, and included ah 
expiration date of December 23, 1985. 
A1729-30. Robert sought immediately to 
obtain a franchise application from BMW 
NA, and although they vigorously' contest 
the reasons, both parties agree that Rob-
ert's application was not taken until Octo-
ber 29, 1985. Thus, as BMW NA recog-
nized, it had 60 days from October 29th in 
which to act on the application under state 
law. After the buy-sell agreement expired 
on December 23rd, BMW NA informed 
Green that Potamkin was not a suitable 
candidate for a BMW franchise. A869-70. 
The Potamkins filed suit in April of 1987, 
alleging that BMW NA violated section 1 
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, sections 
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 15, 26 (Count I), and the Pennsylvania 
Board of Vehicles Act, 63 Pa.Stat.Ann. 
§ 818.1, et seq. (Purdon's Supp.1991) 
(Count II). In addition, the Potamkins al-
leged that BMW NA tortiously interfered 
with their contractual and prospective busi-
ness advantage (Count III), committed 
state law civil conspiracy (Count IV), and 
utilized unfair methods of competition un-
der Pennsylvania law and New York's Don-
nelly Act (Count V). 
After lengthy and acrimonious discovery, 
in Ma> of 1989, BMW NA moved for sum-
mary judgment. Much of the evidence pro-
vided in support of its motion involved in-
formation that the district court had ruled 
inadmissible in its April 18, 1989 order lim-
iting discovery A59-60 In answer to the 
Potamkins* responsive motion, as well as to 
amplify ifc> previous order, the district 
cuurt issued an order on June 2, 1989, 
which excluded, for purposes of summary 
judgment, "information concerning plain-
tiffs' specific customer satisfaction rank-
ings except to the extent that such infor-
matiun was known to and allegedly relied 
upun b> the defendant in 1985, and has 
been disclosed to plaintiffs in discov-
ery 
1
 A1448-49 
ihnx: ruling* \U* will, therefore, review the 
cviJcruc J> t o i i h n e J b\ those orders. 
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In due course, th^ d^trr-t cur* r;l*id :»> 
favor of BMW NA »»n each r«'*m!. • wry* 
for Count II, the Penn*} Kama I?'»ard of 
Vehicles Act claim, v.hirh it TP***T\t»d f«»r 
trial. The Potamkin? sought and rf*cn\\p<\ 
a Rule 54(h) certification from the district 
court as to tho^e count5 on which summary 
judgment was entered. On thp *tntp hw 
claim of Count II, the district court certi-
fied a controlling question of law concern-
ing standing to sue under the Board of 
Vehicles Act, and we subsequently granted 
BMW NA permission to appeal the denial 
of summary judgment on that claim pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) This appeal and 
cross-appeal followed. 
The district court exercised federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the Sherman 
Act claim and pendent jurisdiction over the 
state law claims. Our standard of review 
is plenary. Goodman v. Mcad Johnson & 
Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 
L.Ed.2d 748 (1977). We review the dismiss-
al of the pendent state claims utilizing an 
abuse of discretion standard. Cooler/ x\ 
Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 
830 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.1987). 
IL 
A. 
As the district court accurately stated in 
its unpublished Memorandum Opinion, 1990 
WL 182340 "[t]he narrow issue upon which 
decision turns is whether plaintiffs have 
enough evidence to get to a jury on the 
issue of concerted action." Id. at 5. The 
district court first concluded that the Po-
tamkins had failed to produce direct evi-
dence that BMW dealers opposed the Po-
tamkins as dealers, complained to BMW 
NA about the Potamkins, or that BMW 
NA's decisions were responsive to dealer 
complaints, Id. at 6. The district court 
then evaluated "19 bits of evidence which, 
.[the Potamkins] argue, support . . . an in-
ference [of the requisite concerted ac-
tion]." 3 Ia\ After considering each of the 
"19 bits" individually, the district court 
concluded that it was "left with the reason-
3. These "19 bits" of evidence are listed infra at 
iMy t'tnn ««»nvu'tn»n that, while the evi-
d»mcv •!<>•»> n«»t rule «»ut the possibility that 
**'•» defendant * n'jVctioii* of plaintiffs' ap-
pl»i ati^n* wt-rv the product of concerted 
action het*A*H*n defendant and one or more 
of it5 dealer*, there i* dimply no proof of 
concerted action sufficient to withstand a 
motion for Mimmary judgment." /rf. at 15. 
B. 
(1 | Summary judgment should be 
granted where no genuine issue of material 
fact exists for resolution at trial and the 
moving' party i«* entitled to judgment as & 
matter of law Fed R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is ho 
longer a disfavored procedural shortcut, 
and may present the district court with the 
first opportunity to dispose of meritless 
cases under the federal practice of notice 
pleading. Celofrx Corp. v. Catrett, 477» 
US 317, 327, 106 S Ct 2548, 2354, 91 
L Ed 2d 265 (1986) This is true even in 
antitrust cases, "where motive and intent 
play leading roles, the proof is largely in 
the hands of the alleged conspirators/and 
hostile witnesses thicken the plot," Poller 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System,, Ipc, 
368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct 486, 491^7 
L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); see Matsushita Elec 
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp^ 
475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct 1348, 89,LEd.2d$£ 
(1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. 
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct 1464^ 79 
L.Ed.2d 775 (1984); Edward / Siceenefb 
Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 fjjfc 
Cir.1980), cert denied, 451 U.S.,91I,lpl 
S.Ct. 1981, 68 L.Ed.2d 300 (1981); Fragile 
& Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F2i 40 
(3d Cir.1985). . ' , ,\]fi* 
The summary judgment standard^  h^ f 
been likened to the "reasonable jurj^ jjf: 
rected verdict standard. See Andersopjf. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251>,i06 
S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202,(1986). 
The moving party need not produce- eri-
dence to disprove the opponents clahnjCid-
otex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct at 2552,W 
does carry the burden to demonstrate the 
absence of any genuine issues of material 
fact If the movant has produced evide5jt< 
in support of summary judgment, then tw 
footnote U. 
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opponent may not rest on the allegations 
set forth in its pleadings but must counter 
with evidence that demonstrates a genuine 
issue of f ac t Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). This, in 
turn, requires the opponent to "set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial." Id. 
[2,3] When deciding a motion for sum-
mary judgment, nonetheless, a court's role 
remains circumscribed in that it is inappro-
priate for a court to resolve factual dis-
putes and to make credibility determina-
tions. Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1061. 
Thus an opponent may not prevail merely 
by discrediting the credibility of the mov-
ant's evidence; it must produce some affir-
mative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
256-57, 106 S.Ct at 2514-15. Inferences 
should be drawn in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, and where the 
non-moving party 's evidence contradicts 
the movant's, then the non-movant's must 
be taken as true. Country Floors, 930 
F.2d at 1061 (citing Goodman v. Mead 
Johnson & Co, 534 F.2d at 573). 
v This trial "on paper" differs from a trial 
before a jury in one significant detail: "at 
the summary judgment stage the judge's 
function is not . . to weigh the evidence 
and determine the truth of the matter but 
to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
249, 106 S.Ct at 2511. This does not re-
quire a court to turn a blind eye to the 
weight of the evidence; the "opponent 
must do more than simply show that there 
is some metaphysical doubt as to the mate-
rial fac ts" Matsushita, 475 U S at 586, 
106 S.Ct, at 1356 To raise a genuine issue 
of material fact, however, the opponent 
need not match, item for item, each piece of 
evidence proffered by the movant. In prac-
tical ternib, if the opponent has exceeded 
the "mere scintilla" threshold and hut> of* 
fered a genuine issue of material fact, then 
the court cannot credit the movant'* ver 
sion of events against the opponent, even if 
the quantity of the movant's evidence far 
butweighs that of it* opponent It thus 
remains the province of the factfinder to 
ascertain the behevability and weight i>f 
the evidence 
A non-movant's burden in defending 
against summary judgment in an antitrust 
case is no different than in any other case. 
As was recently clarified by the Supreme 
Court: 
The Court 's requirement in Matsushi-
ta that the plaintiffs' claims make eco-
nomic sense did not introduce a special 
burden on plaintiffs facing summary 
judgment in anti trust cases. The Court 
did not hold if the moving party enunci-
ates any economic theory supporting its 
behavior, regardless of its accuracy in 
reflecting the actual market, it is entitled 
to summary judgment Matsushita de-
mands only that the nonmoving party's 
inferences be reasonable in order to 
reach the jury, a requirement that was 
not invented, but merely articulated, in 
that decision. If the plaintiffs theory is 
economically senseless, no reasonable 
jury could find in its favor, and summary 
judgment should be granted. 
Eastman Kodak Co v. Image Technical 
Services, — U.S. , , 112 S.Ct 
2072, 2083, 119 L Ed 2d 265 (1992) (footnote 
omitted). 
Therefore, in the summary judgment 
context, ' 'inferences to be drawn from the 
underlying facts must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the opposing par-
ty M Matsushita, 475 U S. at 587, 106 S C t 
at 587 These inferences, however, when 
drawn from ambiguous evidence, are cir-
cumscribed in antitrust cases because a 
fine line demarcates concerted action that 
violates anti trust law from legitimate busi-
ness practices See Monsanto, 465 U S at 
762-64, 104 S C t at 1470-71 Care must 
be taken to ensure that inferences of un-
lawful activity drawn from ambiguous evi-
dence do nut infringe upon the defendant's 
freedom, so long as it acts independently, 
to refuse to deal, United States v Colgate 
£ Co, 250 U S 300, 39 S Ct 465, 63 L Ed. 
992 (1919), or to impose vertical non price 
restraints, Continental T V, Inc v GTE 
Sylmnia Inc., 433 U S 36, 97 S C t 2549, 
53 L r^ i2d 5fa8 (1977) Nevertheless, the 
dununarv judgment movant must show 
that an inference of concerted action to 
exclude Luiiipetitiun from evidence of BMW 
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NA's inconsistent beha\K»r and dealer com 
plaints i* unreasonable Srr En*t*nnn Ao 
(ink, U S at . 112 S f t at 2<W 
(' 
(1-6) Of COUP***, in ruling upon a mo 
tion for summarv judgment a court mu*t 
evaluate the material facts against the sub 
stantive proof required of the plaintiff 
For a section 1 claim under the Sherman 
Act, a plaintiff must prove "concerted ac 
tion," a collective reference to the " 'con-
tract . combination or conspiracy.' " Bo-
gosian v Gulf Oil Corp, 561 F 2d 434, 
445-45 (3d Cir.1977), cert denied, 434 U S 
1086, 98 S.Ct. 1280, 55 L.Ed 2d 791 (1978), 
see Edward J. Sweeney, 637 F 2d at 111 
If, as BMW NA asserts, it acted indepen-
dently in denying the Potamkins a fran-
chise, no antitrust liability would attach 
Colgate, 250 U S at 307, 39 S.Ct. 468 
Moreover, the inferences of concerted ac-
tion that may be drawn from circumstantial 
evidence in antitrust cases is circumscribed. 
Thus an antitrust plaintiff must be pre-
pared to demonstrate a causal relationship 
between alleged dealer complaints and a 
distributor's action in order to show that 
the concerted action in violation of the 
Sherman Act is distinguishable from "per-
fectly legitimate" independent conduct 
See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64, 104 
S.Ct. at 1470-71. 
In that regard, proof of causation re-
quires more than a sequence of dealer com-
plaints to a distributor that are followed by 
the distributor's conduct alleged to violate 
antitrust laws. Edward J. Sweeney, 637 
F.2d at 111-15. A jury may not be permit-
ted to speculate as to cause from a chain of 
events, id. at 111; the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate adequately " 'a unity of purpose 
or a common design and understanding, or 
a meeting of the minds/ " Id. (quoting 
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 
328 U.S. 781, 810, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 
L.Ed. 1575 (1946)). 
As the Supreme Court admonished in 
Monsanto, we ought not to permit an infer-
ence of an agreement in violation of the 
Sherman Act to arise merely from "the 
fact that termination came about 'in re-
«*p«»n«t» to complaints ' 465 US. at 763, 
HU S Ct at 1470 Permitting such an in-
ferrnce could "deter or penalize perfectly 
legitimate conduct", non price restrictions 
mav simply reflect normal business condi-
tion* which do not raise the specter of 
concerted action Moreover, dealers are 
often important sources of information for 
distributors or manufacturers and these 
sources should not be restricted by imprac 
tical antitrust prohibitions. See id. at 763-
64. 104 S Ct at 1470-71. 
In Monsanto, the Court ruled that more 
than mere complaints of concerted action 
were necessary to defeat the motion for 
summary judgment. Accordingly, "tt]here 
must be evidence that tends to exclude the 
possibility that the manufacturer and non-
terminated distributors were acting inde-
pendently." 465 U S at 764, 104 S.Ct at 
1471. '*[T]he antitrust plaintiff shou# 
present direct or circumstantial evidence 
that reasonably tends to prove that the 
manufacturer and others 'had a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme designed 
to achieve an unlawful objective/? I<L, 
(citing Edward J. Sweeney, 637 FMtt 
111). 
Monsanto does not require that a plain-
tiff provide direct evidence of a causal 
relationship; concerted action may be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence. /See 
id., 465 U S. at 764, 768, 104 S.Ct at 147CV 
1472 That evidence should be analyzed *s 
a whole, rather than compartmentalized* to 
determine whether it supports an inference 
of concerted action. Continental Ore C& 
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 3f0 
U.S. 690, 82 S.Ct 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 
(1962). In Continental Ore, the Court ad-
monished federal courts not to "approach 
[antitrust] claims as if they were . . . conv 
pletely separate and unrelated lawsuit*.* 
Id. at 698, 82 S.Ct at 1410. 
In cases such as this, plaintiffs shoaiytf 
given the full benefit of their prooi^nt^ 
out tightly compartmentalizing the fig*, 
ous factual components and w i p i n g ^ 
slate clean after scrutiny of each.,,* 
[T]he duty of the jury was to look at the 
BIG APPLE BMW, INC. v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. 1 3 6 5 
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whole picture and not merely at the indi-
vidual figures in it. 
370 U.S. at 699, 82 S.Ct. at 1410. 
We utilized this approach in Arnold Pon-
tiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp, 
786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.1986), in which the 
plaintiff asserted that GM and its dealers 
conspired to deny the plaintiff a franchise 
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. There we found sufficient to with-
stand summary judgment the evidence that 
GM had favorably viewed Arnold Pontiac's 
franchise application until after the GM 
dealers' collectively expressed disapproval 
and threatened non-cooperation. Id. at 
573-74. Arnold Pontiac had met the Mon-
santo standard, specifically that the con-
duct of the dealers constituted sufficient 
evidence that "tends to exclude the possi-
bility that [GMC acted] independently." 
Id. at 574 (quoting Monsanto). We con-
cluded that a reasonable inference of con-
certed action could be drawn from the 
whole of the evidence and remanded the 
case for trial. Id. 
[71 Here, the Potamkms assert, and we 
agree, that the district court inappropriate-
ly compartmentalized their evidence and 
drew inferences in favor of BMW NA rath-
er than in their favor They argue that the 
district court's holding, in effect, would 
require that to successfully defend against 
summary judgment, they must produce evi 
dence sufficient to prevail upon their own 
motion for summary judgment In es 
sence, the Potamkins urge, and we agree, 
that m defending against summary judg-
ment, they need not "eliminate all possible 
'independent* justifications b> the manufac 
turer, [so that] only evidence oi concerted 
action would be left m the record " The) 
need, rather, to produce "evidence that 
tendb to exclude the possibility of indepen 
dent action " Motisantu, 465 U S at 768, 
104 SCt at 1473 
According to the Potamkmb, Monsanto 
cannot be read to require an opponent of 
sununar) judgment to produce the same 
quantum and kind of evidence it would 
need to aftirmatueU make its own motion 
for b u m n u n judgment Thus the Potam 
kins urge thai a leading ut Munstinto that 
requires them to affirmatively disprove any 
legitimate reasons for BMW NA's actions 
would be inconsistent with the burden of 
proof required for a non-movant to defeat a 
summary judgment motion. In this case, 
that consideration is especially germane be-
cause the quantity of the Potamkins' evi-
dence is outweighed by the quantity of 
BMW NA's evidence. BMW NA primarily 
contends that summary judgment is appro-
priate because "there [is] no evidence to 
establish that BMW dealers were opposed 
to appellants' efforts to obtain franchises, 
or that any BMW dealers complained to 
BMW NA about [the Potamkms], or that 
BMW NA's refusal to appoint [the Potam-
kins] as dealers was in response to dealer 
complaints." With the foregoing orienta-
tion, we now turn to review the evidence 
presented in this case 
III. 
The Potamkms have produced evidence 
of concerted action spanning several years 
and three locations. For the sake of clari-
ty, we will order the evidence according to 
the location in which the Potamkins sought 
a particular franchise. There is consistent 
evidence that BMW NA encouraged the 
Potamkins to acquire BMW dealerships, 
that the New York and Philadelphia deal-
ers subsequently complained to BMW NA 
about the Potamkins, and that BMW NA 
later denied the Potamkms franchises giv-
ing allegedly pretextual reasons 
A. 
1981 Gteat Neck 
In 1980, Victor Potamkm initiated negoti-
ations with BMW NA for a franchise by 
writing to BMW's German manufacturer 
A14b3 In response, Terry Cronin, BMW 
NA's Eastern Regional Manager, sent the 
following correspondence to Victor in No-
\ ember vi I9b0 
OLwuusI), because I reside and work in 
the New York Metro area I am personal 
1> well aware of your status as a proven 
and successful automobile executive 
Hcalcri/ation for the northeast portion of 
the I mud States comes under the re 
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sponsibility of \h** FaM'-rn r» c : ,r I 
would be very happy to m^ M v.ifh
 #wi at 
your convenience t/> di.«c»i*c '.«. ra>*. »r 
mutual opportunities may exl^t r^-t^ p^n 
yourself and BMWNA. 
A1464. 
Accordingly, Victor and Cronin met on 
approximately four or five occasion? Cm-
nin testified in his deposition that following 
initial meetings, also attended by Andrew 
Pokomy, BMW NA's Vice President of 
Sales, A1487-88, 1507-09, he "was favor-
ably impressed wfth Victor" as an individu 
al, although Cronin shied away from opin-
ing as to Victor's suitability for a dealer-
ship at that time. A1491-92. These meet-
ings focused upon available "open 
points." * As one basis for its termination 
of negotiations, BMW NA contends that 
Victor's interests lay not m the Great Keck 
open point that BMW NA sought to fill, 
but in Atlanta and Miami, A1489-90, or 
North Plainfield, New Jersey. A1501. 
Cronin testified, but Victor denies, that Vic-
tor was primarily interested in a North 
Plainfield, New Jersey, franchise rather 
than one in Great Neck, New York. A261; 
A645. 
However, despite inquiries about other 
locations, BMW NA does not dispute, and 
Cronin testified, that Victor located a facili-
ty in Great Neck. A1495-96. Cronin, who 
visited that facility, A1496-97, testified 
that "It probably needed a great deal of 
renovation. But I believe it could have 
been suitable for BMW." A1498. Cronin 
also testified that the Potamkins envisioned 
this as an exclusively BMW franchise and 
may have anticipated selling as many as 
500 cars annually. A1500. 
Negotiations proceeded apace as Cronin 
subsequently met with Robert and Alan 
Potamkin at BMW NA's eastern regional 
office, to review a "pro forma facility in* 
vestment analysis" during the summer of 
1981. A1499, 1508. At the conclusion of 
this meeting, Cronin was still interested in 
the Potamkins" pursuit of the Great Neck 
point/ A1503J and Robert and Alan were 
expected to report back to Victor and con-
i 
4. An "open point" is a location for which a new 
franchise is slated in contrast with a "buy-sell" 
•.in BMW V \ If r*'.'\ w.»rt. «till interested, 
[r
 r>»r»i;vn* Vn*>i»r « b t^i^ f that during these 
r»*i:«»vV.»'*r« h»* and RMW NA reached an 
^rn1 aen»*Ti'»nt on the (Jrent Neck BMW 
fnrvh;<*<* A»>tr> 
Liter, during that fall. (Vonin again met 
with Victor at the '21 Club" in Manhattan, 
when*. CpMiin t^hfi^d. they discussed the 
viability of BMW in J treat Neck over lunch 
and Victor again allegedly inquired about 
North Plainfield A1509. Afterward, in 
Victor's limousine. BMW NA alleges that 
Victor attempted to bribe Cronin for a 
North Plainfield location. Cronin testified: 
". . . (H]e said to me that North Plainfield 
was very important to him: that it would 
be worth a lot of money to him, $25,000, if 
he were awarded the North Plainfield 
point." A1510. Cronin immediately re-
turned to his office and telephoned Gordon 
Bingham, then-Vice President of Opera-
tions and Jack Cook, then-President of 
BMW NA. to report the alleged bribe. 
A1513-14: A1522-23 Pursuant to Cook's 
instructions, Cronin did not tell anyone else 
of this incident, nor did he document it. 
A1523-1526. It is not disputed that others 
at BMW NA became aware of the alleged 
bribe. 
By letter dated November 4, 1981, from 
Cronin, Victor learned: 
After much deliberation, we have decided 
that the appointment of a BMW dealer in 
Great Neck, at this time, would not be 
the proper long range solution to our 
long standing problem. In lieu of an 
appointment, we have opted to work with 
our existing dealer body to improve the 
overall representation of BMW on the 
Northshore of Long Island. 
A1203. 
In support of their allegation of concert-
ed action, the Potamkins have produced the 
affidavit of Harry Gray. In 1981, Gray 
served as a Long Island BMW dealer and a 
member of the area Dealer Advertising 
Group ("DAG"). Dealer Advertising 
Groups are composed of regional dealers 
who meet regularly with BMW NA repre-
sentatives to coordinate advertising sfcrate-
situation in which a new dealer replaces a retir-
ing one. M 
BIG APPLE BMW, INL. v. B& 
Cite M 974 FJd 
gy. A1854-55; * • * [one sentence delet-
ed]. In his affidavit, Gray reported dealer 
opposition to a Potamkin franchise fea-
tured at a DAG meeting: 
2. Great Neck, Long Island, was a 
BMW "open point" during the early 
1980's. I knew that BMW had expressed 
interest in having Victor Potamkin as a 
franchised dealer at that location. 
3. At that time, I recall attending a 
BMW Dealer Advertising Group 
("DAG") meeting with other BMW deal-
ers from the New York area and with 
BMW employees. I recall specifically 
that the dealer principals for BMW deal-
erships in Brooklyn, New York, Jamaica, 
New York, Smithtown, New York and 
In wood, New York were present. There 
were other BMW dealers present as well. 
4. There was a discussion among the 
BMW dealers about the possibility of 
Victor Potamkin obtaining the Great 
Neck, BMW open point. 
5. The dealers opposed BMW grant-
ing Victor Potamkin a BMW franchise. 
The dealers feared that Mr. Potamkin 
would take away significant business 
from them, and would "alter the competi-
tive landscape", as I believe one dealer 
expressed it. 
6. The dealers understood and ex-
pressed that Mr. Potamkin's Great Neck 
dealership had already been approved at 
the level of BMW's central office, in 
Montvale, New Jersey However, the 
central office had decided to leave the 
final decision to the regional office for 
the BMW Eastern region, which region 
included all of the New York area dealer-
ships 
7 BMW dealers at the meeting *atd 
they had already spoken to Terry Cro-
wn the BMW Regional Manager for 
the Eastern rtgion, opposing Mr Potum 
kin's BMW franchise appointment, and 
that they uould continue to speak to 
him on this subject, Mnce the dealers 
understood that Mr Cronin had signifi-
cant input on this matter 
8 1 subsequent!) tame to understand 
that lVrr> I'ronm had opposed this up 
W OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. 1 3 6 7 
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pointment, which I concluded was in re-
sponse to the New York-area BMW deal-
ers ' objections. 
A1541-43 (emphasis added). 
Assuming that Gray's trial testimony 
would be consistent with his affidavit, the 
district court ruled it inadmissible, reason-
ing that Gray's testimony would not estab-
lish a conspiracy between BMW NA and 
the New York area dealers. Specifically, 
the district court found that Gray's affida-
vit did not establish that dealer opposition 
had been communicated to BMW NA nor 
that BMW had acted in response to dealer 
complaints. Memorandum Opinion at 8. 
Therefore, the district court ruled that 
Gray's conclusion of causation constituted 
"[t]hat kind of unfounded speculation 
[that] would not be admissible at trial, and 
does not prove anything." Id. 
The Potamkins argue that the affidavit 
itself evidences communication of dealer 
opposition to BMW NA because Gray 
states first, that Cronin possessed authori-
ty to approve Victor for the Great Neck 
point; second, that some of the DAG mem-
bers had communicated their opposition to 
Cronin; and third, at the meeting they ex-
pressed an intent to continue to communi-
cate to Cronin their opposition. 
The record also supports this first propo-
sition; prior to Michael Jackling's installa-
tion as BMW NA's Vice President, Director 
of Operations in October of 1985, BMW 
dealership appointments were largely rele-
gated to the regional offices. A2378. 
While there is little in the record to flesh 
out the details of the pre Jackling era deal-
er appointment procedure, a jury could rea-
sonably infer, from the evidence that Jack-
ling confined post-l9b5 decisions to BMW 
NA's Montvale headquarters, that regional 
representatives wielded a significant 
amuunt of power over appointments pnor 
to 19fc>5 
#
 * * [one sentence deleted] 5 Thus the 
third proposition, according to the Potam-
k»m> would be supported by Gray's testi-
muii) ut Lunctrtcd action on behalf of the 
New \ u i k tireii dealership body with BMW 
5 • * * (one H I I I U K C JilclirJ) 
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NA to reject Victor's apj*untment a.* a 
price competitor. BMW NA accurately 
notes that, as factual matters, the Gray 
affidavit does not even identify t'rnnin a? 
one of the unnamed BMW NA employee? 
present at that DAG meeting. Nor d^es it 
contain evidence that BMW NA considered 
the alleged dealers' demand?. This factual 
argument, however, properly belongs in 
front of a jury. That Gray's affidavit is 
not a proverbial smoking gun does not 
make it inadmissible. 
As a legal matter, BMW NA suggests 
that the Gray affidavit is inadmissible be-
cause it allegedly contains only Gray's sur-
mise of causation and lacks the requisite 
personal knowledge required by Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 56(e). In this respect, BMW NA 
cites Edward J. Sweeney, Inc., in which we 
held, in part, that the plaintiff had failed to 
meet its burden to prove concerted action, 
when defending against summary judg-
ment. 637 F.2d at 116-17. Significantly, 
in that case we did not rule that evidence of 
concerted action inadmissible, but simply 
insufficient to sustain the plaintiffs burden 
of proof. This case, as distinguished from 
Edward J. Sweeney, presents more evi-
dence than a witness's "general feeling,M 
637 F.2d at 114, and another witness's 
" 'belief . . . without factual basis," 637 
F.2d at 112. See also Mid-South Grizzlies 
v. National Football League, 550 F.Supp. 
558 (E.D.Pa.1982) (finding a statement that 
some people opined that the applicant's 
past WFL affiliation would hurt its chances 
of obtaining an NFL affiliation was insuffi-
cient to prove retaliation, in part because 
the witness admitted these views were per-
sonal to the speakers and did not represent 
the NFL's position), affd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d 
Cir.1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 
S.Ct. 2657, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984). 
In addition, we noted in Edward J. Swee-
ney that "absent some evidence supporting 
appellant's theory, we will not assume [that 
the defense witness] lied about his [legiti-
mate] reasons." 637 F.2d at 113. By con-
trast, Gray's affidavit, combined with the 
6. BMW NA's response at appellate oral argu-
ment to the apparent inconsistency between 
Cronin's outrage in 1981 at the alleged bribe 
segment nf a 197S BMW Policy and Proce-
dure Manual for Pealer Development," in-
dicates that Cronin was given decision-mak-
ing authority And that area dealers had 
voiced tn Cronin. and intended to continue 
tn voire, their opposition to a Potamkin 
franchise. The fact that Cronin has cate-
gorically refuted any dealership pressure 
or discussions with dealers concerning Vic-
tor's interest in a BMW franchise does not 
serve to render Grays affidavit inadmissi-
ble, but simply creates a material fact for 
the jury to resolve. See A265. 
The Potamkins do not request that we 
simply discredit the testimony of BMW 
NA's witnesses in order to deny summary 
judgment. Rather, they have proffered 
significant, albeit circumstantial, evidence 
to counter this evidence. For example, 
Robert alleges that one New Jersey BMW 
dealer, Gene Hoffman, revealed to him in 
late 1985 that "BMWNA's decision in 1981-
82 not to give the Potamkins a BMW fran-
chise in Great Neck, Long Island was due 
to the fact that other Long Island BMW 
dealers feared the price competition that a 
Potamkin BMW franchise would bring to 
the Long Island market." A1712. Hoff-
man has testified inconsistently that 1) he 
cannot recall the substantive content of his 
conversations with Robert and 2) he denie* 
Robert's allegations. A417-18. Reason-
able inferences of concerted action may be 
drawn from the Gray affidavit combined 
with Hoffman's comments, BMW NA's al* 
leged abrupt reversal of opinion, and,% 
will be seen below, Cronin's solicitation;^ 
Robert even after the alleged bribe '& 
tempt. 
Unlike the plaintiff in Edward /. Swee-
ney, who failed to disprove the defendant's 
legitimate reasons, the Potamkins .hafe 
produced evidence that tends to negate 
BMW NA's allegation of the attempted 
bribe. BMW NA has not explained why,;if 
the bribe incident occurred, later in 1982 
Cronin suggested to Robert Potamkin thit 
he purchase Irv Green's franchise as Rob* 
ert alleges. A1704.5 The absence^of.anf 
:
 and his solicitation of Robert's application in 
1982 is two-fold: (1) Robert's recollection of the 
1982 date is inaccurate, or (2) Cronin had DO 
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BMW NA documentation of the bribe and 
Cronin's November 1981 letter to Victor 
evidencing different concerns further 
serves to buttress an inference that this 
alleged bribe may have been conjured up 
later. The Potamkins point out that Victor 
and Gunter Kramer, BMW NA's President, 
had a cordial lunch together in 1983, 
A1460; 2171, although Kramer responds 
that, new to his position at that time, he 
had not yet been informed of the bribe. 
A484-86. 
Given this sequence of events, a reason-
able jury could infer that BMW NA would 
have welcomed a "high volume" dealer 
such as Victor, and after succumbing to 
pressure from its New York area dealers, 
entertained the prospect of installing a Po-
tamkin dealership in an alternative loca-
tion, Philadelphia. 
B. 
1985: Manhattan 
In early September of 1985, the Potam-
kins7 began negotiating with Gladys Cau-
field and her lawyer, Marvin Buchner, in 
order to purchase Caufield's Manhattan 
BMW dealership, Trans-Atlantic. Caufield 
explained that she had sought to sell her 
business to the Potamkins because " . . . it 
just made more sense . . . you know, they 
had the wherewithal to really do a beauti-
ful job and I thought that's what BMW 
was looking for." A1662-63. Because her 
lease was expiring, bhe was compelled to 
sell the business by the end of December of 
1985. A1612-1614. At a September 9th 
meeting, the Putamkms offered to buy 
Trans-Atlantic for $800,000 plus an unde-
termined amount for parts. A1620 On 
September 30th, Cronm ^poke to Buchner, 
and urged that Caufield stall the Putamkm 
deal so that BMW NA could make an offer 
by October 10th. A1673. 
re*pun*ihilil> for ihc Phi ladelphia u m i u r s 
The tit si explana t ion i l c a i l ) l a i ^ s ail »>M.C ut 
C l c d i b i l l l N t o r OlC JUI \ I l i e x . c o . , J C \ p ) « i l . a l l u n 
is not Inn nc oui bs OK i c n t i J V\ U»I to Wd5 
\shcu the MiJ Atlauiu Region was h i si f u i i ne J 
Croa tu s c i \ c J lhe i-asici u Rifciwii w h u h i i.vu.i. 
p j i s ^ J Phi ladelphia Nc* AI&SI M u . t w u t 
G l t V i l > l o l l l l l u l i \ i h » " \ \ i t h a i I i t >H.k > .* J -t I I I H J 
his J*. UILI ship X c \ l 7 c v 
Having heard nothing from BMW NA, , 
Buchner unsuccessfully attempted to reach 
Cronin on October 16th. A1674. . Subse- • 
quently, the Potamkins and Caufield 
reached an "agreement in principle" on Oc-
tober 29, 1985, subject to successfully ne-.-
gotiating a written sales agreement. 
A1632, A1674. BMW NA again stepped 
into the picture the next day, on October . 
30th, when Cronin and Andy Pokorny of. 
BMW NA met with Buchner, Caufield and*. 
her partner at Trans-Atlantic. A1633.,: 
Buchner testified that Cronin advised them 
"that BMW would not accept Potamkin a s , 
a dealer" and "BMW wanted Manhattan to 
be a one-dealer territory" and they- should 
"delay signing an agreement with Potam-
kin until BMW could make its offer to 
Trans-Atlantic." A1633. Buchner be-
lieved that BMW's opposition to the Potam-
kins was related to discounting and reputa-
tion for service. A1634. 
Informing them of the agreement in prin-
ciple, A1634-35, Buchner countered that if 
a signed agreement was submitted to 
BMW for approval and was rejected, it 
would precipitate litigation by Trans-Atlan-
tic and probably Potamkin against BMW. 
A1633. The following day, October 31st, 
BMW NA's counsel, Michael Epstein from 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, contacted Bu-
chner and asked to see the agreement with 
the Potamkins; Buchner refused and the 
two agreed to a November 5th deadline for 
a BMW NA offer. A1635-36. On Novem-
ber 7th, Caufield, her partner, and Buchner 
met with BMW NA's Vice President Mi-
clt&el JatkUtig and Michael Epstein and Ar-
thur Jacobs of Weil, Gotshal & Manges. 
AHiay. 
After reviewing the Potamkin negotia-
tion,, BMW NA offered Caufield $500,000 
phi* repurchasing assets as required under 
the franchise agreement. A1640. No 
7- i i l a J s> L a u h e l d testified tha i she believed that 
*hc u i i J her !avv)Lr, M a r w n Buchner , negot ia ted 
VMIU ail th ree of (he P o t a m k i n s , A1663, because 
>hv. uu-t vsith all t h i ce at o n e t unc . Moreover , 
Hi.iwhncr i m i u l U LuntaLtcd o n e of Victor 's salcs-
n i ; u t^ UKju.te into ihe I 'u lamluns" interest in 
I *-*.>• Atlantic n l f t i l 
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agreement \sa* reached b*it Ja^VlTg d"l 
infh'cntp that BMW NA wnnM m>t nwaH a 
franchise to the* Potamkm* hrra»i«p n« P\i-
chner recalled, it %\a* the t/»nnr <>( hi« 
comment that the\ were pnep d!«™tm**r* " 
A1641. In re«=pon«e to a counteroffer 
based on the price the Potamkin* were 
willing to pay, BMW N.V* counsel "indicat 
ed to [Buchner] that the portion of BMW 
was that the^e premise were closing down 
and that we really had nothing to *ell. they 
had nothing to buy" A1K42 
Buchner then called the Potamkins' law 
yer and explained that Caufield would not 
sign that agreement until the Potamkins 
could provide a possession date A1643 
Nothing happened until December 17th, 
when Jacobs offered Buchner BMW NA's 
top offer of $550,000/ and Caufield, 
pressed by an expiring lease, accepted 
A1644. Buchner explained that "BMW, 
through Mr. Cronin, had made it crystal 
clear that they would not approve the Po-
tamkin people; therefore, our choices of 
purchasers was limited to one and my in-
structions were to strike the best deal I 
could with BMW and close it." A1645. 
Caufield stated, "I think they indicated 
clearly that if we went ahead with the sale 
to Potamkin that we would be in litigation 
for a long period of time." ". . . [A]nd if 
we were in some kind of litigation I had 
parts and cars and whatever that would be 
tied up and it was sort of forcing the hand, 
so to speak." A1665. 
BMW NA counters that it had long 
planned to eliminate one of its two Manhat-
tan dealerships because New York is wide-
ly considered to be a one-dealer market, 
according to Cronin, and BMW NA already 
had an additional New York City dealer-
ship, Martin BMW. A296-97. Caufield 
testified that in 1984, BMW NA had once 
mentioned the possibility of buying Trans-
Atlantic and turning it into a factory store 
or mausoleum, although no terms or prices 
were reached. A1655-56; 303-07. This 
was consistent with BMW NA's earlier 
plan for its Manhattan dealers, dubbed the 
"Manhattan Project," which envisioned 
eliminating the two Manhattan BMW deal-
pr*hip"» by hitting thorn out and then open-
f p a firtorv store or mausoleum. A873-
Tr>. 211** For thi«* reason. BMW NA sug-
£p*t« that Caufield « negotiations with the 
Potamkin*! w*»re merelv an attempt to ob-
tain a valuation of her business. A305; 
Following BMW NA's purchase of 
Tran*-Atlantic*5 a**ets. however, it deviat-
ed from the "Manhattan Project", granting 
to Martin BMW an exclusive Manhattan 
franchise BMW NA alleges it chose this 
course because it came to see the wisdom 
of not engaging in competition with its 
dealers 
Nevertheless, Robert asserts that one 
BMW dealer, Hoffman, later informed him 
that a BMW NA representative had "visit-
ed him and asked his opinion" about the 
proposed sale of Trans-Atlantic to the Po-
tamkins. A1712 During BMW NA's ne-
gotiations with the principal of Martin 
BMW—prior to the Caufield/Potamkinjie; 
gotiations—a Cronin memorandum antici-
pated the need to discuss with the area 
dealers the operation of a factory store. 
A2227; A873-75. The Potamkins theorize 
that the dealer opposition of 1981 was reac-
tivated in 1985 to defeat their agreement in 
principle with Caufield for Trans-Atlantic 
and to award Martin BMW an exclusive 
Manhattan dealership. 
C. 
1985: Philadelphia 
Also during the fall of 1985, Robert and* 
Alan Potamkin reached a written buy-seQ, 
agreement with Philadelphia BMW dealer* 
Irvin Green, but once again fell short ofi 
acquiring a BMW franchise. Because tha, 
third attempt constitutes the heart of tbe^  
Potamkins' lawsuit and BMW NA presents 
a multitude of reasons for its decision-^ *} 
reject Robert's franchise application, an e»d 
pecially detailed review is required. 
Robert alleges that Cronin approached 
him in 1982 about acquiring the Philadel-
phia franchise owned by Irvin Green-
Green conceded that BMW NA, particular-
ly Cronin, had long been dissatisfied with 
8. BMW NA ultimately paid $693,569 for Trans- Atlantic, inclusive of parts. A1649 
BIG APPLE BMW, INC. v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. 1371 
Cite a* 974 FJd 1358 (3rd Cir. 1992) 
his meager sales performance * * * 
[phrase deleted]. Therefore, on October 8, 
1985, Green and Robert entered into a buy-
sell agreement for Green's BMW and 
Volkswagen franchises. A929-47. Rob-
ert, as half owner, would manage the deal-
ership; Alan and another investor were 
each to contribute 25% of the capital. The 
Potamkins planned to move these franchis-
es to a different location in Northeast Phil-
adelphia, at the corner of Grant Avenue 
and Academy Road, which also housed 
Robert's Chevrolet, Dodge, Isuzu, and 
AMC Jeep Renault franchises. A595; 
A2065. 
The buy-sell agreement was expressly 
contingent upon the award of BMW and 
Volkswagen franchises, and contained an 
expiration date of December 23, 1985. 
A1729-30. This expiration date, combined 
9. There is significant dispute concerning wheth-
er BMW NA made a good faith attempt to con-
sider Robert's application. According to Rob-
ert's affidavit, by October 10th Green hand-de-
livered the buy-sell agreement to Philip Caposse-
la, then the BMW Regional Manager for the 
mid Atlantic Region, and requested a dealership 
application form which Capossela refused to 
provide. A1706. Capossela testified that he 
was thus aware of the expiration date, A103, 
and that at that time he told Green that Robert 
was not a '"suitable" candidate fur a franchise, 
in the words of BMW NA in house counsel. 
A105-10O. Robert telephoned Capossela and of-
fered personally to navel to his Virginia office 
to obtain an application, but was told that the 
district manager wv>uld piuvide Robert with a 
copy and that he, Capossela, would contact Rob 
ert by October 16th. A1706-07. Robert was 
unable to reach Capossela again, but sent a 
letter, dated October 18th, A1716, and contacted 
Robert Casella, BMW Director of Dealer Dcvel 
opment for the mid Atlantic Region, on October 
22, NS5. who again discouraged Robert from 
traveling to Virginia to obtain an application 
form. AI 707 Casella agreed to meet with Rob 
ert on October 2^th and to supply a form at that 
tune. RO1H.II then wiotc a follow-up letter. 
A1717. Casella [chiles Ruben's rcvuidahou thai 
Casella gave him assurances thai there wuold be 
su!twicnl tune to pun.ess the application bch.ic* 
the evpuattou i»f the bu>->ell agreement A 147. 
set abx> Al20S-<>o tlasellu's Intel br*iuh 
Memo vl the incident) 
liMW NA piowdcs a host ol icaxn.s U.f fail-
ing to decide on the applualum until ailei the 
agl cement e x p n e d It l.int> that * * * (ila>.s-e 
deleted] and thai l ie lJ pc ix .n r . e l . .cold m l have 
taken the a p p l u a i u . u K f v i e iku>(Nci 2vil. ai.d 
30th UMW NA al>u sv . ^e s i s lhai l<* ( i i ee i . J . J 
(IOl | ' I O | p t l l v M u i i l l i . ' l U C y-l U.v a . ' t c g c J t " . . » 
with BMW NA's alleged delay in delivering 
a franchise application to Robert, forms a 
significant part of the Potamkins' griev-
ance with BMW NA. Although Green and 
Robert each sought to obtain a BMW fran-
chise application immediately after signing 
their agreement, the Potamkins assert that 
BMW NA delayed sending the necessary 
application form until October 29, 1985. 
BMW NA was required to act on Robert's 
application under the Pennsylvania Board 
of Vehicles Act, 63 Pa.StatAnn. § 818.-
9(b)(4), within 60 days. By delaying until 
October 29th, BMW NA ensured that this 
deadline would exceed the December 23rd 
expiration of the buy-sell agreement.9 By 
letter to Irv Green dated November 25, 
1985, Michael Jackling, at that time BMW 
NA's Senior Vice President of Operations, 
explicitly acknowledged this deadline.10 
A1746. 
sell agreement. Thus. Capossela testified that 
Green needed to enclose a cover letter to intro-
duce the buy-sell agreement, and his personal 
delivery of the buy-sell agreement to BMW NA' 
was insufficient notice. A1756. 
Indeed Jackling asserted that Robert's applica-
tion was incomplete, and the buy-sell agreement 
expired of its own accord. A2415-16. The rec-
ord does not indicate why, if the application 
package was incomplete, Jackling directed 
counsel at Weil, Gotshal to hire a private inves-
tigator to investigate Robert pursuant to the 
application, nor why other processing steps 
were taken. • * * [one sentence deleted). And 
Casella explained (hat an application is pending 
from the "time the [acquisition agreement) hits 
my desk." A1814. 
Although District Pans Manager Graynor in-
dicated that Robert and his proposed parts man-
ager had refused to sign the Prospective Dealer 
Parti Department form, A2017, Robert contends 
they were never shown that form. A1974. An-
other BMW dealer, Martin Sussman, had re-
fused to sign a BMW Dealer Operating Require-
ment Agreement because he disagreed with one 
of its Conditions, but had not been threatened 
with termination of his franchise. A2141-44. 
10. L\ relevant pait. Jackling wrote: 
I am ir.tunncJ that Pennsylvania law allows 
HMW.NA lu respond to a request for consent 
to the wle uf a trariihise 'within 60 days of 
receipt ut a unfit;/! rtque.it on the forms, if 
any genu ally utilueJ by the manufacturer or 
vh>uiLwtur U-» suJi pui poses a\\\S containing 
the iuloi malum i chimed" 
\t vvur iku/txr 10 l*a5 meeting with Mr. 
l'ap<o.*4.ta U M U N \ was not pioVlded with a 
w . u u . i u . ^ . u i wi with the iufoi (nation we 
.e^wire m i . i Jc r in eva lua te yuur potential 
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As a result of this poMuring, Andrew 
Pokorny, BMW NA's Vice President of Re 
gional Operations and Sales, A28i>. sent to 
Irv Green a letter dated December 2f\ 
1985, informing him that it would not 
award Robert Potamkin a franchise. By 
this time, the executor}' contract had al-
ready expired. Ultimately, Green sold his 
BMW franchise to an existing area BMW 
dealer, Robert Sloane, and his partner, 
Martin Lustgarten, who relocated the fran-
chise to an affluent Philadelphia suburb. 
The Potamkins allege that they were de-
nied the Green franchise because Philadel-
phia area BMW dealers feared price compe-
tition and coalesced to pressure BMW NA 
into rejecting their application. As proof, 
they tender the testimony of Bruce Braver-
man, Robert's Lease Manager. This evi-
dence consists of statements allegedly 
made by a BMW leasing representative, 
D,on Mitchell, to Braverman. Braverman 
testified in his deposition that: 
Don Mitchell told me that the BMW deal-
ers in the area would not let Potamkin 
get the franchise because they were 
afraid that Potamkin's reputation of sell-
ing cars cheaper than everybody else 
was not something that they wanted to 
get involved with. They didn't want to 
be involved in price competition. They 
wanted to keep their price levels where 
they were and that [sic] they were going 
to do what they could to make sure that 
Potamkin did not get the franchise. 
A2195-96. In answer to the question "Did 
Mitchell indicate that he had spoken to 
anyone from BMW of North America?/' 
Braverman also stated: 
No. He indicated to me that he had 
spoken to dealers. The dealers, it was 
the dealers who did not want Potamkin 
to get the franchise, it wasn't BMW who 
had rejected them. 
To me it seemed like it was a conspiracy 
of the dealers in the tri-state area that 
purchaser. Mr. Potamkin submitted his ap-
plication package on October 29. The follow-
ing day, October 30, we received your written 
request for consent. 
By statute, BMWNA's 60 days to evaluate the 
proposed sale of a franchise cannot expire on 
didn't unnt Potamkin to get that fran-
chise \ don't think BMW cared. 
A2M2 However. Braverman also an-
swered negatively when asked, "Did Mr. 
Mitchell indicate that the dealers had spe-
cifically spoken to a particular individual at 
BMW?" A2312. Braverman memorialized 
this alleged conversation in a memorandum 
dated January 15. 198f>. A2197. While 
this testimony also falls short of direct 
"smoking: gun" evidence of causation, if 
admissible, it does supply additional cir-
cumstantial evidence of concerted action. 
In excluding" this evidence, the district 
court reasoned that Mitchell's statement 
would constitute hearsay unless he pos-
sessed authority to bind BMW NA, which 
he indisputably lacked. This conclusion 
misperceives the nature of a vicarious ad-
mission, wrhich the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence designate as outside the realm of, 
hearsay by definition. Further, the vica-
rious admission rule of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) does not require that 
a declarant have authority to bind its em-
ployer. As the Advisory Committee noted 
when amending this rule, to limit its scope 
in this manner would preclude much proba-
tive evidence because an employer will 
rarely authorize its employee to make in-
criminating statements. Advisory Commit-
tee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). - The 
rule simply requires that an agent make 
the statement "within the scope of' his or 
her employment. 
To analyze the relevant scope of Mitch-
ell's employment, we must first identify his 
employer. Braverman testified that Mitch-
ell was BMW Credit's representative to 
Robert's prospective dealership. A2194-
95. Yet according to BMW NA, Don 
Mitchell was employed by General Electric 
Capital Auto Lease (GECAL) as an area 
sales manager. A2426. Mitchell testified 
that he received his salary from GECAL 
without commissions from BMW Credit 
A506. . ;.'J 
a Saturday or Sunday. Consequently, wheth-
er we count from October 29 or from October 
30, BMWNA's deadline is Monday, December 
30, 1985. 
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The relationship between Mitchell's em-
ployer, GECAL and BMW NA is complex. 
* * * [three sentences deleted]. 
* * * [paragraph deleted]. 
' [8] As far as the record discloses, 
Mitchell was the only representative of 
BMW Credit and BMW Leasing assigned to 
serve the territory in which Robert 's pro-
posed dealership was located. Mitchell de-
scribed his job function as "soliciting] leas-
ing business from automobile dealerships 
and independent leasing companies within 
[his territory]." Pursuant to the GECC 
and BMW NA joint ventures, his job includ-
ed some retail installment financing. 
A2427; * * * [citation to record deleted]. 
He also "provide[d] the BMW dealers with 
help on their leases and promotions," 
A2434, and provided BMW dealers with 
training and the necessary supplies to com-
plete the leasing and financing paperwork. 
A2846. As the leasing agent for GECAL 
to BMW dealerships, he admitted, "I repre-
sent BMW Credit Corporation." A2872. 
We conclude that Mitchell's statement, 
made as a representative of BMW Credit 
and BMW Leasing, may be attributed to 
BMW NA. The statement of a subsidiary 
may be attributed to its corporate parent, 
consistent with agency theory, where the 
parent dominates the activities of the sub-
sidiary. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 505 F.Supp. 
1190, 1247-48 (E.D Pa.lDbO). This evidence 
of the relationship between BMW NA and 
BMW Credit and BMW Leasing, while 
close, does suffice to confer agency status 
on Mitchell BMW NA's ownership inter-
ests, control through corporate officers, ad-
vertising, and the subsidiaries' use o( the 
BMW logo on their documentation, togeth-
er indicate a sufficiently dominating inter-
est in its subsidiaries. 
As a further matter, the identity of the 
dealer^ referred to Ls sufficient^ clear 
from the record. BMW NA's District Man 
ager Martin Focht identified the members 
of the Philadelphia area dealer advertising 
group (DAG) as consisting u( (he folluuing 
dealerships Rosen. Otto's De\on Hill 
Sloane. DeSimone Martin I'nion Park 
Thompson, Hans, diui West German 
A1854. Mitchell specified servicing the fol-
lowing BMW dealerships from September 
1985 through January 1986: Rosen, Otto's, 
Devon Hill, Thompson, Hans and West Ger-
man. A2201-02. Braverman'g account of 
Mitchell's statement conveys tha t 'Rosen 
referred to the area dealers, which would 
fairly comprise, the area DAG. The evi-
dence sufficiently identifies the source of 
the dealers' statements. Contra Carden 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 
1002 (3d Cir.1988) (an Unidentified "they'," 
who said something to the declarant, was 
insufficient). 
[9] The district court noted, as its sec-
ond reason, that Mitchell was alleged to 
have made the statement "some two weeks 
after" BMW NA rejected Robert's applica-
tion. We reject the theory that a state-
ment evidencing the occurrence of concert-
ed action may be inadmissible because it 
follows that activity. Although Mitchell's 
alleged statement to Braverman occurred 
on January 16, 1986, and after the decision 
to reject Robert's application was made, 
there is no evidence to support the conclu-
sion that the dealers' statements to Mitch-
ell followed the rejection of Robert's appli-
cation. In addition, that a vicarious admis-
sion is disclosed after the fact does not 
defeat its admissibility. See Mahlandt v. 
Wild Can id Survival & Research Center, 
Inc., 588 F 2 d 626 (8th Cir.1978). 
[10] The Potamkins also assert that the 
dealers' statements to Mitchell are admissi-
ble under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), the co-
conspirator admission provision. In Unit-
ed States r. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238 (3d 
Cir 1983), cert, denied, Stillman v. United 
States, 464 U S . 936, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78 
L.Ed 2d 311 (1983), we comprehensively 
identified the requirements for such an ad-
mission 1) independent evidence establish-
es the existence of a conspiracy and con-
nects the declarant and defendant to it; 2) 
the statement was made in furtherance of 
the conspiracy; and 3) the statement was 
made during the course of the conspiracy. 
Id at 245 The proponent must establish 
the first requirement by a "fair preponder-
ance i)i independent evidence " Id at 250. 
Merc association does not suffice but, on 
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the other hand, timing circumstance, nr 
one or a series of meetings, may. Id. 
More recently, while not deciding the 
question of whether the challenged hearsay 
statement alone might adequately demon-
strate conspiracy, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the conspiracy need not be exclusively 
proven by evidence aliunde. Bourjnily r 
United States, 483 U.S. 171. 181, 107 S.Ct 
2775, 2781, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). Scr 
United States v. Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 553 
(3d Cir.1989). Thus, for the first element, 
we may look to independent evidence plus 
the statement itself for evidence of a con-
spiracy. On appellate review, the witness" 
statements "must be accepted as true for 
the purposes of determining the sufficiency 
of the evidence." Am mar, 714 F 2d at 
251. As well, the co-conspirator admission 
of Rule 801(d)(2) does not require personal 
knowledge. As noted by the Advisory 
Committee, Rule 801(d)(2) is designated as 
an admission against interest; its admissi-
bility is premised upon our adversarial sys-
tem rather than in reliance upon indicia of 
reliability or trustworthiness. Id. at 254; 
see United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118 
(3d Cir.1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1029, 
106 S.Ct. 1233, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). 
[11] Because the Potamkins have prof-
fered evidence to show concerted action in 
violation of the Sherman Act, they have 
demonstrated the requisite conspiracy for 
admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). This 
judgment is entirely separate from the fact 
that both Mitchell and Rosen, in their depo-
sition testimony, categorically deny the 
l i . These "19 bits" were identified as follows: 
1. the letter rejecting Victor Potamkin's 
Great Neck application; 
2. the affidavit of Harry Gray; 
3. BMW MA's failure to differentiate among 
the various members of the Potamkin family; 
4. and 5. Michael Jackling's and Terry Cro-
nin's assertions that they did not want the Po-
tamkins as dealers because they were "price 
discounters/'; ' 
" 6» Bruce BraVerman's testimony about state 
ments made by Don Mitchell; 
. .7. BMW MA's alleged opposition to price ad-
vertising by'its dealers; 
*'« 8. dealers' cooperative efforts to enforce ad-
vertising standards; 
9. evidence that BMW dealers had a strong 
motive to exclude [the] Potamkin[s]; 
statements attributed to them in Braver-
man'* t^timnnv. At trial, the factfinder 
mu«t decide which of the diametrically op-
posed witnesses is truthful. 
La5t. *he district court reasoned that 
Bravennan's testimony did not support an 
inference that dealer sentiment caused 
BMW N'A's inaction on Robert's applica-
tion. Memorandum Opinion at 10, 1990 
WL 182340. We agree that as with the 
Gray affidavit, the Braverman testimony 
alone does present sufficient evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could find concert-
ed action in violation of section one of the 
Sherman Act. 
IV. 
[12] BMW NA provides a variety of 
reasons for allegedly independently reject-
ing the Potamkins as BMW dealers. The 
district court found these reasons compel-
ling, on balance, when contrasted to the 
"19 bits" of evidence it attributed to the 
Potamkins.1' To the contrary, although a 
jury may credit BMW NA's reasons, we 
cannot conclude that a reasonable jury 
would disbelieve the Potamkins' substantial 
rebuttal evidence. In light of BMW NA's 
many inconsistent reasons for denying the 
Potamkins a franchise, and assuming all 
credibility determinations in favor of the 
Potamkins at this juncture, we are satisfied 
that they have met their burden of proof. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the Potamkins while bearing 
in mind that an antitrust plaintiff must 
assert an economically sensible claim, we 
10. the testimony of Michael Vadasz; 
11. discussions of sales figures at dealer ad-
vertising group meetings; 
12. groups of BMW dealers are organized 
into 'Twenty Group" clubs; 
13. BMW NA monitors the average profit 
margin for all dealers in each region; 
14. allocation of vehicles; 
15. the 1978 dealers' manual; consulting ex-
isting deaters about new applicants; ">^} 
16. the testimony of Frank Ursomarso; 
17. evidence that BMW NA conferred with 
other New York metropolitan dealers "concern-
ing plans for the New York market"; "m 
18. evidence that BMW NA punished (M* 
counters by decreasing their allocations; and 
last, ' 
19. BMW NA's aversion to the Potamkins. 
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turn to consider BMW NA's alleged inde-
pendent reasons and the Potamkins' evi-
dence that these reasons were pretextual. 
In sum, BMW NA alleges that the Potam-
kin image as high volume priceKiiscounters 
was incompatible with the desired BMW 
image; the Potamkins* customer service 
record was inadequate; the proposed Phila-
delphia location was inadequate for a num-
ber of reasons; the Potamkins were un-
cooperative; and Robert objected to an an-
nual allocation of 94 cars.12 Indeed, when 
contrasted to BMW NA's earlier actions 
expressive of an interest in the Potamkins, 
the plethora of complaints pressed by 
BMW NA is both internally inconsistent 
and inconsistent with its concomitant treat-
ment of BMW dealers. We turn to address 
BMW NA's alleged reasons for refusing to 
grant a franchise to the Potamkins. 
As its primary reason for refusing to 
grant a franchise to the Potamkins, BMW 
NA asserts that the Potamkins threatened 
harm as potential "free rider" dealers. 
BMW NA mistakenly reads Business Elec-
tronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 
485 U.S. 717, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 99 L.Ed.2d 808 
(1988), to support its proposition that no 
liability could attach to its decision not to 
appoint the Potamkins as dealers. It con-
tends that under Sharp, the Potamkins 
12, A November , 1985 m e m o r a n d u m f rom R o b 
ert Casella. Bus iness Deve lopment M a n a g e r for 
the Mid-At lan t i c Region, to E d w a r d Rob inson . 
BMW NA's E a s t e r n Reg ion Sa les Manage r , be^t 
ar t icula tes BMW NA's pos i t ion: 
1. Mr. P o t a m k m h a s not indica ted a wil l ing 
ness to p rov ide the necessary m i n i m u m oper 
at ing r e q u i r e m e n t s s t a n d a r d s for Service and 
Par ts 
2. It is not c lear that p roposed P o t a m k m 
BMW \ tou ld l>e a dis t inct and M:par ale upcra-
turn a l lowing tor the comple t e a u t o n o i m 
needed lv»i a p i u i u i c n l a n d d i s i u u l BMW 
o(H.t a l l o t ) 
3 Mi Po iamki t i h a s c \ p r c » c J an unwi l l ing 
nc*s to pi ovule the nccc^*ai> exclusive per 
sonnet l e q u u c d for the BMW" u p c i a l i o n 
4 As a dealer in Ph i l ade lph ia Pcnn>> 1\ u m a 
M\d l l t iotigh his assoxial iui i ai\J \ c > u d u .U ; 
est m the P o t a m k m New \ oi L u i b a h u j i < . ' i i 
Kot*ol M P o t a m k m hiuvgs a voir.ewLui J> >, 
d \ v O l l l l l U l H U I l l l o v l . s t O i t i i i U l l J a . l i > n a . . J 
O U U M I U I S * I V K C l i t a d J l l l i ' i k I . ' j w t l u J v a... 
i i ^ u i u i J JH n d n . g h 6 a ) J , in i. h - , «>.2i .; .(.:«.; 
must prove an agreement to fix prices or 
price level, and BMW NA maintains that it 
has not set price levels for its cars,- al-
though the record is replete with evidence 
that BMW NA representatives and dealers 
share and discuss retail price statistics. 
A1845; see also A2053; A2063-64. * ? * 
[two sentences deleted]. *' 
Therefore, there is evidence of a concrete 
motive for dealer animus toward other 
dealers who would undercut a flexibly set 
price over invoice by advertising sales at, 
for example, $99 oyer invoice. Neverthe-
less, there is no direct evidence, only evi-
dence from which a factfinder could infer, 
that BMW NA and its dealers have tacitly 
fixed prices for BMWs. 
BMW NA further asserts that it does not 
prohibit its dealers from price advertising. 
Seet e.g., A135-37 (testimony of BMW 
NA's Mid-Atlantic Region Business Devel-
opment Manager Robert Casella); A327-31 
(testimony of BMW NA's Mid-Atlantic Re-
gion District Manager Martin Focht). In 
fact, numerous BMW dealers concurred 
that they are free to price advertise. See, 
e.g., A420 (testimony of BMW dealer Gene 
Hoffman); A399 (testimony of BMW dealer 
Irv Green); A406 (testimony of BMW deal-
er Andrew Hill); A502 (testimony of BMW 
dealer Martin Lustgarten); A225 (testimo-
ny of BMW dealer Mario Gesarini). BMW 
t a m p e r i n g , adver t i s ing mi s r ep re sen t a t i on , and 
ques t i onab l e leas ing tactics. The a b o v e as 
ev idenced by enc losed n e w s p a p e r ar t ic les . 
5. .Sir. P o t a m k i n has empha t i ca l ly s t ressed 
that the guide of 94 uni t s would not b e accept-
able It is felt that at some t i m e in the fu ture 
o u r s ta tus at the p roposed facility wou ld be 
c o m p r o m i s e d and the BMW o p e r a t i o n w o u l d 
be shut t led into secondary or less t h a n ade-
qua te a c c o m m o d a t i o n s . 
A190I. 
In addi t ion , n u n ; of those s a m e r e a s o n s were 
pu iv ided to Gieen b> And iew Pokorny : 
Muicovc r . to date , Mr P o t a m k i n has been 
unwi l l ing 10 a^rce to meet BMWNA's mini -
m u m s u n d a i d ope ra t ing r e q u i r e m e n t s , a n d to 
acvept a n SPG of 94 unit*—the ident ical SPG 
\i>u friave We a rc unwi l l ing to accept a n y 
b ; . \c t not p r e p a r e d to meet o u r m i n i m u m 
upc.'tiiuig s u n d a i d s In addi t ion , P o t a m k i n ' s 
m.(ik>i. le l lcvts a spirit of non c o o p e r a t i o n 
. . , ' , . . : . i i a<iiUai> tui iliat t e q u u e d to bui ld a 
6^-..J v .wjk l t . 4 . c la tkOJi ih ip 
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NA and it<* dealer* d<> admittedly di«rn?ir 
age other BMW dnalers (mm p?»iraginir in 
price advertising because they view that 
practice as counterprfHluctivr* giv^n the 
preferences and demographics of a typical 
BMW customer. As one dealer explained. 
'The quality of the product is a factor, but 
you have to understand as a dealer whn 
your customers are, what the demograph-
ics of the customers are and figure out how-
to handle that customer " A2470. Accord-
ingly, customers spending more than $30.-
000 for an automobile "don't want it 
thought of as a price i t em. . . [Ijt is an 
image thing, an association, an affinity 
with a fine product/* A330. BMW NA's 
Senior Vice President of Operations. Mi-
chael Jackling, stated that BMW NA 
speaks with its dealers about advertising 
and about setting the appropriate tone. 
Because BMW is marketing a luxury 
product, BMW is very sensitive as to 
how that product is perceived in the mar-
ketplace, so . . . that the product value 
itself is maximized through its image as 
well as its specification, performance and 
ownership qualities. 
A450. • • • [one sentence deleted]. 
Thus BMW NA claims that the Potam-
kins' advertising style—prominently fea-
turing prices and terms like "blow out 
sale" or "seliathon" A314-17; A915-28— is 
incompatible with the BMW image and 
heavily influenced BMW NA's decision to 
.reject the Potamkins. 
BMW NA misapprehends the legal pa-
rameters. In Sharp, the Court held that 
"a vertical restraint is not illegal per se 
unless it includes some agreement on price 
or price levels/' Ruling after a trial in 
which the jury was instructed only on a per 
se theory of liability, the Court remanded 
the case for a new trial holding that per se 
illegality would not attach to a vertical non-
price restraint and that "an agreement be-
tween a manufacturer and a dealer to ter-
minate a 'price cutter/ without a further 
agreement on the price or price levels to be 
13. Proof of anticompetitive effect is the hall-
mark of a rule of reason test, see Tunis Bros. 
Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715 (3d 
Cir.1991) cert, denied, — U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 
3034, 120 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992), and it is well 
charged by th»' remaining dealer," must be 
yv\£r<\ undnr a nil* of reason test. 485 
frS at 7JK. T.W. UN SCt. at 1520, 1526. 
Thu«. <»vrn if th»* case is on all fours with 
Shnrp. the Pntnmkins may still proceed to 
a jury trial under the rule of reason test13 
Moreover. thi« case has an additional 
horizontal component that Sharp lacked. 
In Shnrp, a single dealer, Hartwell, pres-
sured Sharp tn terminate Business Elec-
tronics. Here the Potamkins pled in their 
complaint, and the evidence suggests, that 
a number nf BMW dealers combined to 
form a group boycott to pressure BMW 
NA to reject Potamkin competition. The 
Potamkins assert that all of BMW NA's 
alleged reasons for rejecting them are pre-
textual and that until BMW dealers voiced 
their strenuous opposition to Potamkin 
competition, BMW NA had acknowledged 
the value of installing Potamkins as deal-
ers. Thus the Potamkins present a hori-
zontal boycott case, rather than the non-
price vertical restraint suggested by BMW 
NA. As we fully evaluate infra, the evi-
dence of record, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Potamkins, supports 
their proposition. .,,*' 
Sharp suggests that the proper distinc-
tion between a horizontal and a vertical 
restraint lies in determining which kind of 
an arrangement produces the restraint 
rather than analyzing its anticompetiti?e 
effects. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 730 n. 4, 108 
S.Ct at 1523 n. 4. Under either analysis, 
however, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Potamkins, the evidence 
suggests that BMW NA rejected the Po-
tamkins as a result of dealer opposition to 
price competition. 
Last, Sharj) also reflected the concern 
that fear of antitrust liability should not 
serve to inhibit a manufacturer's ability to 
expel "free riders" from its dealership 
body. BMW NA insists that it feared & 
"free rider" effect. As explained in GTS 
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55, 97 S.Ct at 2560, 
this effect occurs when the "free riding" 
settled that protecting interbrand, rather than 
intrabrand, competition should be the goal «f 
antitrust law. GTE Sylvania, 433 US. at 52,97 
S.Ct. at 2558. 
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retailer reduces or eliminates service to 
create price competition and a customer 
researches a purchase at a full service re-
tailer but ultimately buys the product from 
the discounting retailer. BMW NA main-
tains that it feared just such an effect, 
emphasizing that quality service is crucial 
to its reputation and ultimate success. In 
support of its claim, BMW NA asserts that 
the Potamkin reputation evokes a high vol-
ume, price-discounting image. When 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Potamkins, however, the record suggests 
that this image incompatibility, as well, is 
simply pretextual.*4 
14. In a letter to BMW dealer Irv Green, Andrew 
Porkorny, BMW NA's Vice President of Region-
al Operations and Sales, also provided as a 
reason for the decision that "Mr. Potamkin is 
not qualified," the following: 
In general, it is clear to us that there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between the 
"BMWNA" corporate image and the "Potam-
kin" image, that the proposed buyer will not 
maintain the high commitment to customer 
service required by BMWNA, and that Mr. 
Potamkin will not properly represent 
BMWNA in the market place. As a result, the 
public and BMWNA will be harmed should 
your proposed transaction go forward. 
A869. In an effort to prove that incompatibili-
ty, BMW NA has also produced the report of a 
private investigator, Earle Gay. which was pre 
pared at the request of BMW NA's counsel dur-
ing the pendency of Robert's application for the 
Green franchise. The Potamkins have provided 
sufficient evidence to render as a material factu 
al dispute the genuineness of this 'image" rea 
son, however, especially as it relates to Gays 
report. 
First, combined with the other evidence to 
indicate that BMW NA never intended to con 
sider Roberts application, there is i\o dispute 
that Robert's application was the first tor which 
BMW NA'hued a private investigator's services. 
A2288. Gay submitted his rcpoii directly to the 
Weil. Gotshal & Manges law firm and BMW NA 
dcvision-makers never teceived a copv of it. 
A21&4. Further, from the information provided 
to Gav at (he outlet of hi> invCbiigation a jury 
could mlei dial BMW NA was culling piclcvlual 
excuses to dcn> a Potamkin trauchoc. Guv 
testified that he was oidered to investigate con 
sumei complaint*, but not provide J with lav or 
able ictcieiKcs lumishcd b> Kobcit. A22^2-s>6 
Despite BMW NA s contention that uppluani 
rcicictucs ate alwavs tavorable and lhcicU>ie 
wcic considered lc>s valuable lot pui poses ol ih 
investigation. Gav testified that in each s.>h>c 
qucnt investigation ot a potential dealer. BM\S 
NA tiuntshcd bun with a vt>p\ ni the appluatn.;. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that 
the Potamkins would not have posed the 
"free rider" problem. Robert Potamkin as-
serts that he had been willing to conform 
to any service and facilities requirements 
that BMW NA demanded. Robert insists 
that he was willing to meet any BMW 
requirement, "if I could get somebody in 
authority to talk to me." A1974; 1977. 
Despite BMW NA's claims that Robert evi-
denced an uncooperative attitude, an inter-
nal BMW NA document acknowledged that 
Robert had promised to meet all required 
BMW standards. See A1998-99.15 
and he checked positive as well as negative 
sources. 
Moreover, BMW NA's thorough investigation 
into the Potamkins' business practices appears 
pretextual given its lack of interest in similarly 
investigating other prospective and existing 
dealers. For example, although Gay was asked 
to investigate all consumer complaints against 
the Potamkins, a 1981 lawsuit brought by the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General against several 
Toyota dealerships, who. also owned BMW fran-
chises, attracted no attention from BMW NA. 
One BMW dealer who entered into an "assur-
ance of voluntary compliance" with the state 
Attorney General's Office testified that he did 
not receive an inquiry from BMW NA. A204O-
41. 
15. Another reason given by BMW NA pertained 
to alleged deficiencies in Robert's Philadelphia 
location. We note that these are no more exten-
sive than those attributed to other prospective 
and existing dealers, and a reasonable jury may 
find that rationale for BMW NA's decision to 
have been pretextual. For example, one BMW 
dealer, John Thompson, whose franchise acqui-
sition was conditioned upon relocation, re-
ceived numerous extensions over several years. 
A2034-4G. By contrast. BMW NA contends that 
the location oi Robert's proposed facility was 
undesirable, as had been Green's location, and 
that BMW NA had planned to move that dealer-
ship point north into the more affluent subur-
ban area where Sloanc BMW was eventually 
opened. Vet. in contrail to the negotiations 
with and repeated extensions given to Thomp-
son. BMW NA never informed Robert of this 
aliened deficieuc). Robert also opined that his 
piupuscd tacjli;>. luvuied at a busy crossroads 
ficquentcJ b> lesidcnt* of the northern sub-
urbs, would have been an appropriate one. 
Another dealer. Frank Ursomarso, conceded 
thai he tailed it* meet a requirement of separate 
t'iaiuhiM: tu^duie* but has reached a compro-
mise with BMW NA A2465. For example, in 
lopM-nyc lo> ii.-.c difuieric) of which Robert was 
mlvj; IUCJ L . i u t J cusiwiner service counter, he 
r.v,,i.o<J tv, h,.ilJ K.;;e lu suit BMW NA In 
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Additionally, only innuendo supports 
BMW NA's assumption that the Potamkins 
would have engaged in price advertising 
BMW*. In fact, one BMW NA "Inter-
Branch Memo" reported that "[Robert) 
stated .. . [he] has no intention of utilizing 
[price advertising] in [the Potamkin organi-
zation's] potential activity with the BMW 
franchise." A1989. Alan Potamkin also 
testified that each Potamkin franchise be-
longed to its corresponding Dealer Adver-
tising Group, A2444; one could presume 
that Robert and Alan would have adhered 
to that practice and joined the Philadelphia 
area BMW NA DAG and its collective ad 
vertising efforts. 
The record is equally clear that a number 
of BMW dealers did engage in price adver-
tising on occasion. See, e.g. the testimony 
of BMW dealers: Green, A399; Hoffman. 
A409-10; Lustgarten, A500; Hill, A327-31. 
Although these dealers were ''counseled" 
by District Manager Martin Focht and oth-
er BMW NA representatives, A327-31; 
A2210-12, sometimes at the behest of com-
peting area dealers, price advertising re-
mained an occasional practice. A327-31. 
Significantly, BMW NA ultimately granted 
a franchise to one dealer who displayed the 
same price advertising practices associated 
with the Potamkins.16 
We do not mean to suggest that BMW 
NA had a responsibility even to consider 
the applications of the Potamkins. Clearly, 
as long as it acted independently, BMW 
NA could escape antitrust liability for its 
conduct But the Potamkins have provided 
sufficient evidence of concerted action, and 
have raised genuine issues of material fact, 
which call into question BMW NA's state-
ment of reasons for rejecting the Potam-
kins. There is no evidence that the Potam-
kins' service and facilities would not have 
equalled those of other qualified dealers 
contrast, BMW NA's District Parts Manager 
John Graynor indicated to Robert and his parts 
manager that BMW required an exclusive BMW 
parts manager and counted their disagreement 
as a deficiency; yet Robert was never informed 
that many BMW dealerships satisfied that re-
quirement by assigning one assistant parts man-
ager exclusively to the BMW franchise. A1916-
18. 
and applicants, sre supra, notes 14-15; 
however, and there is sufficient indication 
that the alleged concerted action between 
BMW NA and its dealers may have dimin-
:  tehed retail competition without a corre-
z sponding benefit to consumers. Moreover, 
i  like the manufacturer's reversal of opinion 
f in Arnold Pontine. BMW NA's conduct is 
0 inconsistent with all of the evidence that 
BMW NA's Eastern Regional Manager 
Cronin negotiated with Victor Potamkin in 
? good faith, and even after Victor allegedly 
1 tried to bribe Cronin, Cronin allegedly en-
* couraged Robert to buy Green's Philadel-
phia franchise. If proven at trial, the fact 
that the Philadelphia area dealers, like the 
r New York area dealers, were familiar with 
the Potamkins* success as high volume 
price discounters and feared that kind of 
competition, would make sense of BMW 
NA's reversal of opinion with respect to 
the Potamkins. 
;
 B. 
Another of BMW NA's reasons for re-
jecting Robert Potamkin's application for 
[ the Philadelphia franchise was his alleged 
» challenge to the number of cars he would 
I be allotted annually. When BMW NA field 
personnel took his application in late Octo-
ber of 1985, Robert qualified his signature 
on the "New Dealer Information and Re-
quirements" form, with the typed notation: 
"I do not accept Irvin Green's SPG (plan-
ning guide). It is unreasonable." A120T. 
This notation became one of the primary 
reasons cited for BMW NA's rejection of 
Robert's application. 
While the precise definition of the SPG 
remains in dispute, the parties agree that a 
dealer's SPG serves as a guide to the num-
ber of BMW automobiles allotted to it an-
nually. A dealer's SPG is derived from 
16. Although BMW NA rejected BMW dealer 
Robert Ciasulli's initial application for a fran-
chise in a 1981 proposed buy-sell agreement, 
citing a "perceived lack of commitment to cus-
tomer satisfaction," A2214, and again in 1986, 
citing concerns nearly identical to those in-
voked when rejecting Robert's application, 
A2229-30, the record indicates that Ciasulli sub-
sequently received the Mack BMW franchise in 
Toms River, New Jersey. A2377; 2307-03. 
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both the number of cars available from the 
German manufacturer and BMW NA's as-
sessment of the sales requirements and 
service capacities of each dealership. 
BMW NA has been imprecise in defining 
the SPG throughout this litigation, * * • 
[one clause and one sentence deleted]. 
In October of 1985, before Robert Potam-
kin made the notation, Robert Casella, 
BMW NA's Regional Business Develop-
ment Manager, informed Robert that 
Green's dealership carried with it an SPG 
of 94. A171-72; A1999. Despite Casella's 
view that the SPG serves merely as a guide 
or a forecast, (in his words, "I 'm not aware 
that it has [limited allocations] but it 
could," A1803-O4), he did not convey that 
to Robert. A171-72; A1999. The BMW 
NA representatives who subsequently eval-
uated Robert's proposed facility were un-
qualified to negotiate the SPG and also 
declined to explain it. A632. Robert ex-
plained that he refused to sign without 
reservation, and thereby to obligate him-
self to, a form that indicated an annual cap 
of 94 BMWs, before he could speak to 
someone in authority at BMW NA. He 
testified that he signed the form with the 
notation so as to comply as fully as possi-
ble with BMW NA requirements, but he did 
not want to be bound by a figure that he 
felt had been neither adequately explained 
nor justified. A910-12. His notation was 
received as evidencing an uncooperative at-
titude, yet it is undisputed that no one from 
BMW NA inquired of Robert, concerning 
his notation. A869-70. 
BMW NA has explained, however, that 
the SPG of 94 conformed with corporate 
policy According to Phil Capo^eHa, Mid-
Atlantic Regional Manager in 1985, when a 
dealer acquires a dealership through a buy-
sell agreement, lie inherit* the i>ame SPG 
as the seller. A l i i , see A IT 1-74, A495 
The SPG lb thus neutral ami &enej> neither 
to inflate or deflate the price uf the dealer-
ship during the transaction A new dealer 
may, however, anticipate an increased SPG 
after, for example, demonstrating an abili-
ty to accvunnuulale a higher "rate ui lra\ 
el" (actual sales). AlJ>-iW. A41HMM, or ex-
panding or enhancing u* Lciln> A3,iT-.^ 
Nonetheless, there is substantial , evi-
dence which shows that the SPG did not 
limit actual allocations of cars. Green's 
eventual successor, Sloane BMW, while 
nominally bound by an SPG of 94, A1898, 
actually obtained approximately 400 BMWs 
a year. A1830. An internal BMW NA 
memorandum suggests that the decision to 
hold Sloane BMW to a nominal SPG of 94 
was motivated by this litigation. A1898. 
In fact, District Manager Focht praised 
Sloane for selling more than 101 BMWs 
during its first three months of operation. 
A2305. BMW dealer Sloane's experience is 
consistent with that of another BMW deal-
ership manager, Michael Vadasz, that his 
SPG never limited the number of cars he 
would be able to sell, A793; see, e.g., 
A1887-88 (Focht), and of dealer Andrew 
Hill of Devon Hill Motors. A2118-20. In 
fact, Hill believed that the SPG equals ap-
proximately one-half of a dealer's actual 
allotment. A2124. And BMW NA's Presi-
dent, Gunter Kramer indicated, the "actual 
allocation is also determined by rate of 
travel," unless that rate indicates price dis-
counting. A491. None of this was ex-
plained to Robert; he was simply told that 
his SPG would be 94 and no more. 
Moreover, Robert indicated that he had 
been willing to meet any BMW NA criteria, 
including renovations to his proposed facili-
ty, to meet standards required for a higher 
SPG, and had so informed Casella. A1708-
09; A1719; A1999. As evidence, Robert 
produced the cover letter submitted with 
his application to Casella, BMW NA's Mid-
Atlantic Region Business Development 
Manager. In relevant part, Robert wrote: 
On Tuesday I gave you a copy of plans 
for a facility in which we could put our 
BMW dealership As we discussed, facil-
ity size and car numbers go hand in 
hand That facility could be used exclu-
sively fur BMW m both saleb and service 
it v» e get enuugh cars to support it. If 
v. e get a smaller number of cars, we 
could use the bhouroom for both BMW 
and VW and the service department for 
BMW e\cUi3i\el>. We will consider both 
^mailer facilities ami larger facilities as 
the number ^i cars dictates 
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A1719. In contrast \n HMW NA * >K-»M 
of nnnrr>npcration, (%a«n1!a * O«A»> v','.rrv\l 
BMW NA memorandum refh-cU R/>N r» s 
willingness to me«*t any rr •jinp'f"^nt«» 
Al 998-99. 
C. 
Integral to BMW NA * theory of the 
case is its assertion that during the early 
1980s, BMW NA was initiating a dealer 
"upgrade'* program Thi* invohed target-
ing items for improvement, gradually im-
proving deficient aspects of existing deafer-
ships, and requiring improved standard* of 
prospective franchise applicants RMW 
NA also faults Robert for planning to place 
his BMW dealership in an "automaH" adja-
cent to Robert's other dealership* * * * 
[one sentence deleted]. 
The Potamkins proffer significant evi-
dence suggesting that this reason, as well, 
is pretextual. First, and most importantly, 
the Potamkins produced a letter addressed 
to Business Development Manager Casella, 
that Robert had expressed an interest in 
making his BMW facility exclusive if he 
received the number of cars necessary to 
make it profitable. A1719. Despite this 
invitation, Robert stated that he was not 
asked to make the dealership exclusive. 
See A1710-1L Second, many other BMW 
dealers operated multi-franchise dealer-
ships and, contrary to BMW NA's implica-
tion, BMW NA appeared unconcerned, and 
in some cases even unaware, of the addi-
tional franchises * * * [one sentence delet-
ed]. 
Finally, Casella opined that with an SPG 
of 94, Robert would be likely to "shuffle" 
his BMW franchise to less accommodating 
facilities, A194-95, tacitly acknowledging 
that with an SPG of 94 a BMW dealership 
would have been only marginally profit-
able. In addition to BMW NA's intent to 
hold Robert to a 94 SPG, as contrasted 
with the .treatment accorded other dealers, 
this decision makes little economic sense 
for BMW NA. Accordingly, BMW NA's 
President, Gunter Kramer, acknowledged 
BMW NA's emphasis on dealership profita-
bility. Cf. A480-81. 
FrrVU RMW N \ * alleged concern that 
Rnb^rt"* i|n i^r^hip \\ a* n«»t to he an exclu-
sive <»ne i> \v»>-\k»ned b\ th»> testimony of 
RMW M \ representative* that m 1985, the 
definition of an oxchmw*"' dealership had 
n,>r yit N*on clarified Prior to the arrival 
of Vice Pr»^nknt and Director of Opera-
tions Jack ling, an ' exclusive" dealership 
could con«i*t »»f a different building from, 
evpn if phv*»cr\llv attached to. other fran-
chises Over time. thi<? concept evolved to 
re-fjuir** that tho RMW franchise would 
stand alone entire!v In 1985, however, 
Robert's proposed RMW showroom and 
service area would have met the first defi-
nition of "exclusive." 
I). 
In summary, although BMW NA offers a 
wide variety of rensons for having rejected 
the Potamkins as RMW franchisees, it has 
failed to meet the standard of proof neces-1 
sary for summary judgment. The Potam-
kins have countered each alleged reason 
with evidence that both discredits BMW 
NA's witnesses and provides independent 
support for the Potamkins' claim that 
BMW NA and its dealer? acted in concert 
to repel any Potamkin competition in BMW 
sales. 
Because the Potamkins have adduced 
sufficient evidence to support their federal 
antitrust claim, we will vacate the order 
granting summary judgment on Count I 
and remand the case for further pretrial 
proceedings. As well, the judgment withj 
respect to Counts IV and V, dismissed pur-
suant to the disposition of Count I, will be 
vacated and remanded. 
V. 
[13] In Count III, the Potamkins also" 
claim that BMW NA tortiously interfered 
with their contract and prospective contract 
tual advantage to purchase the Green and 
Trans-Atlantic dealerships, respectively; 
The district court granted BMW NA surn^ 
mary judgment on this claim as well, con-' 
eluding that the Potamkins lacked an en-* 
forceable contract in either case absent" 
BMW NA's approval and that BMW NAt 
was privileged not to offer its approval/ 
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A. 
The parties apparently agree that sec-
tions 766 and 766B of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, adopted by both New 
York and Pennsylvania, govern.17 Guard-
Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg 
Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 
631, 406 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1980); Adler, 
Barish, Daniels, Leinn and Creskoff v. 
Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175, 1183-
1184 (1978); see Thompson Coal Co. v. 
Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466, 
471 (1979). 
With respect to the Green agreement, we 
look to section 766, entitled, Intentional 
Interference with Performance of Contract 
by Third Person, which provides: 
One who intentionally and improperly in-
terferes with the performance of a con-
tract . . . between another and a third 
person by inducing or otherwise causing 
the third person not to perform the con-
tract, is subject to liability to the other 
for the pecuniary loss resulting to the 
other from the failure of the third person 
to perform the contract. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766 
(1979). Factors delineating the contours of 
"improper" conduct are set forth in section 
767,** and include the nature of the actor's 
conduct and intent. 
As articulated by the Pennsylvania Su 
preme Court, proper conduct may be de 
scribed as "socially acceptable conduct" 
that comport* with the "'rule* of the 
game' which &ociet> ha* adopted." Adler, 
Ban±h, 4b2 Pa at 433, 393 A 2d at llb4 
17. The p a i n t s have not addressed ihe ques t ion 
of whoue of luu It r e m a i n s t rue thai if Ntv. 
\ o i k lavt g o v u n * the Ti an*-Mlan lu . UKidi.nl 
(prospcvUVL c vuili av. tual advan tage ) AI\\\ iYiiK 
s>lvania law ^ i \ a i h l lu (" l inn a ^ u u i . t n i Uui i 
t r a a u a l iclatu>u*hip) l l u n tht. Ki.>iu(ui»cnt 
(Second) of I\>»i> as adop ted b \ c a J i jwn>Jtc 
l l o i l Vsv»uid u p p l v U t U l l l [ M » M . t . J i>.. I I . a l 
avsuniphuii 
\N C 1U»U t l w U i \ U t h a t tl I ' l l . t l s V l * * . . J l u . s 
U C U U> v X l l l l c l l h t p i t ' t p i w l l V k i u i , l [ j . l u a l a J 
V J I l U ^ i i l a t i n | ' l o ( H I f u t ' U I W . s h i e l d Lx m a d e 
lo k v i K i n 7f\& ul I t»c k t i i a U j, .e :.l i l i i > i » ^l 
T m l s \tl\ir \ iUndtl ^ 4 I CJ ^ a C<*i i»2 
( \d III ) i i M Mt.icJ 4 v c [ S V2? 11U b l i 
2coo u o i i d :d M I ti*>A>> 
18 ih . IIU I U J L 
Because only an agreement in principle 
had been reached during the Trans-Atlan-
tic negotiations, section 766B, Intentional 
Interference with Prospective Contractual 
Relation, governs that claim: 
One who intentionally and improperly;in-
terferes with another's prospective con-
tractual relation (except a contract to 
marry) is subject to liability to the other 
for the pecuniary harm resulting from 
loss of the benefits of the relation, 
whether the interference consists of 
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a 
third person not to enter into or continue 
the prospective relation or 
(b) preventing the other from acquir-
ing or continuing the prospective rela-
tion 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B 
(1979) Having set forth the applicable le-
gal principles, we turn to the parties' con-
tentions. 
B. 
With respect to the Green agreement, 
BMW NA urges that absent a valid, en-
forceable contract, the Potamkins would 
not have a claim for tortious interference. 
Likewise, BMW NA claims that a higher 
standard u> required for a prospective con-
tractual advantage, and that, concerning 
Trans-Atlantic, it has also not been met. 
To the contrary, the Potamkins contend 
that if we reverse the antitrust claim in 
their favor, the> have, a fortiori, presented 
material factual issues on the question of 
IM d e t e r m i n i n g w h i t h e r an ac tor ' s conduc t in 
i i tUii i iunal l) i n t u f c n n g with a con t rac t or a 
[»u»>|A.viiu c o a t i a ^ i u a l i c l a t i on of ano the r is 
HI p rope r or nut t-onsidci ut ion is given lo the 
l\ »Ui.«. u.g ta^tuf* 
ia) ihe nat iwe or the ac tor ' s conduc t , 
lb) i h i actor s mot ive . 
iwi an. m u t e s t ut the o the r with which the 
a . . . s madviv.t interfere*. 
U i if.L i n u c o t sought to be advanced by 
thw a , (u , 
(et the social in te ics l s in p ro tec t ing the 
(<wwUo.» yjt awituu of the a^tor and the con-
.tavix.ut t..(e;e>i> of the o the r , 
ir > the prour t i i iv or r e m o t e n e s s of the ac-
K^{ s vot»J»Kt to the in t e r f e rence and the rela-
te....» u u u c i t the ^ i t m 
K . ^ - t i ^ o .d; i,f T u n s . § 767 (1979) 
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whether BMW NA'« int»^rf»r^j>r» -i.ivw,.,*,*, ,i 
to actionable "imprnpnr mnd'K! 
Although variously r»iu» )K"1 a<= ^ ' priM 
lege to intprfr»re. or in'^rf'T^nro n#>* *»T» 
proper." the Re*tat*»m»'nt pr'>v»d"« »hv 
"[t]he issue in earn rnc*» i* wh^ ' lv r th»» 
interference is improper nr not upd^r t^ *» 
circumstances /* § 7^7. comment b 
Further, "[aj determination of propriety re 
quires inquiry into the 'mental and mora! 
character of the defendant"* rnndurt ' 
Brownsville Golden Age Xnr^ng Ffmnr 
Inc. v. Wells. 839 F.2d l.r>:>. \W M Cir 
1988) 
Some stated examples of improper a m 
duct are particularly germane In one. 
"conduct that is in violation of antitrust 
provisions or is in restraint of t r ade" may 
constitute improper interference Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, § 767 comment on 
clause (a). Economic pressure, such as 
that allegedly applied to Can field when 
BMW NA bought Trans-Atlantic at a sig-
nificantly lower price than the Potamkins 
had offered while suggesting that she had 
nothing to sell wiihout its approval, may 
constitute unprivileged, improper interfer-
ence. BMW NA's allegedly disingenuous 
delay in taking Robert's application for the 
Green franchise, if found by the jury to 
have violated the Pennsylvania Board of 
Vehicle Act and to have been sufficiently 
intentional, could also constitute improper 
interference. Because the factual under-
pinnings of these tort claims are inter-
twined with the antitrust claims, we will 
vacate the district court's judgment with 
respect to them and remand them as well. 
VI. 
[141 In its cross-appeal, BMW NA chal-
lenges the district court's denial of sum-
mary judgment on Count II, alleging a 
violation of the Pennsylvania Board of Ve-
hicles Act, 63 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 818.1, et seq. 
Although BMW NA presented a multifacet-
ed attack on this claim in its motion before 
the district court, on appeal it has confined 
its challenge to the single question certified 
by the district court: "Does a prospective 
purchaser of an automobile dealership have 
standing to pursue a claim under the Penn-
ed-, v m H ' ^^ j ,»f Vf ine)* '* Vet against 
^ fn r t« h,(»»»r wh«» w i thho ld* its consent to 
rhi» t n ' ^ f ' T " f 1 f ran i ' ln^e" " (citations 
n»iW>'«h HIP Vet prmule* for liability 
wher^ a fr\nrhi««*r ha** acted so as to: 
Hi rnr^a^onrxMy withhold consent to 
t>v» «a|p tr\n*for or exchange of the 
fmnrhi** to a qualified buyer capable of 
being hc*m^d a^ a new vehicle dealer in 
t h i * Commonwealth {. or) 
Ml Fail In re*p<uid m writing to a re-
qu<»«t for a m ^ n * n<? specified in para-
graph I'M within f>0 r|n\ s nf receipt of a 
written request Such failure shall 
be deemed tn be refusal to consent to the 
request 
M Pa Stat Ann $ ^18 9<bX,*) and (4). Sec-
tion 20 provides for civil actions: 
Notwithstanding the terms . . . of any 
agreement . [1) any person who is or 
may be injured by a violation of a provi-
sion of thi* act or (n) any party to a 
franchise who i* so injured in his busi-
ness or property by a violation of a provi-
sion of this act relating to that franchise 
or [iii] any person so injured because he 
refused to accede to a proposal for an 
arrangement which, if consummated, 
would be in violation of this act, may 
bring an action for damages and equita-
ble relief, including injunctive relief, in 
any court of competent jurisdiction. 
63 PaStat .Ann. § 818.20(a) (bracketed 
numbers added for purpose of explanation). 
Since this count raises an issue of Penn-
sylvania law, our duty is to predict how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide 
this issue Robertson v. Allied Signal* 
Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 1990); see 
Coynmissioner v. Estate of Bosck, 387 U.S. 
456, 464-65, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782-83, 18 
L.Ed.2d 886 (1967). We must make this 
prediction without the benefit of substan-
tive legislative history or Pennsylvania 
caselaw concerning this standing provision 
of the Board of Vehicles Act. Lacking 
direct guidance on the interpretation of this 
Act, we turn to the general instructions of 
Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act 
of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq. (Pur-
don's Supp 1991). The Statutory Construc-
tion Act provides that we should construe 
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the Act "to give effect to all its provi-
sions," and further provides that "when 
the words of a statute are clear and free 
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to 
be disregarded under the pretext of pursu-
ing its sp i r i t " 1 Pa C S.A. § 1921(a), (b) 
(Purdon's Supp.1991). 
Given this guidance from the Pennsylva-
nia legislature, we conclude that the clause 
providing that "any person who is or may 
be injured by a violation of a provision of 
this Act . . may bring an action . " plain-
ly confers standing upon the Potamkins 
BMW NA contends that the Act protects 
only franchisees' economic interests by lev-
eling the playing field between franchisees 
and manufacturers, and therefore does not 
impose on manufacturers any duty to pro-
spective franchisees. While this contention 
has some appeal, we reject it because it is 
inconsistent with the plain language of sec-
tion 818 20. Second, BMW NA contends 
that the standing conveyed to "any person 
who is or may be injured . " by section 
818.20(a), must be read narrowly so as to 
avert rendering unnecessary the standing 
conveyed in the following clauses In oth-
er words, if "any person who is or may be 
injured" were broadly construed to encom 
pass the Potamkins, the following clauses 
would not enlarge the class of litigants 
BMW appears to suggest that "any person 
who is or may be injured" refers to \iola 
tions of the statute other than those relat 
tng to regulation of franchises 
The Act doe* not support BMW NA'* 
position, however, and BMW NA ha* not 
cited an> binding or even persuasive casts 
In none of the cases BMW NA cites did the 
courts construe a statute similarly broad in 
granting standing to "any person " At 
least with respect to the standing provision 
in clauses one and three BMW NA s con 
cern that the first makes the remaining 
clauses superfluous is misplaced The cun 
cern of the first clause is mjurv caused b> 
violation The concern of the third provid 
tng standing to "anv, person so injured In. 
cause he refused to accede to a proposal 
for an arrangement which if consummat 
ed, w o u l d he a v i o l a t i o n of th i s act is 
injur) c a u s e d l»v r t ! u > a l to p a i l k i p u U in a 
violation; no actual violation need occur. 
Even if the first clause covered every con-
ceivable violation, some additional persons 
could sue under the third clause. 
BMW NA also asserts a policy argu-
ment, predicting that if the court opens the 
door to prospective franchisees, manufac-
turers will be afraid to deny applications, 
even reasonably, for fear of litigation. 
Where manufacturers have acted reason-
ably, however, they have not only the de-
fense of reasonableness, but in litigation 
brought in the federal courts, the protec-
tion of Rule 11 as well. Moreover, the fear 
of litigation is not alien to car manufactur-
ers nor limited exclusively to them; they 
are subject to all kinds of liabilities—prod-
uct, negligence, and, even under this stat-
ute, liability to franchisees. These are sub-
sumed in the cost of doing business and 
from society's viewpoint have favorable as-
pects which outweigh the negative ones. 
In sum, we will not diverge from the 
plain language of the Pennsylvania Board 
of Vehicles Act's standing provision, espe-
cially where we cannot find support in leg-
islative history or caselaw for doing so. 
VII. 
We u ill therefore vacate the grant of 
summary judgment on Count I, vacate the 
dismissal of Counts III, IV and V, and 
affirm the district court 's order with re-
spect to Count II, remanding all counts for 
further proceedings 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring and 
dissenting 
I join part VI of the majority's opinion 
and judgment which affirms the denial of 
summary judgment on the Potamkins' 
claim under the Pennsylvania Board of Ve-
hicles Act Flow ever, I respectfull) dissent 
Iroin the majont) 's disposition of the Po-
tumkiii:/ antitrust and tortious interference 
*ith contract claims In regard to the 
antitrust claim I conclude that the plain 
tiffs have not met their burden of produc-
ing tuaci.ee which tends to show that the 
vlisinhat^r BMW NA, had entered into a 
miopiracv with its dealers to bo) to t t the 
1 . tun Kiio Mure s ign i t i ca i . t l ) , 1 find t ha t 
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plaintiffs have not met their burden of 
producing evidence that tends to exclude 
the possibility that BMW NA wa« acting 
independently of it^ dealers when it reject-
ed the Potamkin dealerships Mnnsanfn 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Cnrp, lfi5 tr S 
752, 768, 101 S.Ct. MR I. 1173, 79 L F d 2d 
775 (1984). There is no evidence of a "con-
scious commitment to a common scheme 
designed to achieve an unlawful objective " 
Id.; Edward J. Sieerncy & Sons. Inr r 
Texaeo, 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d 0 .19*0) , 
cert denied, 451 U.S. 911, 101 S f t . 1981. 
68 L.Ed.2d 300 (1981). I would, therefore, 
affirm the summary judgment entered 
against the Potamkins on their Sherman 
Act § 1 claim. Because the basis for the 
tortious interference with contract claim is 
so closely interwoven with the antitrust 
claim, I further conclude that it must fail 
with the failure of the antitrust claim. I 
would, therefore, affirm the grant of sum-
mary judgment on that claim as well. 
Turning first to the antitrust claim, I 
believe the majority has misread our stan-
dard for summary judgment when it allows 
the ' Potamkins' antitrust claim to go for-
ward. As the majority acknowledges, an 
antitrust plaintiff must be prepared to dem-
onstrate a causal relationship between al-
leged dealer complaints and a distributor's 
action in order to distinguish concerted ac-
tion in violation of the Sherman Act from 
"perfectly legitimate" independent conduct. 
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64, 104 S.Ct. at 
1470-71. However, the present case dif-
fers from situations such as that in Arnold 
Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors 
Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.1986), where we 
were able to find such a linkage. In Ar-
nold Pontiac, there was direct evidence of 
concerted action which was coupled with 
circumstantial evidence that GMC had 
planned to grant Arnold Pontiac-GMC a 
Buick franchise but changed its mind after 
a meeting between its representative and 
the local dealers. We found that the com-
bination of direct and circumstantial evi-
dence raised a genuine issue as to whether 
the Buick dealers had conspired to thwart 
competition at the dealership level. For 
this r ea^m. we reversed the grant of sum-
mary judgment and remanded the case for 
trial 
Our careful review of the record here 
shows no direct evidence of a conspiracy 
that allegedly caused the Potamkins their 
injury. We are left to infer from only 
circumstantial evidence whether there was 
concerted action. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 
m , 10H S.Ct. 1348. 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 
(1986). As I relate below, I find that BMW 
KA's conduct is as consistent with permis-
sible unilateral conduct as it is with illegal 
conspiracy, and therefore, following Mat-
sushita, I find that the evidence is not 
adequate to support the alleged antitrust 
conspiracy. 
The evidence here suggests at most that. 
at different times New York area and Phil-
adelphia area dealers may have complained 
to BMW NA about awarding dealerships to 
the Potamkins. Yet, in Monsanto, 465 
U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct. a t 1470, the Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that a jury could 
infer the existence of a price-fixing agree-
ment from the complaints of other distribu-
tors or "from the fact that termination 
came about 'in response to' complaints" 
from other distributors. The Court re-
quired something more of section 1 plain-
tiffs: Evidence that "tends to exclude the 
possibility that the manufacturer and non-
terminated distributors were acting inde-
pendently/ ' Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764, 
104 S.Ct at 1471; Fragale & Sons Bever-
age Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 473 (3d Or. 
1985). 
The Court explained that a plaintiff does 
not establish an illegal price-fixing agree-
ment solely by proof of complaints by com-1 
petitors of the prospective dealer. Com-
plaints about discounters 1 "are natural— 
and from the manufacturer's perspective, 
unavoidable—reactions by distributors to 
the activities of their rivals." Monsanto,. 
465 U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct at 1470. ' A 
distributor's decision not to deal may re-
I. The Potamkins had been long recognized for 
selling high volumes of automobiles at discount 
prices. 
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fleet a restraint which is primarily horizon-
tal in nature, in that dealers are trying to 
suppress competition by utilizing the power 
of a common supplier Nevertheless, so 
long as the distributor made an mdepen 
dent business decision not to do business 
with a dealer, the fact that the distributor 
was aware of the dealers' complaints is of 
no moment Id at 763-764, 104 S Ct at 
1470-71 
In looking at all of the evidence which 
the Potamkms present, I understand we 
cannot compartmentalize the various factu 
al components However, neither can we 
read between the lines to infer linkage 
where there is none When drawing infer 
ences, we may draw only reasonable infer 
ences from sufficient evidence For the 
reasons which follow, I conclude that the 
Potamkins have not presented the quantum 
of evidence necessary to permit their case 
to go to the jury In reaching this conclu 
sion, I heed the Monsanto Court's warning 
that allowing finders of fact to infer con 
spiracies from extremely equivocal evi 
dence may deter pro competitive conduct 
If an inference of such an agreement 
may be drawn from highly ambiguous 
evidence, there is a considerable danger 
that the doctrines enunciated in Sylva 
ma and Colgate will be seriously eroded 
Id. at 763, 106 S Ct at 1470 
Evaluating the evidence in the present 
case in the light most favorable to the 
Potamkins, I conclude that a jury could not 
find a violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
\ct without relying on speculation or con 
(ecture, a result we have cautioned against 
Edward J Sueeney, 637 F 2d at 116 
When examined closely the Potamkins' 
evidence lb slender With regard to the 
illeged 1981 conspiracy, the Potamkins* 
)resent the Gray affidavit along v»ith the 
tatement of Robert Potamkm to support 
in inference of concerted action AJ> the 
najonty notes, the Gray atfidavit contains* 
10 evidence that BMW NA considered the 
lealers alleged demands* or acted in re 
ponse to those demands Ne\ertheless> 
» The affidavit suggests that sonic dealers had 
complained to Cronin prior to the meeting and 
that others eomplamed fallowing the meeting 
the majority reads the affidavit to support 
an inference that BMW NA knuckled under 
to dealer pressure Taking the affidavit 
together with the other evidence the Po-
tamkins present, I cannot draw such an 
inference Gray's testimony relates only 
Gray's own belief that BMW NA's decision 
to deny the Potamkins the Great Neck 
open point came as a result of the New 
York area BMW dealers' objections The 
affidavit neither mentions whether a BMW 
NA employee participated in the meeting at 
which dealers discussed complaining to 
BMW NA nor supports an inference that 
the dealers had formed an agreement to 
pressure BMW NA or its Eastern Regional 
Manager, Terry Cronin 2 The affidavit re-
lates only that dealers at the meeting op-
posed BMW NA's granting the Potamkins 
a franchise, a sentiment which is not sur 
prising from dealers who would face new 
competition if the franchise were granted 
Even if a representative of BMW NA 
were present at the dealer advertising 
group meeting, such contact between a dis-
tributor and its dealers, while evidence of 
an opportunity to conspire, does not 
amount to a conspiracy Our case law 
suggests such meetings have important 
business purposes, they provide the dis-
tributor or manufacturer with important 
information which can be used to change 
product mix or advertising direction Dis-
tributors and dealers must speak "to as-
sure that their product will reach the con-
sumer persuasively and efficiently " Mon-
santo, supra, 465 U S at 763-64, 104 S Ct 
at 1470 
As further evidence of concerted action 
by New York area dealers, Robert Potam 
kin offers his own statement that in late 
1985, Gene Hoffman a BMW dealer m 
Bloomfield New Jersey told him that 
BMW N \ s decision to deny the Potamkins 
the Great Neck franchise "was due to the 
fact that other Long Island BMW dealers 
feared the price competition that a Potam 
km BMW franchise would bring to the 
Ixmg Island market ' I do not find that 
There is nothing to suggest a meeting or the 
minds followed by concerted action 
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this evidence enhances the Potamkm*' cm 
spiracy claim Again, all bu^me^e* fear 
competition, particularly fmm a ncu mm 
petitor who will compete on price Mnre-
over, I do not read Robert Potamkm s affi-
davit to suggest that Hoffman told him 
that BMW NA consented to an agreement 
with its Long Island dealers to exclude the 
Potamkins.3 Robert Potamkin's affidavit, 
even when considered with the Gray affida-
vit, does not present evidence which tends 
to exclude the possibility that BMW N'A 
acted unilaterally to keep the Potamkins 
out of Long Island. 
* * * [one sentence deleted} * However, 
even if BMW NA did contact existing deal-
ers, a conclusion refuted by the testimony 
of Cronin and Hoffman among other*, such 
evidence, when taken together with the 
Gray and Robert Potamkin affidavits, still 
does not raise an inference of concerted 
action between BMW NA and its New 
York area dealers to deny the Potamkins a 
franchise. At a minimum, "the circum-
stances [must be] such as to warrant a jury 
in finding that the conspirators had a unity 
of purpose or a common design or under-
standing, or a meeting of the minds in an 
unlawful arrangement." American Tobac-
co Co. v. United States, 328 U S. 781, 810, 
66 S.Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946). 
BMW NA's own decision to contact its 
dealers would not meet the Potamkins' bur-
den of having to show that BMW and the 
dealers had acted with a common design. 
Finally, it must be remembered that the 
1981 allegations are not part of the anti-
trust injury complained of here; the Po-
tamkins use those allegations to suggest a 
pattern of dealing that supports their claim 
of concerted action arising out of the 
events of 1985. 
With regard to those 1985 events sur-
rounding the Potamkins' inability to obtain 
a BMW franchise in Manhattan, the evi-
3. Because I am looking at this evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Potamkins, I will not 
consider the credibility of this affidavit or of 
Hoffman's responding affidavit, which denies 
Robert Potamkin's allegations. 
4. * * * [one sentence deleted] 
<\ni\cr which th»» Potamkin* present is very 
thin To «ugg»»<5t concerted action, the Po-
tamkm* nffVr <>nl\ Robert Potamkin's 
statement that Gene Hoffman had in-
formed him on May 30. 19^0, that a BMW 
NA repre«pntnti\e had visited Hoffman in 
the fall of 198.1 and had asked Hoffman's 
opinion about the proposed sale of Trans-
Atlantic tn the Potamkin* Based on this 
e\idence. the Potamkin* argue that dealer 
oppocition from 1981 was reactivated in 
1981 to dpfeat their aprpement in principle 
with Caufield for the Trans-Atlantic deal-
ership m Manhattan E\en if Hoffman had 
complained to a BMW NA representative— 
Hoffman denies that any representative of 
BMW ever visited him regarding the possi-
ble *ale of a dealership in Manhattan to the 
Potamkins—and even if a BMW NA repre-
sentative heard similar complaints from 
other dealers—there is no evidence sup-
porting this point in the record—complaints 
by competitors, standing alone, are not suf-
ficient to show a conspiracy.5 
As for other evidence of a 1985 New 
York conspiracy, the majority notes that 
BMW NA backed away from its strategy 
of creating a factory store and instead 
gave Martin BMW the exclusive Manhattan 
dealership. However, the factory store 
concept was not invented to cover up the 
conspiracy. The uncontroverted documen-
tary and deposition testimony suggests 
that BMW came up with the idea at least 
one year prior to the proposed sale of 
Trans-Atlantic. In short, I find the evi-
dence insufficient to deduce a conspiracy 
between BMW NA and its New York deal-
ers to deprive the Potamkins of a BMW 
dealership in Manhattan. 
Finally, the evidence that BMW NA con-
spired with its Philadelphia dealers to pre-
vent the Potamkins from purchasing the 
Green dealership is equally scant. It stems 
from one source: the statement of Bruce 
Braverman, a Potamkin employee, recount' 
5. I do not suggest that evidence of complaints 
has no probative value at all, but only that the 
burden remains on the antitrust plaintiff lo in-
troduce additional evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding of unlawful contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy Monsanto, 465 UJS. at 764 
n 8, 104 SCt. at 1471 n. 8. 
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ing what Donald Mitchell allegedly had told 
him. I do not agree with the majority's 
conclusion that the Braverman statement is 
admissible evidence. Nor can I conclude 
that the district court abused its discretion 
in excluding the Braverman statement. 
See, e,g., United States v. Ga?nbino, 926 
F.2d 1355, 1364 (3d Cir.1991). However, 
even if his statement were admissible, I 
find that it offers little evidence of the 
alleged conspiracy. 
The majority goes to grea t lengths to 
find Braverman's testimony admissible. 
Yet, I cannot agree with its reasoning for 
several reasons. First, I find that Braver-
man's statement of what Mitchell told him 
should not be admitted as an exception to 
the hearsay rule because Mitchell does not 
qualify as an agent of BMW NA acting 
within the scope of his agency and employ-
ment. Second, I find that Braverman's 
statement also falls short of the exception 
for the admission of hearsay statements by 
co-conspirators. Furthermore, even if the 
Braverman relation of the Mitchell state-
ment is admissible evidence of a conspira-
cy, it relates only to a conspiracy between 
BMW dealers, which is not the conspiracy 
charged in the complaint. The statement 
does not refer to BMW NA's role in any 
such scheme. 
The record suggests that Mitchell 
worked for BMW Credit f e n e r a t i o n * * * 
[remainder of sentence deleted]. in his 
work for BMW Credit, Mitchell had no 
contact with BMW NA and nothing to do 
with its decisions on dealer appointments. 
Therefore, I do not believe that Mitchell's 
statement to Braverman concerned a mat-
ter within the scope of his agency, such 
that Braverman's retelling should he ad-
missible under Rule 801(dM2>U>). 
in any event 1 ilu not find that BMW NA 
so dominates the activities uf BMW Credit 
that Mitchell could act as BMW NA's 
a^enl. The majority Inula this a close 
question I think the answer is clear 
* * • [four sentences dele lev)] 
Moreover, even if Mitchell could have 
spoken as BMW NA s agent, the adnusai 
bihty o( Hraw nnun's statement is cast into 
doubt l»y the multiple layers i»I hearsay 
contained within Mitchell's statement as 
Braverman relates it. As the majority indi-
cates, our case law allows secondary and 
tertiary levels of hearsay to come in if 
there is a basis for admitting the hearsay 
statement. See Fed.R.Evid. 805. . Braver-
man testified in his deposition that he re-, 
members Mitchell telling him that Don RQ: 
sen was the source of Mitchell's news that 
other Philadelphia area BMW dealers were 
going to do what they could to make cer-
tain the Potamkins did not get a franchise. 
However, I do not find that the out of court 
statements purportedly made by other deal-
ers to Rosen, who then repeated them to 
Mitchell, should be admissible in light of 
our concern for restricting declarations of 
unidentified persons. Even where we 
might infer who such persons may be, such 
supposition does not satisfy the heavy bur-
den on the proponent of the evidence to 
demonstrate its trustworthiness. See Car-
den v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d 
996, 1003 (3d Cir.1988). We do not know 
the identity of the other dealers who pre-
sumably spoke to Don Rosen, nor do we 
know whether it was Don Rosen himself or 
someone else at his dealership who spoke 
to Mitchell. I note that Mitchell indicated 
that he did not usually talk to dealership 
owners when he visited his accounts. 
Moreover, the nonhearsay evidence contra-
dicts Braverman's testimony. Mitchell de-
nies having made the statements attributed 
to him by Braverman, and Don Rosen de-
nies having told Mitchell that Philadelphia 
area BMW dealers had complained to BMW 
NA about the possibility that the Potam-
kins would become a dealer. 
i also conclude that the Mitchell "state-
meni" is not admissible under the co-con-
spirator exception, Rule 80i(d)<2)(E). I do 
not find, either within the statement or 
independent of the statement, any evidence 
<jf a conspiracy involving BMW NA and 
the Philadelphia area BMW dealers. Nor 
d^ 1 find that Mitchell held a position rela-
tive to BMW NA that could implicate BMW 
NA in such a conspiracy through Mitchell's 
UCtlo i ia 
lo r each of the above reasons, I believe 
the district court did not err in excluding 
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Braverman'a statempnt Hmmvrr. oso^ }' 
the trial court did abu«p it« disrrp*^ by 
ruling that the Braverman t*«!;'por*y WT; 
inadmissible, our consideration of \>>* «tn»p-
ment in connection with the motion F'»M 
would not preclurle nummary judgment f»r 
the defendants on the antitrust claim In 
the statement. Braverman a.«?ert? that 
Mitchell told him that tbp Philadelphia ar^a 
dealers did not want the Pntamkin? in have 
a franchise because they feared price com-
petition. Yet, at his deposition. Braverman 
responded in the negative to questions re-
garding whether he knew if Mitchell had 
spoken to anyone at BMW NA and whether 
Mitchell knew if the Philadelphia dealer? 
had spoken to anyone at BMW NA about 
the proposed sale. These negative answers 
suggest that Mitchell was relating nothing 
more than the grumbling he heard in his 
conversations at BMW dealerships. Brav-
erman's testimony provides no hint that 
BMW NA acted other than unilaterally 
when it chose not to approve the sale of the 
Green dealership to the Potamkins. Noth-
ing in what Braverman says Mitchell told 
him suggests that the dealers communicat-
ed demands to BMW NA or that BMW NA 
acquiesced in those demands or entered an 
agreement with the Philadelphia area deal-
ers to keep out the Potamkins.* 
I recognize, of course, that it is rare to 
find overt evidence of a conspiracy. I note 
as well that BMW NA may have been both 
slow and disingenuous in its handling of 
the Potamkins' application for the Philadel-
phia franchise. However, BMW NA's fail-
ure to consider the Potamkin's application 
in a prompt and scrupulous fashion does 
not constitute evidence of a conspiracy. 
, Beyond the evidentiary problems relating 
to concerted action, I believe the majority 
understates the four-year gap between the 
events .surrounding BMW NA's failure to 
award the Potamkins the Great Neck open 
point in 1981 and the failed attempts by the 
6* In addition, I note that, while the majority 
opinion focuses on the dealer interactions with 
BMW NA, it overlooks the paucity of evidence 
showing that the dealers had conspired together 
to form an anticompetitive scheme. 
p,»»An-t^nc tn i'»Jr-,'hi«.» rb'^l^r^hips in Man-
)»v».nn an.| Philadelphia in th»> fait of 1985. 
[ find ^»' *-n»»«a! n^u<* hotwpen the 1981 
neurone and *h* ovt»nt* «»f l^"» too attenuat-
<vf en <'ff«p^ rT thr rx!<jfrnr»» of the nileged 
mTiQp:ra«\v Th»*r** i« n»> evidentiary link 
?hn\wne that rhe alleged \9<[ agreement 
|,ptWPon NpW York area dealers and BMW 
\\a* reactivated tn keep the Potamkins out 
of Manhattan in 19S5. Even more appar-
ent is the lack of any evidence which sup-
ports even an inference that the purported 
conspiracy fmm 19S1 to deny the Potam-
kins the Great Neck open point could have 
been reactivated \n 1985 to deny them the 
Green dealership in Philadelphia. Previ-
ously, we have required of plaintiffs "proof 
of a causal relationship between competitor 
complaints" and the decision not to deal. 
Edward / Sweeney & Sons, 637 F.2d at 
111. Plaintiffs have failed to meet this 
same burden of proof here. 
Moreover, the relevant literature sug-
gests that the defendant had credible busi-
ness reasons for rejecting the Potamkins1 
dealership applications. BMW NA had an 
interest in protecting its reputation and the 
image it has attempted to develop as a high 
quality car distributor. In order to com-
pete with other brands in the market for 
luxury automobiles, BMW NA had ample 
reason to want to insure that its products 
were offered with certain point-of-sale ser; 
vices. BMW NA could have feared that 
the introduction of a dealer who "sells at 
the factory gate" would lead its other deal-
ers to lower the level of service they of-
fered in order to compete better with the 
price-cutter and prevent the price-cutter 
from free riding on the services they pro-
vided.7 Finally, BMW NA may have acted 
in a desire to protect the investments its 
dealers had made in their own franchises'. 
Had BMW NA's rejection of the Potam-
kins' applications lacked a sensible econom1 
ic justification, plaintiffs' allegations • of 
concerted action would be more compelling. 
7. A review of the depositions and exhibits 
makes clear that both BMW and its dealers had 
reason to fear a price cutting Potamkin fran-
chise. The Potamkins had built a huge retail 
business by selling cars in high volume at small 
markup over the prices paid to various manu-
facturers. 
Tab 18 
May 6, 1992 
Subject: Ogden, Utah 
Note to the File; 
On today's date, Tim Martin called from Ogden, Utah to say that he was 
in the Buick dealership and that Dave Koch the dealer had advised him 
that he would be closing the dealership today and not re-opening until 
Monday. 
Sheila Powell and I discussed the situation with Dave Koch. Dave 
advised that he would re-open the dealership on Monday with a skeleton 
crew- He also advised us that the service manager had gone to work for 
Rick Warner at the Mitsubishi dealership. 
Tim Martin advised us that a representative from 6MAC would be taking 
the keys for all the new cars with him and would keep us informed as to 
the situation and occurences at the dealership. 
I called Rick Warner after talking with Dave Koch to see if he was 
aware of what was going on. Rick was not aware that Dave Koch was 
closing the dealership but did say that he had received a phone call 
from Dave Koch but was away from the dealership and had not returned 
the call. However, he would call Dave Koch as soon as he and I 
finished talking. Rick Warner said that he would get back with me to 
let us know what we could expect from the Buick dealership. When asked 
about the remaining paperwork needed to complete his proposal package, 
Rick said that Dave Gibbs had everything. I have left two messages for 
Dave Gibbs this afternoon but he has not returned my calls. I will 
complete this note to file after hearing back from Dave Gibbs and Rick 
Warner. 
At 3:25PM on today, I received a call from Rick Warner and Dave Gibbs 
to verify that we would have the necessary paperwork to complete the 
proposal package on tomorrow by fax. Dave Gibbs asked how long the 
approval would take. I advised him that once everything was completed 
here and forwarded to Flint, that perhaps a week to a week and a half. 
Dave Gibbs said they should be able to work out something to keep the 
Buick dealership open for that amount of time. 
End of note to the file. 
D e f t . , ForkJer^iCaUo.i 
Costing cf ' . A Paoe(s)l 
000613 
r^nnnr-rko 
NOTE TO FILE: 
June 30, 1992 
J'M 
I called Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle, Ogden, Utah today at 4pm and got a 
recorded message Indicating that services had been temporarily 
disconnected. The number that I dialed was 801-394-1651. 
I called Henry Mixon's office at approximately 4:10pm and left a 
message for him to call me. 
d^4 
Vorn Woodley 
or hi  to c a l l e. W^fTAit+\ 
/ 
E X H I B I T ^ _ . _ 
D e f t . . Forwent. 
Consisting of L 
Witness 
D a t e _ 
n^ f I / 
A. L. ANDREfiil, C.S'H. NO. 4£0d 
000532 
Tab 19 
1 PREMISES? 
2 A YES, SIR. 
3 Q WHAT WAS SAID AND BY WHOM AT THAT MEETING? 
4 A WELL, IT WAS A LONG DISCUSSION. THEY WANTED 
5 TO MEET US, VISIT OUR FACILITY, LOOK THE FACILITY OVER. 
6 THERE WAS DISCUSSION THAT THEY HAD LOOKED THE TOWN OVER 
7 AND IN FACT KNEW WHERE THE POCKETS OF AUTO DEALERS WERE. 
8 THEY WERE VERY — 
9 Q WHICH IS WALL AVENUE AND RIVERDALE ROAD, IS 
10 THAT CORRECT? 
11 A YES, IT IS. 
12 AND THEY WERE FAIRLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THOSE 
13 TWO HIGH VISIBILITY AREAS AND THEY, IN FACT, SAT IN THIS 
14 OFFICE AND, ONCE AGAIN, WERE QUITE IMPRESSED WITH THIS 
15 FACILITY, IMPRESSED, AS THEY MENTIONED, WITH OUR ABILITY 
16 TO POTENTIALLY BECOME THE BUICK DEALER AND THE WORDS THAT 
17 CAME OUT OF MR. GAROVE'S MOUTH WERE THAT — LET ME 
18 PREFACE THOSE REMARKS BY WE DID DISCUSS A LITTLE BIT OF 
19 PROJECT 2000 WHILE THEY WERE IN THIS OFFICE. BUT WITH 
20 THAT DISCUSSION MR. GAROVE SAID, AND I QUOTE, "I DON'T 
21 WANT BUICK IN THAT MAZE OF FRANCHISES OUT ON RIVERDALE 
22 ROAD." THAT GAVE US A GOOD FEELING THAT THEY WERE 
23 INTERESTED IN US AND CERTAINLY GAVE US THE REASON TO 
24 CONTINUE TO DO THE WORK THAT WE WERE REQUIRED TO DO ON 
25 THE BUY-SELL OF DISMISSING THE — TRYING TO GET THE 
64 
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2 complete review of with respect to Project 2000. 
3 But there is a recommendation as to one of those 
4 documents which I will provide to you that does 
5 indicate preferred locations Riverdale Road for 
6 that Pontiac, Buick, GMC dealer. 
7 Q Do you recall making any statement in your 
8 visit to Mr. Watson and Mr. Bean that you did not want to 
9 go out into that maze on Riverdale Road or words to that 
10 effect with the Buick franchise? 
11 A I may have made a statement similar to that. 
12 Q What was the basis for that statement? 
13 A Well, if the place would have been based on 
14 the -- I assume I'd be referring to the Petersen 
15 operation which housed, at that time, Nissan, Honda, 
16 Pontiac and GMC Truck, I believe, give or take a few 
17 franchises. 
18 Q And you think that's what you had made 
19 reference to when you made that statement? 
20 A Correct. Once again, I don't recall it, but 
21 chances are it's a statement I may have made. 
22 MR. BEAN: Mark that for me, please. 
23 (Whereupon, at this time, the reporter~ 
24 marked the-above mentioned two-page handwritten 
25 document titled "Options I" as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
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A. It's one of the exhibits here (indicating). 
That was a telephone call to one of the exhibits here 
that I recalled. 
Q. Other than that, have you talked to 
Mr. Koch, to your knowledge? 
A. Not that I — not that I can recall, other 
than what's noted in the exhibits. 
Q. Do you maintain in your office, Mr. Woodley, 
a separate file on each of the Buick dealers in the 
zone? 
MR. STEPHENS: Does he personally? 
THE WITNESS: The zone office maintains it; I 
don't personally. 
MR. BEAN: Q. The zone office maintains it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have access to those files? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Are you aware, Mr. Woodley, of any other 
applications for a Buick sales and service agreement 
that had been rejected to implement Project 2000? 
A. And the time frame? I guess I'm — would 
you please characterize the time frame; excuse me. 
Q. Yes. Well, first of all, during the time 
that you served in the capacity as zone organization 
manager for the San Francisco zone. 
A. No, I'm not. I'm not aware of any. 
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Q. Are you aware of any since that time where 
Buick has rejected the application for a sales and 
service agreement and exercised its right of first 
refusal for the purpose of implementing Project 2000? 
A. I'm aware of — 
MR. STEPHENS: Go ahead, I'm sorry. 
THE WITNESS: I'm aware of one that's in process. 
MR. BEAN: Q. That's in process now? 
A . Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that within the San Francisco zone? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And where is that dealership located? 
MR. STEPHENS: I'm not so sure that -- let me 
talk to the witness on this. This could be 
confidential information. 
(Brief recess.) 
MR. STEPHENS: Back on the record. After talking 
with the witness, the process is not complete and the 
information is highly confidential and proprietary and 
I'll have to instruct the witness not to answer or 
identify the dealership. 
MR. BEAN: Q. Are you aware, Mr. Woodley, of any 
applications for sales and service agreement with 
Buick Motor Division that have been rejected and right 
of first refusal exercised to implement Project 2000 
anywhere else in any other zones in the United States? 
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A. No, I'm not aware of — 
Q. Have you had any conversations with Henry 
Mixon other than as set forth in the memorandums that 
are part of the exhibits to this deposition --
A. None that --
Q. -- that you can recall? 
A. None that I can recall. 
Q. Have you had any conversations with anyone 
representing Henry Mixon, an attorney or anyone else 
representing Henry Mixon, with regard to the sale of 
the assets of Helsco dba Sierra Buick or the 
application of any other party for that Buick point in 
Ogden? 
A. None that I can recall. 
Q. Do you know a person named Sally Pearsol? 
A. No, I do not. 
MR. STEPHENS: Who is she? Why do we care? 
Sally, Sally. 
MR. WATSON: We met her last night. No, I'm 
being facetious. 
MR. STEPHENS: What's David's obsession about 
Sally? 
MR. BEAN: Talk to John a minute. 
(Brief recess.) 
MR. BEAN: I'm through. That's all I have. 
MR. STEPHENS: Thank you. 
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